1 Wednesday, 15 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: I've temporarily forgotten and failed to mark which

8 paragraph I was at. My mistake. If I can find it.

9 JUDGE MAY: While counsel is looking for the paragraph, Mr. Tanic,

10 could you try and keep your answers as narrowly focused as possible.

11 You've got a lot of evidence to give and it's important that we hear it,

12 but our time is limited, and we'll get through it more quickly and you can

13 get away more quickly if you would just focus on the questions and answer

14 them. If counsel wants more information, he can always ask for it. If

15 you'd keep that in mind.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll do my best to respect those

17 guidelines.

18 MR. NICE: I think it was paragraph 53, was it? I may be wrong

19 about that.

20 JUDGE MAY: Judge Kwon reminds me the private chain of command was

21 the last topic.

22 MR. NICE: I'm grateful. It was paragraph 54 and indeed I now

23 have found the mark I've left myself. Thank you very much.

24 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]

25 [Witness answered through interpreter]

1 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

2 Q. Mr. Tanic, you were telling us yesterday of the fact-finding

3 mission and of the recommendations that it was able to make. Were those

4 recommendations - yes or no - acted on by the accused?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did he ever pronounce the KLA to be a terrorist organisation?

7 A. Not in the legal framework, but just as a political accusation.

8 But not within the law as provided for by the constitution.

9 Q. Yes/no will do to this answer: Did he ever proclaim a state of

10 emergency in Kosovo which would have allowed for official action against

11 terrorists?

12 A. Not in keeping with the law.

13 Q. Just yes or no to this, and I mean just yes or no: Following the

14 recommendations of the fact-finding group, were you aware of the accused

15 laying blame for what was happening in Kosovo elsewhere? Just yes or no.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. From whom did you hear this account of blame, if not from the

18 accused himself? From whom did you hear it?

19 A. From the leadership of the State Security Service and from

20 political structures with whom we had a regular exchange of information,

21 both in parliament and in the government of Serbia.

22 Q. And in a sentence, what was now being said by the leadership as to

23 who bore responsibility for the problems in Kosovo?

24 A. Well, it turned out at the end that the responsibility for the

25 problems in Kosovo was to be borne by a group of unresponsible --

1 irresponsible policemen, and the Security Service and the army that were

2 covering up the facts and did not wish to act against the terrorists.

3 Those were the rumours and story bandied about within the circle, inner

4 circles of Yugoslav and Serbian parent authority.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me a minute. Mr. Tanic, you just mentioned

7 that the action against the KLA was not done in legal framework. Is it

8 right?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE KWON: Could you clarify more about the legal framework?

11 Does it mean that the actions taken in the Kosovo area was kind of

12 unofficial one?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't say they were

14 unofficial. All I can say is that they were illegal with respect to our

15 constitution and legal frameworks, at least as far as I am aware of them,

16 and as I was able to check up in consultations. So an extraordinary state

17 of affairs or an emergency situation is proclaimed by the Assembly of

18 Yugoslavia. That is provided for by the constitution. It is the Assembly

19 that decides on war and peace. And to proclaim a group terrorist, you

20 have to follow a procedure that is much stricter than a political

21 qualification by saying that somebody is a terrorist or is not. So the

22 actions were official, but they weren't in conformity and dovetailed to

23 the constitution and the legal provisions of the country.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. There's one event that occurred rather later, on which you draw a

2 particular inference. It's paragraph 55. And I want you to deal with

3 this very shortly. Was there, on the 23rd of March of 1999, a session of

4 the Republic of the Serbian Assembly which was televised, in the course of

5 which Mr. Milutinovic made an observation? If yes, just tell us about the

6 observation and, in one sentence, its significance.

7 A. Yes. At the Serbian Assembly meeting held on the 23rd of March,

8 1999, first of all there was a completely illegal discussion as to whether

9 Yugoslavia would enter into a war with the NATO pact or not, and that does

10 not come under the competencies of the Assembly of Serbia but the Assembly

11 of Yugoslavia.

12 Q. Mr. Tanic, we're going to get on better if you remember what His

13 Honour Judge May said to you this morning and if you listen carefully to

14 my questions. We'll do this as an experiment to make sure that we get it

15 right.

16 What I asked you is this: On that 23rd of March, did

17 Mr. Milutinovic make an observation? And, if yes, tell us about the

18 observation and, in one sentence, its significance. So all I want from

19 you is two things: what he said and what was important about it.

20 A. Mr. Milutinovic said that the political problem with the Kosovar

21 Albanians did not exist at all, neither did it exist in Rambouillet, the

22 problem of a political agreement, and that the Western powers and the

23 Contact Group was -- offered the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet a

24 political agreement of whatever kind it liked, as it saw fit and as it

25 understood the interests of Serbia and Belgrade and Yugoslavia, but that

1 the only problem in that was that the Contact Group and the international

2 community wished to ensure the implementation of that political agreement

3 with the ground troops who would be present in Kosovo.

4 Q. Thank you. And so the significance of that observation, in your

5 understanding, is what?

6 A. The significance of that observation, in my opinion, is that that

7 talk about the fact that the Western forces and the Contact Group wanted

8 to impose a bad political agreement for Serbia and Yugoslavia at the

9 detriment of Serbia was completely incorrect, not to say untruthful,

10 because Mr. Milutinovic did acknowledge that we could have had a

11 favourable agreement, favourable to Serbia and Yugoslavia.

12 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 57. In the course of that Serbian Assembly

13 session, did other SBS representatives make statements contrary to or in

14 support of war?

15 A. Well, they spoke in favour of a war conflict, but in complete

16 contrast to what Milutinovic had said. He said that we were being offered

17 a bad political agreement and that that is why we had to accept war, to go

18 to war with NATO.

19 Q. And finally, paragraph 58. Did Mr. Vuk Draskovic provide an

20 alternative?

21 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, he did, on behalf of a group of

22 people who compiled an alternative solution to the Serbian Assembly which

23 should have been sufficient to avoid this conflict with the NATO pact,

24 which would have been suicidal.

25 MR. NICE: Can we now, then, please, look at a document which

1 comes in three parts. It needs a little explanation. And can we have TX

2 8, please.

3 The original, Your Honours, is an old-style fax paper. The

4 significance will become obvious, but includes that, of course, old-style

5 fax paper used to degrade over time, so it was recopied when it came into

6 the possession of the OTP. But I think we can probably survive on this

7 version. Now, if we'd like to lay the original on the overhead projector

8 so that we can see it.

9 Q. Mr. Tanic, is this a document that you've seen before and indeed

10 that you received?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What's on the overhead projector on the moment is, I think, an

13 original fax document. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Dated March 24th, 1999. How did you receive it, please?

16 A. The document is draft conclusions, as you can see, and it was sent

17 to the deputy group --

18 Q. Now let's put the -- we'll move --

19 A. -- for a meeting of the Assembly that we mentioned a moment ago.

20 Q. Can we now please lay the English translation on the overhead

21 projector. Then we'll come back to the original in a minute. And if we

22 look at the draft conclusions, running through them:

23 1. At its session on the 23rd of March, the National Assembly

24 accepted positions and work of the Republic of Serbia state delegation at

25 Rambouillet and Paris.

1 2. The National Assembly affirms that the state delegation made

2 every effort and did everything it could, in direct dialogue with the

3 delegation from the separatist movement of Albanians from Kosovo and

4 Metohija, both in Rambouillet and Paris, et cetera.

5 3. It is with regret that the National Assembly notes that the

6 international goodwill mediators and co-chairs of the talks in Rambouillet

7 and Paris did not find a way to persuade the delegation of the separatist

8 movement to sit at the same table.

9 4. And there's an illegible line ... be ascribed to the state

10 delegation of Serbia, which insisted the whole time on direct discussion.

11 Instead the blame lies exclusively with the delegation of the separatist

12 and terrorist movement.

13 5. And I'm summarising it to save time: The National Assembly

14 appeals to eminent representatives of the Contact Group to find a way to

15 get the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement to sit at the same

16 negotiating table.

17 6. If the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement does not

18 want to talk and reach such an agreement, then the state delegation is

19 prepared, at any time, and so on.

20 7. As soon as any political agreement is reached, the state

21 delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic is prepared to conclude an

22 agreement.

23 8. The National Assembly demands an end to all threats of

24 aggression by the NATO pact.

25 9. Expresses the determination of Serbia to reach a quick,

1 peaceful, and just agreement.

2 Now, if we go back to the -- well, let's just read 7 in detail.

3 Again, 7: "As soon as any political agreement is reached, the

4 state delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is

5 prepared to conclude an agreement with the international community on the

6 application of the said political agreement, with a clearly specified and

7 strictly limited mandate from the UN Security Council."

8 Now, let's go to the original, please, the fax copy, on the second

9 sheet, where we can see that there is a handwritten addition there. Just

10 yes or no: Did somebody tell you whose hand that was in?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Who told you whose hand it was in?

13 A. I got that information from Vuk Draskovic and Dusan Mihajlovic.

14 Q. And whose handwriting did they say that was?

15 A. According to that information, it is the handwriting of

16 Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.

17 Q. Had you seen his handwriting yourself before? Yes or no.

18 A. Yes, on two or three occasions.

19 Q. Right. Let's now go back to the English version to see what the

20 amendment reads. And so at the end of paragraph 7, the amendment in hand

21 reads: "Respecting the sovereignty of Serbia and the Federal Republic of

22 Yugoslavia."

23 MR. NICE: Very well. May that be given an exhibit number, then,

24 please.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked Prosecution's

1 Exhibit 149.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, did the witness answer to your question how

3 he got this document? He said it was sent to the deputies. Was it the

4 answer?

5 MR. NICE: That's the only answer he gave, and it wasn't

6 sufficient. I'll get a little bit more -- I'm sorry not to have dealt

7 with that properly earlier.

8 Q. You heard His Honour Judge Kwon's question. It was sent to the

9 deputies. How did you receive it yourself? How come you were talking to

10 Vuk Draskovic about it?

11 A. I got the document from my own personal archive and from my own

12 knowledge, from the president of our deputy group, and I noticed

13 differences between what had been agreed and what was actually discussed

14 at the meeting. So I wanted to have the paper, to have the document, to

15 see whether it had been circulated, and that's how had I came by that

16 paper, or rather, the draft conclusions.

17 Q. And how did you come to be talking to Mr. Draskovic about it?

18 A. Not only with him, but with a series of other individuals. Well,

19 for the simple reason that I was included in the group of people who

20 prepared a document which would have been sufficient to avoid this

21 unnecessary and suicidal war with the NATO pact, and I received

22 information that Mr. Milosevic, in principle, was in agreement but that

23 all that had to be done was to find a solution which would not be to the

24 detriment of the sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And at the

25 Assembly meeting of Serbia, I saw a completely different discussion taking

1 place which was directly leading into an unnecessary war with NATO. And

2 this enormous difference cropped up over two days, and I think that that

3 caused --

4 JUDGE MAY: That again is the point that I had in mind. Just

5 stick, if you would, to the question.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. Just so that we understand the position, Mr. Tanic: The draft

8 conclusions, apart from the handwritten addition, are they conclusions

9 that you accept had been reached and were a plan that had been made?

10 A. According to my information, yes, between Mr. Draskovic and

11 Mr. Milosevic.

12 Q. And what you're saying, but correct me if I've got it wrong, but

13 what you're saying is that this plan, even with its handwritten amendment,

14 was inconsistent with the debate you heard in the Assembly where

15 Milutinovic and others were speaking; is that correct?

16 A. Yes, because capital differences rose to the surface.

17 Q. And I think there was -- I needn't trouble with that. We'll move

18 on to the next page, paragraph 65.

19 From your knowledge, Mr. Tanic, going back a couple of years,

20 1996, 1997, how large or small was the KLA?

21 A. According to professional intelligence on the security assessment,

22 about 2.000 people who were poorly armed and distributed in small groups,

23 generally young villagers, young male villagers.

24 Q. The KLA leadership was where, and how numerous was it?

25 A. Well, the true leadership was, for the most part, abroad, perhaps

1 not more than five or ten people: Switzerland, Germany, Croatia, from time

2 to time Albania.

3 Q. Now, you told us yesterday there were already indications from

4 other countries that they would give assistance to Serbia if it was

5 determined to control the KLA; is that correct?

6 A. The conditions for the political -- based on the conditions of the

7 political solution for Kosovo, yes.

8 Q. And what, if anything, had President Rugova said was his intention

9 so far as KLA or other radicals were concerned? What was he prepared to

10 do for them?

11 A. Generally speaking, they waged a policy of non-violent resistance

12 and they were ready to politically marginalise the KLA if a political

13 solution to Kosovo were to be found.

14 Q. Paragraph 67 to 72 I can deal with in, I think, one sentence. As

15 to the possibility of foreign troops functioning on the soil of Serbia,

16 was there any, to your knowledge, constitutional objection to that

17 happening?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Paragraph 74. In the late 1990s, but maybe earlier, but certainly

20 in the late 1990s, were there occasions of Kosovar Albanians being killed

21 in the course of this developing conflict?

22 A. Yes, already at the beginning of 1998.

23 Q. Were these deaths discussed in the political circles in which you

24 moved? Yes or no.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or

2 no.

3 A. I'm sorry, but I'm getting the English interpretation on my

4 headsets -- the French, sorry. I'm getting the French.

5 Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or

6 no, please.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And again, do you know - yes or no - what his reaction was from

9 time to time to the problem of Kosovar Albanians being killed? Just yes

10 or no.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, did you learn of that from direct contact with the accused or

13 from other sources, or perhaps from both?

14 A. From both. First of all, from other sources.

15 Q. Then also from the accused himself?

16 A. Yes, on the occasion that I mentioned yesterday.

17 Q. When he said what about the deaths of Kosovar Albanians?

18 A. Well, that there was collective support of the Albanian people to

19 the Albanian terrorists, and so if there was collective support, then the

20 death of civilians is something that will come about in a war conflict as

21 an unfortunate consequence.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I appreciate your attempt to be

23 concise, but it's not clear to me how it is being alleged that these

24 Kosovar Albanians met their death.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. Can you please tell us, Mr. Tanic: The deaths of which we're

2 speaking, how did they come about, typically?

3 A. Well, they came about -- and I have to explain this at length. I

4 find it difficult to strike a balance between being precise and being

5 allowed to explain, so may I get instructions as to that?

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... the reason

7 why I'm asking is that this is in the early stages of the conflict, the

8 developing conflict, and I consider it useful, in fact necessary, to find

9 out exactly how it is alleged that these Kosovar Albanians met their

10 death. And you can give the answer as concisely as possible.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those deaths came about through the

12 regular activities of our police force against the Albanian terrorists.

13 However, bearing in mind the fact that this activity was conducted in the

14 manner that I described previously, according to the chain of

15 semi-personal command, without constitutional and legal frameworks,

16 without police logistics and security logistics, what happened was that,

17 together with the terrorists, civilians would be killed too, and a large

18 number of civilians at that, sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. The

19 classical example took place in the Donje Prekaze village in March 1998.

20 If you want me to, I can explain that case to you.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: This would be in 1997, or what year was this?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1998, the beginning of 1998.

23 JUDGE KWON: And if you could give us some concrete conversation

24 between you and Milosevic at that time, in concrete terms, your comment

25 and Mr. Milosevic's answers.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said yesterday that it wasn't a

2 conversation in the classical sense, but a sort of short verbal

3 communication. When it was said by Mr. Milosevic that the Albanians had

4 the massive support of the people and that it was a case of mass terrorism

5 in fact. So this wasn't, in fact, a conversation, and I was quite

6 specific when I described it yesterday. Because you couldn't discuss

7 those matters with Mr. Milosevic, at least I couldn't, because I didn't

8 have that rank.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. So far as you were aware, were other senior -- were senior

12 officials at that time, including Perisic, Stanisic, Mihajlovic and

13 others, were they taking any line on the death of Kosovar Albanians,

14 either a line that was consistent with the attitude of the accused, as

15 you've described it, or different? What was the position?

16 A. Yes. I am aware of that much better, because I could discuss

17 these matters with these persons at much greater length at meetings.

18 Their positions were mostly to the contrary to the position held by the

19 accused. They were opposed to the unselective use of force.

20 Q. More recently, and I think probably in the course of the

21 preparation of the book you've told us about, you've had conversations

22 with various people, including with Perisic; correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In the course of those conversations, were you shown a letter,

25 which we'll have a look at, dated the 23rd of July of 1998, from Perisic

1 to the accused? Is this the letter that you were shown by Mr. Perisic?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. NICE: If the original can just be -- or not the original. If

4 the B/C/S version could be laid on the overhead projector, first of all as

5 to the first page, so the accused can see what it is. The next sheet,

6 please. The date, the 23rd of July of 1998, and we can see the address to

7 the president. And then if we just look on to the last page, we can see

8 the signature of Momcilo Perisic. So if we can now put the English

9 version on the overhead projector, please, starting at the first

10 substantive page.

11 JUDGE MAY: Before we do, we need to know where this comes from.

12 MR. NICE: Yes.

13 Q. Is this -- first of all, do you recognise this as the letter that

14 you were shown?

15 A. Yes. That is the letter of the Chief of General Staff, addressed

16 to Mr. Milosevic, as President of Yugoslavia.

17 Q. In fact, this version comes, I think, from a book, is that

18 correct, the letter having been published?

19 A. Yes. Yes. That's quite clear to me. But it is quite identical

20 to the original of the letter that I saw, read, studied, and discussed

21 with several people.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It comes from a book, the witness's book, is

23 that?

24 MR. NICE: No. It's another book, and I think it's -- the front

25 cover of it, I think, gives you -- in the original. And it's got the

1 authors at the top and the date of publication at the bottom.

2 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

3 MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I have the whole book here. If the

4 Court wants it --

5 JUDGE MAY: No. I just want to know how it comes to be in

6 evidence.

7 MR. NICE: Yes. I hope the method of summarising these texts for

8 people who can probably read faster than I can read out loud is

9 satisfactory, to save time. The English translation, by the way, of the

10 book title is "Fire and Flood." I'm grateful to Ms. Graham. She had

11 already told me that, and I should have told you that.

12 Q. "Dear Mr. President: Having analysed your attitude towards the

13 Yugoslav army, I need to urgently convey to you certain facts ..."

14 Paragraph 2: "I hope you've had an opportunity to assure yourself

15 of the high military patriotic consciousness..." and et cetera.

16 Paragraph 3: "We would not be correct and sincere under these

17 fateful circumstances if, as professionals who safeguarded the VJ and the

18 SRJ in conditions known to you, we did not point out the following

19 negative facts:

20 The constant tendency to use the VJ outside the system's

21 institutions; the separation of VJ units from the Yugoslav army; the

22 attempt by unauthorised persons to command VJ units, passing over command

23 levels in official conversations with VJ members; conducting personnel

24 policy on an unlawful basis and without criteria; financial expenditures

25 outside the law" and so on.

1 Then it gives some typical examples: "The tendency to use the

2 army outside the system's institutions." It says that the state -- The

3 situation in Kosovo and Metohija could have been overcome if a state of

4 emergency had been declared when written proposals had been sent, which

5 had not been accepted.

6 And over the page to B, setting out a request to the government to

7 ensure legal definitions, the proclamation of one of the following: A

8 state of emergency and material and financial conditions.

9 Then it goes on to say: Using the VJ in this manner is untenable

10 for three reasons: The army is not being used adequately and the effects

11 are minor; true goals not being achieved; and we are being accused of

12 behaving as traitors. The use of the army in this manner has been noticed

13 by observers which may provoke reprisals from the international community

14 and NATO.

15 The proposed solution was to use the VJ lawfully and, "The

16 position is clear to us," this part concludes, "but we must have a legal

17 political decision."

18 And 2: "Separation of units from the VJ. You have decided to

19 separate the Guards Brigade from the VJ," and the suggestion in the letter

20 is that that's not lawful and that the decision should be annulled.

21 Attempts by -- 3, attempts by unauthorised persons to command VJ

22 units. Then this: "Constant aspirations by members of the MUP to have

23 some VJ units subordinated to them leads to misunderstandings if the units

24 are not given, and if they are given, this represents unauthorised and

25 unprofessional use which has counter-effects, the best examples being

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

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18

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25

1 Decani and Orahovac."

2 "B, attempt by civilian members of the staff to command the corps.

3 The responsibility of the Corps Commander is to evaluate the situation,

4 plan operations for the VJ and the MUP in cooperation with civilian

5 members of the staff and the MUP, and report to Sainovic and Minic."

6 And then it goes on to say: "In practice, the commander of the

7 Pristina Corps plans what he is ordered to do, which is at the request of

8 Sainovic, Minic and the MUP, and is then turned in to their service for

9 planning and realisation. Since it is his wish, like the wish of us all,

10 to realise the plan if others cannot or will not do it, he does it with

11 the Pristina Corps units, which leads to illegal, unsystematic and

12 inadequate use of VJ units, thus violating the system..." and so on.

13 And the proposal for this part of the letter is to disallow

14 command of the VJ outside the system of military subordination and unity

15 of command and that the third army should set up a forward command post in

16 Pristina.

17 4: Passing over command levels and official conversations with VJ

18 members, the letter says: "According to VJ service regulations, you have

19 the right to conduct official conversations with all members of the VJ,

20 however you sometimes do this without the knowledge of the Chief of the

21 General Staff, contrary to military subordination and unity of command.

22 Violation of these principles leads to the break-up of the unity of the

23 VJ. Proposal: Respect the principles of military subordination."

24 5: Conducting personnel policy on an unlawful basis and without

25 criteria. Sets out: "Generals and colonels are often promoted at the VSO

1 and outside VSO on an unlawful basis, without decrees or criteria, which

2 has far-reaching negative effects in the VJ."

3 VSO, please, Mr. Tanic? What does VSO stand for?

4 A. The Supreme Defence Council.

5 Q. Thank you. It's not on our list of acronyms, I don't think. It

6 goes on to say: "Necessary to respect the laws, decrees, and criteria for

7 promotion." Over the page in the English: "Each institution depends on

8 the main elements of the system," and sets out what a general should be

9 and proposes refraining promotion of colonels and generals to higher ranks

10 if this is not in agreement with the law.

11 And 6, financial expenditure outside the law. "You often order me

12 to give up movable and immovable property for the needs of the MUP on the

13 basis of the SRJ law on property. Neither do you have the right to order

14 me nor do I have the right to carry out orders regarding material

15 payments." The solution proposed: "Direct such requests to the legal

16 owner of the property, namely, the government."

17 Then various concluding paragraphs which we can read rapidly to

18 ourselves, with the concern that if the proposals made aren't met, second

19 to the last paragraph on the English version of that page,: "Otherwise,

20 this sole highly functional Yugoslav institution will turn into a

21 non-functional and disunited amorphous mass."

22 The rest of it we can read. Just a couple of comments from you on

23 what we've been looking at. Can you help us? We saw reference to the

24 Guards Brigade. Can you help us with the significance of that, please, if

25 any?

1 A. The Guards Brigade was singled out to be under Mr. Slobodan

2 Milosevic's personal command in order for them to carry out orders that

3 the army would not have carried out because it would have implied illegal

4 use of force.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

6 speak slower.

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. If you could speak a little more slowly, Mr. Tanic. I know you're

9 getting a bombardment of instructions as to how you should give your

10 evidence. A little more slowly, please. Bombardment from me. I'm not

11 describing anybody else's addresses in those terms.

12 Similarly, any significance in the reference to civilians giving

13 instructions? Can you deal with that, the civilian staff?

14 A. Well, that pertains to this private chain of command that went

15 through the personal representatives and envoys of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.

16 These were civilians who were engaged in the staff for Kosovo, or rather,

17 in the commission for Kosovo. The army cannot receive orders from

18 civilian persons.

19 JUDGE KWON: The exhibit in Serb, you said it's the original one.

20 So is this the copy -- photocopy of the original letter or is it printed

21 again?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is a photocopy of the

23 original letter, but probably adjusted for printing purposes, because it

24 was written on A4 because that is the official format for official

25 communications, A4.

1 JUDGE KWON: So is it that Mr. Perisic kept this letter after he

2 had sent this letter to Milosevic?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course he kept a copy. That is

4 official documentation. It can be seen from the letterhead and the number

5 and also it says "confidential," and also the official channels through

6 which it was sent. The Chief of General Staff has the right to retain a

7 copy of such official documents.

8 JUDGE KWON: Did he serve as chief of the staff of the army later

9 on, after he sent this letter to the accused?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, for another three and a half to

11 four months, I think.

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

13 MR. NICE: We'll be coming to the end of Perisic's engagement in

14 due course. But I think it may be that what His Honour would like to know

15 just a little more in detail is this:

16 Q. When Perisic showed you a document, did he show you his own copy

17 that he had retained or did he show you a copy that had already been

18 published in somebody else's book?

19 A. No, not then. This copy was not printed in any book. He showed

20 me his very own copy, two or three years before it had been published in

21 any book.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just to go back to the first typical

23 example given, the chief of staff says that the situation in Kosovo and

24 Metohija could have been overcome if a state of emergency had been

25 declared, as indeed he had recommended. The witness is not a lawyer, but

1 would he be able to say, briefly, how the declaration of a state of

2 emergency would have made the difference? Does he have any knowledge of

3 the powers that would be available to Mr. Milosevic in a state of

4 emergency that would have been critical in that situation?

5 MR. NICE:

6 Q. Mr. Tanic, you've heard --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: If he doesn't have that knowledge, then he need

8 not answer.

9 MR. NICE:

10 Q. You've heard the question and its limitations. Can you help His

11 Honour? You've touched on it to some degree, but can you help a little

12 further?

13 A. I assume that I can be of assistance, but it is up to the Trial

14 Chamber to decide whether I'm capable of doing it or not. According to

15 our constitution, Mr. Milosevic would not have any greater or lesser

16 powers if a state of emergency had been declared in a regular way through

17 the Assembly of Yugoslavia. The problem lies elsewhere. If a state of

18 emergency had been declared by the Assembly of Yugoslavia, it would have

19 had to be preceded by a serious national debate as to whether there was

20 really terrorism in a part of the country to such an extent that it did

21 necessitate the use of the army and the police, or was this not the case.

22 So then we would have had an in-depth discussion as to whether the problem

23 of terrorism in Kosovo was really so great or whether it was just blown

24 out of all proportion, fabricated, whatever.

25 On the other hand, the declaration of a state of emergency also

1 makes it incumbent upon the president of the republic, in this case Mr.

2 Milosevic, to take other political action, and this would have prevented

3 the voluntaristic and non-selective use of force. This is the way I see

4 it and this is the best I can do in terms of assistance.

5 Q. Just a couple more questions arising from the document we've been

6 looking at. VJ equipment going to the MUP - just, again, yes or no to

7 this question - do you know the involvement, if any, of the accused in the

8 decision that VJ equipment should go to the MUP? Just yes or no.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you learn that from the accused himself, from documents, or

11 from being told about it by an individual?

12 A. Not from the accused personally. I didn't find out from him

13 directly. I found out from talking to the leaders of the SDB,

14 politicians, and through my insight into certain documents.

15 Q. Well, then, in those circumstances, can you tell us, please, what

16 from those sources you understood to be the involvement, if any, of the

17 accused in the movement of VJ equipment to the MUP.

18 A. To the best of my understanding, the participation of the accused,

19 Mr. Milosevic, was crucial.

20 Q. All right. Let's move on, but we may return to some of those

21 topics when they become relevant in later passages.

22 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

23 MR. NICE: I'm so sorry, yes.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit 150.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this this book?

1 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this book becoming an exhibit?

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 JUDGE MAY: The letter, for the moment, is an exhibit. If you

5 want the book -- just a moment. Let the accused see the book if he wants

6 to see it.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am asking whether the book is an

8 exhibit, because I see that this is a book that is called "Fire and

9 Flood," published in Belgrade.

10 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to have the book passed over to you. You

11 can have a look at it and you can address us on it in due course if you

12 want.

13 MR. NICE: I'm checking whether I have it available in the

14 building. If I do, I'll make it available, I hope, by the break. If not,

15 we'll try and get the book -- we'll find a source for the book and try and

16 get a copy as soon as we can.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well. Yes.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. Paragraph 77, and it's just the middle -- sorry, 78, and let's

20 take the Court to the source of the evidence that is to be given. Just

21 yes or no to this: Did you have a conversation with somebody which

22 touched on the business of orders being given in 1998 to local commanders

23 in Kosovo? Did you have a conversation with somebody about that topic?

24 Just yes or no.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. With whom did you have that conversation, and when?

2 A. The leadership of the state security and my political colleagues,

3 the president of my party. This was an entire series of talks with regard

4 to that.

5 Q. And were these conversations you had contemporaneous with events

6 or were they after the event, when you were preparing your book?

7 A. At the same time, contemporaneous. And later on I could only

8 compare certain things.

9 Q. What was said to you about the giving of orders to local

10 commanders?

11 A. I received information from several sources, completely identical,

12 that practically the so-called State Commission for Kosovo, consisting of

13 seven or eight persons, commands over the situation in Kosovo. This is a

14 parapolitical body which practically goes beyond the legal authorities of

15 Yugoslavia and this meant carrying out Mr. Milosevic's personal will

16 regarding the non-selective use of force, for unpurposeful means in terms

17 of using force.

18 Q. We'll come, then, directly, I think, to the body you've described

19 as the State Commission, paragraph 83, over the page in the summary. When

20 was this body formed; who, in your understanding, were its members?

21 A. In my opinion, it was formed at a very early stage, during the

22 first third of 1998. And the members of this commission, that has nothing

23 to do with my opinion really, it's a question of knowledge.

24 Q. I was going to interrupt you to invite you not to give us your

25 opinion, which is exclusively the province of the Judges; just to tell us

1 what you learnt at the time, as a matter of fact. But I interrupted you.

2 The commission was formed early, and it comprised whom?

3 A. Sainovic, Minic, Andjelkovic, Matkovic, the civilian part. And

4 then the military part, Generals Pavkovic and Velickovic. Probably there

5 were some other members, but these are the members that I know for sure,

6 persons who I know for sure were members of the commission for Kosovo.

7 Q. When you speak of Markovic, which Markovic are you speaking of?

8 What's his first name?

9 A. Matkovic. Matkovic.

10 Q. And his first name?

11 A. Dusan, I think.

12 Q. Very well, I misheard. Can you tell us now a little bit about

13 something that's been referred to but occasional, something called

14 Horseshoe. Again, not opinion; just facts, please. Was there a plan that

15 went by the name of Horseshoe?

16 A. Not in that sense. This was a colloquial nickname for a

17 completely different plan.

18 Q. Just so that we can understand the colloquial nickname, can you

19 help us at all with when the name was first used and applied -- when it

20 was first used?

21 A. I know what the plan meant. Now, when the term was used first, I

22 really can't say, especially as it was the colloquial term applied and not

23 an official one.

24 Q. What did it mean?

25 A. It was an exercise plan of the Yugoslav army while it was the JNA,

1 the Yugoslav People's Army, and the plan provided for training and

2 exercise in case of an aggression on Yugoslavia from south-east Europe,

3 and if the Albanian population should take the side of the foreign

4 aggressor, then it would come into force. The army of Yugoslavia would

5 come into force if these two conditions were met. They would take seven

6 defensive positions and they would be geared towards neutralising the

7 Albanian strongholds, and this exercise -- this plan was actually stored

8 in an archive and then it was reactivated and would be reactivated with

9 all the rest for taking action in Kosovo.

10 Q. The seven defensive positions, can you -- are you in a position to

11 list them, and if so, would you rather have a map to point them out for

12 us?

13 A. When we discussed this, I had this jotted down in writing, but as

14 I haven't got the right to have my notes with me, I'm afraid that if I

15 speak off the bat, I might make some mistakes. But they were seven

16 directions making this semi-circle, and I think that those exact

17 directions, the seven of them, are contained in my statement.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we can see the ones that have been set out

19 in paragraph 85, at the top of page 15. I don't know if the Chamber would

20 want to see those places, if I'm allowed to refer to them, on a map. We

21 can either use the map that's at the front of the atlas --

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I find it useful.

23 MR. NICE: If I can just make mine, I think, available. This may

24 do. It may be too big for the overhead. But if you can just look at

25 this. I'm just going to read you some --

1 Q. Would you point them out with the pointer, please, Mr. Tanic.

2 First of all, there's the -- something called -- well, that's Mount

3 Deravica. Can you just point that out for us?

4 A. I do apologise, but if the Court agrees, I'm not a military expert

5 and I'd prefer not to indicate something on the map that I haven't already

6 practiced.

7 Q. Very well. I'll abandon that exercise.

8 MR. NICE: We can see how he lists it and we can get somebody else

9 to do it maybe later. Thank you very much, I'll take the map back.

10 Q. Now, do you know, one way or another, whether there was any

11 intention or expression of intention at the time, the time of this

12 conflict, to have anything to do with the Horseshoe plan?

13 A. Well, quite simply, the basic purpose and intention of that plan

14 was altered. There was no foreign aggression, and the Albanian population

15 did not take the side of a foreign aggressor.

16 Q. Mr. Tanic, back to where we were. Just yes or no: Was there any

17 intention or expression at the time to have anything to do with this plan?

18 Yes or no.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Was there general acceptance of its appropriate -- of its being an

21 appropriate plan or not? Did anybody resist its use? Paragraph 87.

22 A. As far as I know, the peaks of power in the army and the security

23 structures.

24 Q. Did they accept it or did they reject it?

25 A. No. They didn't want to use the plan at all, because there was no

1 external aggression or Albanian rebellion, or rather, that they should

2 take the part and go to the side of the foreign aggressor, because it

3 didn't exist.

4 Q. And from where did you learn that they were rejecting the use of

5 such a plan, or from whom did you learn that they were rejecting the use

6 of such a plan?

7 A. From the army leadership. I would prefer not to mention any

8 names. I don't want to harm those people, because many of them are under

9 pressure anyway. So could we deal with it in a different way?

10 Q. Very well. Let's move to paragraph 88.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. What's the objection?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is that the witness

14 must answer the questions asked. What does it mean if he can say some

15 nonsense like this and then he says that he can't tell you who he heard it

16 from?

17 JUDGE MAY: That's a point you can make in due course. You can

18 ask him again in cross-examination and we'll decide what to do about it.

19 Meanwhile, the witness can go on in the same way.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Paragraph 88, and this turns to the topic His Honour Judge Kwon

22 was asking you about a little earlier. Were there some personnel changes

23 at a very high level in the autumn of 1998? And just list them, please,

24 for us.

25 A. Yes, there was. After the signing of the agreement between Mr.

1 Milosevic and Mr. Holbrooke on a peaceful settlement of the crisis in

2 Kosovo, the military-political agreement, and the chiefs of the Security

3 Services of Serbia and the Chief of the General Staff were replaced later

4 on, Mr. Stanisic and the whole group of the leadership cadre. And Mr.

5 Perisic as the head of the General Staff.

6 Q. They were replaced by, and just give us the names of those who

7 replaced them. Perisic was replaced by --? Paragraph 90.

8 A. General Ojdanic.

9 Q. And before we move from him, how had he ranked before this

10 appointment? What were his political associations, if any?

11 A. I apologise. As to rank, I don't answer the question -- I don't

12 understand the question. And as to his political connections, as far as I

13 know, he was strongly connected to the JUL party. I can't tell you about

14 rank.

15 Q. Very well. Stanisic's replacement was whom?

16 A. Mr. Radomir Markovic. We referred to him as Rade Markovic but his

17 full name is Radomir Markovic.

18 Q. What had been Radomir Markovic's previous political associations,

19 if any?

20 A. Very close personal ties with Mr. Milosevic and his family.

21 Otherwise, before that, he didn't deal in any intelligence work but in the

22 classical police force, or rather, the public Security Service, the public

23 police force.

24 Q. Thank you very much.

25 A. SJB, as we call it.

1 Q. Yes. And then Dimitrijevic's replacement, can you help us with

2 that?

3 A. I'm not quite sure.

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. And I don't want to give you an incorrect answer.

6 Q. Paragraph 91. In 1998, did something happen in relation to what I

7 think you described as economic materials in Kosovo? Just tell us about

8 that.

9 A. Well, economic materials was the term I used, and it relates to

10 movable and immovable property, if I understood you correctly. Is that

11 what you were referring to?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. If they were material -- economic materials, yes, then that did

14 take place.

15 Q. And what sort of materials are you talking of and what time are

16 you talking of, so that we can see how far it was before NATO's

17 intervention.

18 A. Well, there might be a misunderstanding, but we'll be able to

19 ascertain. If we're talking about allocations for Kosovo, then immovables

20 are combat vehicles belonging to the artillery, light artillery, tanks,

21 and that is the materiel, in fact, of the army that must not be used

22 against civilians because in this case the Albanians were citizens of

23 Yugoslavia. If that's what you mean, combat resources. Now, if you're

24 referring to economic material of a different nature, we could perhaps

25 clarify that too.

1 Q. Gasoline reserves?

2 A. Yes. I assumed that there was a misunderstanding. That's right.

3 For several months before the conflict with the NATO pact, fuel, strategic

4 fuel reserves, they were transported to lesser reservoirs all over Serbia,

5 both belonging to military and economic organisations. So the strategic

6 fuel reserves were transferred to other places several months before,

7 between the conference in Rambouillet, or rather, the Milosevic/Holbrooke

8 agreement and the conference in Rambouillet.

9 Q. Thank you. Yes. Paragraph 94, conversations you've had, but I

10 want you to move carefully and listen to the questions carefully, please.

11 Vladimir Stambuk, remind us of his position at the time.

12 A. Vice-president of the government of Serbia, one of the

13 vice-presidents, actually.

14 Q. Now, did you - just yes or no - did you have a conversation with

15 him in I think 1998 about the problems with Kosovar Albanians? Just yes

16 or no.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Where and, so far as you can be precise, when?

19 A. The conversation was between the British ambassador, Mr. Donnelly,

20 the German ambassador, Mr. Gruber, Mr. Stambuk and myself, and this took

21 place on the premises of the German embassy, and I think that that was two

22 weeks before the Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement, perhaps ten days prior to

23 that, a brief time before the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement.

24 Q. Very well. The topic of the conversation, in the most general

25 terms first?

1 A. The topic of conversation was how to avoid NATO intervention

2 against Yugoslavia, because at that time the danger already loomed over

3 the country that the intervention might take place, and could Holbrooke

4 prevent this intervention? Those were the general lines discussed. Or

5 rather, whether a Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement would come into being at

6 all to prevent the intervention, to be more precise.

7 Q. In other words, I think a particular observation made by Stambuk

8 that you can tell us about in the course of that conversation?

9 A. Yes. Mr. Stambuk did make an observation which I heard from

10 others as well. I quoted Mr. Stambuk by way of one example. He made the

11 observation to the two foreign ambassadors, ambassadors of NATO-pact

12 countries, that official Belgrade had nothing against a small-scale

13 bombing operation by NATO, and of course I reacted to that.

14 Q. Did he go on to qualify and explain what would happen at all, if

15 there was a small bombing operation?

16 A. Well, he didn't carry on his explanations in the face of these two

17 ambassadors, the ambassadors of Great Britain and Germany, because I asked

18 him to go to one side and to stop that kind of conversation, and then he

19 explained it to me. The explanation he gave was -- actually, I asked him

20 how was it possible for any official - and as we knew each other, I was

21 free to ask him that - any official to say that official Belgrade had

22 nothing against a limited bombing? That kind of observation was

23 completely taboo because that means an invitation to them to bomb.

24 Q. I'm going to expand on the answers, because we just want an

25 account of what was said. So you made those observations to him, and

1 what, if any, further explanation did he give to you?

2 A. Well, he answered me by saying that I didn't understand certain

3 things, but the president of my party, Mr. Mihajlovic -- that is, he said

4 that a small-scale bombing would be a great pretext and alibi for us to

5 continue with the persecution of Albanians and the Serb opposition as

6 well, because in times of war, nobody can ask anything. So he advised me

7 to convey to the president of my party that we go back to the ruling

8 coalition and to stop resisting attempts of this artificial construction

9 of a war conflict.

10 Q. You've used in your evidence the phrase "continue with the

11 persecution of Albanians." Obviously it's a long time ago, and don't

12 guess if you can't, but can you help at all with exactly what he said

13 about the Albanians and/or persecution of them?

14 A. Well, he said to finish ethnic cleansing, to have a pretext for

15 completing the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians or to throw them out of

16 the territory of Yugoslavia, and I heard words to that effect from others

17 as well, mentioned in other documents, irrespective of my views and

18 opinions.

19 Q. You say in relation to that last topic but also the earlier topic

20 about the acceptability of --

21 A. To that effect about other nations as well.

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter corrects herself in the previous

23 sentence.

24 MR. NICE: Thank you.

25 Q. I'll repeat my question, then. You say in relation to the last

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1 topic but also in relation to the earlier topic of the acceptability of

2 small-scale bombing, that others said similar things to what Mr. Stambuk

3 had said. Can you give us the names of any of the others who said such

4 things, either at this meeting in the embassy or elsewhere?

5 A. Well, this is a very large group of people, from Mr. Milovan Bojic

6 to Mr. -- that is to say, various people from the SPS, leaders, Mr.

7 Milutinovic himself. I just can't enumerate all these people, there were

8 a lot of them. And they were all closed talks. They all spoke about this

9 little bit of bombing as if this wouldn't make a problem. Of course, not

10 in their public statements, but in their private conversations. Not only

11 then but on many other occasions as well.

12 Q. Paragraph 96. There's a man called Bogdan Tomas. Who was he in

13 1998? What was his job?

14 A. Could I ask us to leave this question for a private session, to

15 protect these people? Not because I don't wish to answer, but I don't

16 wish to place anybody in a precarious position. These people are in a

17 sufficiently precarious position already when they want to say what

18 happened.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I put that on one side, then, and come

20 back at the end to a collective, if there is to be any private session, a

21 collective private session? And that, I think, will take care of 97 as

22 well.

23 Q. You may have touched on this yesterday, but just tidy it up, if

24 you wouldn't mind, today: Did you get to learn of the accused's attitude

25 towards information gathering on the KLA generally and about his attitude

1 towards the surrender to this institution of any who had committed crimes

2 against the Serbs? Just yes or no to that. Did you get to learn of his

3 attitude?

4 A. Yes. Yes.

5 Q. From where did you learn of his attitude? From him himself or

6 from others?

7 A. From others.

8 Q. Give us the range of people and their jobs, if you can, from whom

9 you learned of his attitude.

10 A. The leadership of the security structures, the military

11 leadership, the socio-political structures, and I can name them at a

12 private session. That will be no problem.

13 Q. What was the accused's attitude towards learning about the KLA and

14 handing them over to this institution?

15 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, this is important evidence. I think better

18 that you come back to it.

19 MR. NICE: Certainly.

20 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the whole question of a closed session

21 in due course.

22 MR. NICE: In that case, I think, although part of 1998 may be

23 separable, if I just come back to that generally. We can then go over to

24 page 18, and I think probably it will be better if I deal with this major

25 element on page 18 later. I'll come back to that, but not in closed

1 session, Your Honour, but I think in open session, but I'll come back to

2 it.

3 Paragraph 101.

4 Q. Now, did you learn of the conduct of certain operations against

5 the KLA in 1998, and in particular, of one involving the Jashari family?

6 Just yes or no.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was there any pattern -- according to your information, was there

9 any pattern in the way some of these operations were mounted, in

10 particular, in terms of the size of the initial action taken against the

11 KLA?

12 A. Yes. There was a terrible pattern in opposition to everybody --

13 anything that could be read in the leadership of the army, et cetera.

14 Q. The pattern that you identified or that's been identified was

15 what?

16 A. This pattern consisted of the fact that they should allow a

17 smaller number of Serb victims first in order to raise tensions, and then

18 to launch a massive non-selective use of force against the Albanian

19 population much greater than would be necessary for eliminating the rebels

20 and to destroy civilian lives and civilian buildings. This pattern, not

21 only with the Jashari family was used, but in Decani as well, with certain

22 variations. But usually it was the overly great use of force and

23 unselective use of force, which was contrary to the rules and regulations

24 of the police force as well, the rules of service of the police force and

25 the laws generally.

1 Q. Now, you've given the pattern. We'll come back to the two

2 particular locations you've identified briefly in a few minutes. But as

3 against this, and from your understanding of the Security Service with

4 which you had contact, what was the appropriate way to deal with

5 terrorists who would be in a civilian community? Paragraph 105.

6 A. Well, it's not my understanding. There is procedure that is

7 prescribed, and that procedure, combat procedure, that's what I'm talking

8 about, not legal procedure. Combat procedure was dovetailed with the law

9 and ascribed in the rules of services with respect to the deployment of

10 the services, at all attempts to divide civilians from terrorists,

11 particularly under circumstances where we know that many terrorists do

12 have, as a rule, resort to using civilians as a human shield or things of

13 that kind. There are technical means and logistics to combat that and the

14 equipment of our units. After that, what is done is to arrest them at all

15 costs rather than killing them, and you can carry out arrests in various

16 ways. You have combat means for effecting an arrest and taking people

17 into custody, but at any right, the mass use of force against civilians

18 would be --

19 Q. I think that's enough. And just this last question from paragraph

20 106. Were units at that time available equipped with the necessary

21 materials and equipment to deal with terrorists in this proper and formal

22 way?

23 A. Nor were they equipped with the materiel, nor did they have the

24 necessary cadres, and so those were one of the criticisms that Stanisic

25 and Perisic made.

1 Q. It may be my misunderstanding.

2 A. They were criticised for.

3 Q. Did the units at that time have, for example, tear gas or material

4 like that that might have been usable against terrorists in a controlled

5 way, of the way you've explained a few paragraphs before?

6 A. Yes, they did, in their warehouses, but they didn't use them, and

7 that's why the misunderstanding came about. They didn't use them on the

8 terrain, in the field. They did have all the equipment necessary and

9 logistics, theoretically speaking.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, you've given two examples, Jashari family and

11 Decani. As to any detail of what happened at either of those events or

12 incidents, what was your source of information, in general?

13 A. Well, once again, the leadership of the State Security Service and

14 the army, and this can be brought up at a private session. And some

15 people who were there on the spot as well.

16 Q. But passing beyond your sources, then, to what they told you, who

17 did you understand to be in charge of these missions at those times?

18 A. Well, we first discussed the problems at length. They didn't tell

19 me that once, we had an ongoing discussion about that kind of problem.

20 Q. You're not listening -- you are listening. It's my mistake for

21 not getting the question properly. Who in the leadership was in charge of

22 these missions that bore this characteristic you've described? Paragraph

23 102.

24 A. Well, to all practical terms, it was the civilian part of the

25 staff, and this is mentioned in General Perisic's letter as well. To all

1 practical purposes, it was that part that conveyed orders from Mr.

2 Milosevic and his closest associates, not from institutions, but from them

3 as local commanders, according to my information.

4 Q. And can you give us the names of the civilian individuals who were

5 responsible for these particular missions?

6 A. Well, mostly it was Mr. Nikola Sainovic's name that was mentioned.

7 Q. Anybody else?

8 A. And Mr. Vlajko Stojilkovic as well, but the gentleman has died

9 since, so I don't like to ...

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if that would prove to be a

11 convenient moment.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I'd be grateful for your assistance. Perhaps

13 you can reflect on it during the adjournment, and also the amicus, is the

14 course which we should follow with this evidence. Some of it's important

15 but based on sources which either are not given or are said to be given in

16 private session. The question is the value of that evidence and whether

17 it should be admitted at all. But perhaps you would reflect on it.

18 We'll adjourn now. We're going to adjourn, Mr. Milosevic. We'll

19 hear you afterwards.

20 We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, I should have explained this to you, since

24 you may not have followed the procedural argument, that the question of

25 naming any names is a matter on which you will be guided by counsel, and

1 in due course it may be the Trial Chamber will have to make a ruling on

2 the subject, but you'll be told what to do and what your position is.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply did not understand that,

4 and that is why I asked for instructions.

5 MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court wants to discuss the utility

6 of a private session now or whether we should get through the rest of the

7 evidence and deal with it all at the end.

8 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with the evidence.

9 MR. NICE: I have a copy of the book. It's actually a private

10 copy of Mr. Shin, but he's prepared to make it available if not to donate

11 it to the greater good. It's the only copy we have got at the moment, so

12 can I make it available so the accused can look at it?

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

14 MR. NICE: I've flagged it, or rather, Ms. Graham has flagged it

15 at the two letters that are going to be produced. We can consider its

16 status as an exhibit or whatever later.

17 Q. Paragraph 107. No. That falls for the same consideration later,

18 I'm afraid.

19 Let's move on to paragraph 108, to events during the NATO bombing.

20 Did you, in the course of the NATO bombing, have any face-to-face meetings

21 with the accused?

22 A. There was communication with the accused, through official

23 channels.

24 Q. But did you have any face-to-face meeting with him, at receptions

25 and things of that sort, in April of 1999?

1 A. Not a meeting that could prove anything. The accused is denying

2 everything. I cannot prove this. I can prove all the rest. So let that

3 be my answer to this question. Indirect communication through official

4 channels, communications between the governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia

5 respectively.

6 Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm just going to press you. The question of how

7 things are proved is a matter for the Court really. Just yes or no: Did

8 you have conversations with the accused in April 1999?

9 A. During the spring of 1999, yes, on a very brief occasion.

10 Q. Whereabouts?

11 A. I repeat: It is quite hard to prove that now, and I would kindly

12 ask that, if possible, this also remains for this other part, when these

13 specific matters will be dealt with, names and things like that.

14 Q. Very well. Paragraph 110. In the course of the NATO bombing, the

15 -- did you learn - just yes or no - about some of the things that were

16 happening in the course of the bombing; for example, deployments of the

17 armed forces, aircraft -- anti-aircraft positions, that sort of thing?

18 Did you learn about any of those sorts of things?

19 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Personal insight.

20 Q. What appeared to be the main strategy about, so far as an approach

21 to NATO was concerned, from what you understood?

22 A. On the basis of what I understood and found out, the main strategy

23 was to procrastinate as much as possible and to extend the war with NATO

24 for as long as possible, to the detriment of own country, and then the

25 civilian loss of lives and the civilian destruction would constitute a

1 kind of moral victory over NATO, and that strategy was clearly enunciated.

2 That can be proven as well.

3 Q. Very well. I think 113 will fall in the same category probably as

4 some of the earlier passages. But over the page: Did you have contact

5 with the Russian foreign minister at the time?

6 A. No. I beg your pardon. This must be a mistake. In everything I

7 said, there was not a single indication that I could have had that kind of

8 contact.

9 Q. Very well. My mistake. Yes. We'll have to move on from that, I

10 think.

11 As to civilian buildings, what happened to civilian buildings -

12 paragraph 115 - in the course of the conflict?

13 A. Well, they were used for military purposes, and this was

14 unauthorised. I'll give an example. I'm talking about the command of the

15 town of Belgrade, the city of Belgrade, which was at two different

16 locations. I personally saw this. I can mention both locations. There

17 is no problem with that. The elementary school of Sveti Sava in the

18 street of Marsala Tulbuhina and also the department store company in

19 Marsala Tulbuhina Street as well. They are very close to one another.

20 The one is a civilian company, the other an elementary school. And the

21 command of the city of Belgrade was relocated to these locations and the

22 officers who were in command of the city of Belgrade for long periods,

23 during the day wore civilian clothes. And then tanks for a while, they

24 were deployment around the church of Sveti Sava, Saint Sava, and then when

25 people started complaining about this, then they were moved from there.

1 But as for the command, the headquarters of the defence of the city of

2 Belgrade, I personally saw where they were relocated.

3 Q. Paragraph 117. RTS, Radio Television Serbia, did you get some

4 information about that?

5 A. Yes, I did have information about the bombing of the RTS building

6 with two days before and two days later, and I communicated this through

7 official channels to the command or defence, or rather, to Mr. Milosevic,

8 who at that time was the supreme commander of the defence, so he had to be

9 informed, and I have doubt that he must have been informed. The building

10 was not evacuated and civilians were left there on purpose so that they

11 would lose their lives, and I know that there were several sources of

12 information with regard to this RTS building bombing.

13 Q. The SDB, did it have information about future targets other than

14 whatever you may have acquired from somewhere else? Did it have other

15 sources of information?

16 A. Yes, there were other sources of information, two or three

17 different types of sources of information, quite valid, without any kind

18 of espionage involved. I'm not referring to that.

19 Q. And was this continuously provided to the accused or was there any

20 change in the pattern of provision to him, as you understood it?

21 A. He absolutely had to obtain this information, and his behaviour

22 showed that he did have this information and that sometimes he would

23 evacuate the population and sometimes he would not. It depended on what

24 was useful for him. Also this refers to goods, property, not only the

25 population.

1 Q. Did the SDB continue to provide him information throughout the war

2 or not?

3 A. Yes, yes, absolutely.

4 Q. Your role at this time was to do what, and on whose authority?

5 A. According to the decision or opinion. Please take into account

6 one of these two wordings. The opinion or the decision of the united

7 defence of the town of Belgrade and the SDB. I went abroad twice during

8 the war. I cannot call this being sent out on official business, but the

9 explanation was that I should do my best, depending on the people I know,

10 to investigate, to investigate - I emphasise that word - the possibility

11 of bringing the conflict with NATO to an end as soon as possible.

12 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... to an end. Mr.

13 Nice, I'm concerned about this evidence, based on what are described as

14 sources. And the question really is: Of what value is it to the Trial

15 Chamber to have evidence of that sort?

16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. That, of course, falls for

17 determination when we -- in part when we look at the next thing. As to

18 this particular passage of evidence, he's told us what he was doing. I

19 now need to know on what authority he was doing it and then we come to

20 another concrete piece of evidence.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MR. NICE: At this stage, I think we're in a slightly different

23 territory.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well, but if you would stick to the concrete for

25 the moment and in due course we can consider the rest of it.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Mr. Tanic, you've told us what you were doing. You were abroad on

3 official business, investigating the possibility of bringing the conflict

4 to an end. Whose authority was it that you should do that?

5 A. The united staff of the defence of the town of Belgrade and the

6 State Security Service. There was no way of leaving Belgrade during the

7 war for private purposes only.

8 Q. And you were able to leave Belgrade to do the functions that

9 you've described; yes?

10 A. Yes. Yes. But being officially seen off and met by the Security

11 Service at the border with Hungary, and that is where I left the country,

12 and there are official records of that. So this was an official

13 procedure.

14 Q. Very well. As a result of those missions, or that mission, did

15 you have any proposals that you were able to advance?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. One or more than one?

18 A. One. One. It was one proposal that was figuring prominently

19 throughout this time. Various variations of it, but basically one

20 proposal.

21 Q. And when did that proposal come about, first?

22 A. As far as I know, mid-April 1999, at the latest, to the best of my

23 knowledge.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there's a letter that we may be able to

25 produce from Mr. Lilic to the accused.

1 Q. Does that letter have a bearing on this potential agreement, or is

2 it a reflection of it?

3 A. I did not understand this question as being addressed to me.

4 Q. Yes, it is addressed to you. There's a letter --

5 A. I'm sorry.

6 Q. There's a letter from Mr. Lilic in May of 1999, and does that bear

7 out what you're saying about the offer of an agreement that you came back

8 with?

9 A. Yes. Yes, it does bear it out. The spirit and many concrete

10 provisions of that proposal as well.

11 Q. Now, that letter is in the annex or the appendices to the book

12 that we've just provided to the accused. Had you ever seen the letter

13 before seeing it in that book?

14 A. No, and I did not see the letter in the book either. I found out

15 about it from an interview that Mr. Lilic gave to the weekly called Vrema,

16 about three months ago, and I saw that it coincided to a great degree.

17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm proposing to deal with that letter at

18 a later stage in the evidence, by another witness.

19 Q. But can you tell us, just in the shortest possible form, please:

20 What was the agreement that you -- what were the elements of the agreement

21 that you were party to proposing?

22 A. No. No. I was not putting it together. I did not have the

23 mandate to put anything together. The elements of this agreement were the

24 following: The unilateral ceasefire of all combat activities of the army

25 of Yugoslavia and the special units of the MUP for a 24-hour period,

1 except for cases of self-defence. After that, the suspension of combat

2 activities of NATO for a period of 24 hours. And then a longer unilateral

3 ceasefire by the army of Yugoslavia and the combat units of MUP, except

4 for cases of self-defence. And a longer suspension of bombing by NATO.

5 In the meantime, the urgent initiation of political dialogue with Kosovar

6 Albanians, specifically with Mr. Rugova, about resolving political

7 problems related to Kosovo. The Pristina Corps remains in Kosovo, and

8 peace troops enter Kosovo and they possibly -- no, not possibly. They do

9 cooperate with the Pristina Corps. And then after a lasting ceasefire and

10 after a peace agreement is reached, then the economic community would help

11 the reconstruction of Kosovo and then peace troops would enter under the

12 UN flag, and official Belgrade would be free to influence the composition

13 of the peace troops of the UN in the following sense: That there would

14 not be too many people from NATO countries there, so that this would be a

15 bit of a face-saving formula for Yugoslavia.

16 That is, in rough terms, the content of the peace proposal, and

17 there was not only one of them, and they were shown to President

18 Milosevic.

19 Q. Thank you. Was there a proposal for a ceasefire on Catholic

20 Easter, and was there a linkage of that, or temporal linkage of that, with

21 the release of some American soldiers?

22 A. Yes. Yes, there was. That was also one of the variants of this

23 plan.

24 Q. Was that discussed by you and your party leader Mihajlovic, and

25 did that lead you to making a telephone call? Yes or no.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. To whom was the telephone call made?

3 A. First we addressed a proposal in writing to Mr. Milutinovic, and

4 then, after that, the president of my party spoke on the telephone to Mr.

5 Milutinovic in connection with a reply to that letter.

6 Q. Were you in a position to hear one side or both sides of that

7 telephone conversation?

8 A. Both. Both. It's no secret; the speakerphone was on.

9 Q. What was said by Mihajlovic to Milutinovic and what was said by

10 Milutinovic in reply?

11 A. Well, first of all, Mr. Milosevic clearly made it known that he

12 would accept a ceasefire for Catholic Easter, and it is not only that we

13 knew about it, but also Mr. Sedano [phoen], the Secretary of State of the

14 Vatican.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues]... background. You really must

16 focus on the questions. Thank you.

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. The phone call now, please: What was said?

19 A. Well, quite simply, our question was: Why was there no ceasefire

20 for Catholic Easter when it was promised? Because Catholic Easter was

21 already in the past. And also, the freeing of the three American

22 soldiers.

23 Q. The reply?

24 A. Well, the answer that Mr. Milutinovic gave was that he said there

25 would be a ceasefire but a little later on, because he said we - and he

1 meant Belgrade - we have not finished the job done there yet, meaning

2 Kosovo, and that it would take place for the Orthodox Easter.

3 Q. This is how much later?

4 A. He wasn't specific, Mr. Milutinovic. He said, "We haven't

5 finished the job down there in Kosovo yet, and once we do finish it, then

6 we'll see to it."

7 Q. Thank you. I think at one stage you had a conversation with the

8 president of the Assembly, Tomic, about the peace negotiations of which

9 you were aware. Just yes or no: Did Mr. Tomic seem aware of those

10 negotiations at all? Had they been communicated to him?

11 A. Yes, but with others too; Vuk Draskovic, in the first place, who

12 was the vice-premier. Perhaps there was a mistake in my basic -- that is

13 to say, technical mistake, because there was far more communication with

14 Mr. Draskovic as the vice-premier of the Yugoslav government at the time,

15 but also with Tomic, yes.

16 Q. Paragraph 131. No. Paragraph 131 will have to come later, if at

17 all.

18 Paragraph 137, just a few odd details now, please, Mr. Tanic. The

19 Republic of Serbian police, did they have any particular characteristics?

20 Did they have any particular source from which they were drawn which would

21 identify them in a particular way?

22 A. Could you repeat that question and be more specific? I'm not

23 quite sure I understood it.

24 Q. Yes. The Republic of Serbian police, how integrated were they

25 with the other agencies of law enforcement? How separate were they?

1 A. The composition of the public Security Service was integrated.

2 However, the composition of the specialised units were not integrated into

3 those basic forms. But I still don't think I've understood your question

4 fully, at least not precisely enough to give you a full answer.

5 Q. I'm not going to pursue the matter. I'll move on to something

6 else.

7 The control of the MUP -- no, I think you've actually dealt with

8 that already. That's paragraph 138.

9 Paragraph 148. Special units, again, then, picking up on that.

10 Did you see anything of those special units yourself at the time with

11 which we're concerned?

12 A. Well, yes. The special units and the police, they were referred

13 to as the JSO.

14 Q. Did you learn - just yes or no - by whom they were controlled?

15 A. Yes. Yes.

16 Q. In particular, by whom they were controlled when they were

17 operating in Kosovo?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, using his private chain of command through Sainovic

19 and Rade Markovic and Vlajko Stojilkovic.

20 Q. Paragraph 149. Did you have any conversation, I think, with

21 Perisic about these units? Yes or no.

22 A. Could you be more specific once again when you say "special

23 units," because there are special units both in the army and the police

24 force.

25 Q. Very well.

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1 A. It would be difficult for me to discuss special police units with

2 Perisic, for example.

3 Q. That is my error, I think. Can I come back to it? Did you have a

4 conversation - yes or no - with Perisic about military equipment going to

5 the police? Just yes or no.

6 A. Yes. Yes. Yes, absolutely so.

7 Q. When did you have that? Was that contemporaneously or was that

8 more recently, when you were sourcing material for your book?

9 A. It was at the time when I was preparing the material for my book

10 and comparing my knowledge from the previous times with that of Mr.

11 Perisic.

12 Q. Just yes or no to this: Did Perisic tell you something of

13 Milosevic's attitude towards this topic? Just yes or no.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Last line of paragraph 149: What did he tell you of Milosevic's

16 attitude?

17 A. Well, similarly to what he had written in his letter. Let me be

18 precise: That Mr. Milosevic kept asking him that the military equipment

19 be issued to MUP units and that that military equipment would be used in

20 combat operations, and Mr. Perisic, for many reasons, which he set out in

21 the letter and one which he explained to me, was the deployment of this

22 against the civilian population. There is no rule and regulation for this

23 to be deployed and used against the inhabitants. And I'm referring here

24 to heavy military materiel, equipment.

25 Q. Any reference or consideration given to how the personnel would be

1 dressed?

2 A. Well, there was mention of tanks, combat vehicles, infantry ones,

3 and grenade launchers, 120 millimetres and over. And as I was told, Mr.

4 Perisic said that that was absolutely impossible, and Mr. Milosevic

5 responded to that and said that this would not be used by the army but by

6 the police, so there was no danger of having the army blamed for it.

7 Q. Were local commanders, in your experience and understanding, able

8 to arrest special unit members for wrongful acts?

9 A. Of course. Members of the reserve force as well. They also did

10 that.

11 Q. In the course of the war, in general, what did you observe about

12 the output of the local media, newspapers and so on?

13 A. Well, I noticed a whole series of incorrect information put out,

14 information which fanned the flames of war and masked the true results of

15 the combat operations of the war; and this was true throughout 1998 and

16 1999. I'm talking about the official media.

17 Q. What sort of distortions were there?

18 A. As to the number of terrorists, for example, they were

19 exaggerated, and the peaceful solutions were diminished. Our own victims

20 were made less of, and generally, the whole operation was masked. So that

21 kind of distortion, more or less, a distortion of the actual situation, in

22 fact.

23 Q. Last paragraph. Some graves, mass graves, were found in Serbia.

24 Did you have a conversation with someone about them?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who was that?

2 A. Well, first, in the summer of 1999, when I was preparing my book

3 and when we researched into the Serb and Albanian victims - where they

4 were, where they could be found - and the second time was --

5 Q. I asked you who it was.

6 A. I do apologise, but I'm a little confused now. Do you want me to

7 answer now or can I ask to answer this in a private session, if we're

8 going to have one? If not, then I can give an answer. There's no problem

9 there. I don't wish to refrain from answering, I just want to see

10 whether we're going to have this in open session or in closed session.

11 Q. Obviously, I would prefer, if this is a name you can give

12 publicly, that you give it publicly. Is there any reason not to give this

13 name publicly?

14 A. Well, all right. Very well. I won't be jeopardising these

15 people, because there was an official investigation. Zoran Mijatovic,

16 deputy head of the Security Services of Serbia, Dusan Mihajlovic, the

17 Interior Minister of Serbia.

18 Q. What did Mijatovic say about these mass graves that were found?

19 A. That there was an official investigation conducted by the MUP

20 which indicates exactly the perpetrators, the locations, the sites

21 themselves, but that for some reason that investigation was stopped.

22 Otherwise I myself, when I was kidnapped, was exposed to torture --

23 Q. I'm coming to that in a minute.

24 A. -- linked to the mass graves.

25 Q. Yes. I want to know a little bit more about what you learnt about

1 the mass graves. There were mass graves. Mijatovic told you about it.

2 Was there any connection made between those graves and any other finding

3 or occurrence at that time?

4 A. Not only Mr. Mijatovic, but Mr. Mihajlovic as well, the Internal

5 Affairs Minister. They merely told me the results of the investigation,

6 as far as it had got. Now, could you clarify what you mean by the

7 connection?

8 Q. Had a vehicle been found in the Danube River? Is there a

9 connection between one and the other?

10 A. Yes, a vehicle had been found in the Danube, at a place called

11 Vitusi Puteljak, near Tekija, and it was a vehicle which Mr. Keta took

12 from the customs department and gave to the units of public security to

13 transport the bodies, just prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and

14 Yugoslavia.

15 Q. What did Mijatovic tell you about all this? And then we'll turn

16 on to the circumstances of your leaving Yugoslavia. What did Mijatovic

17 tell you about all this?

18 A. Well, quite simply, that -- actually, he didn't tell me his

19 opinion, but the results of the investigation, that there was a clear

20 connection between Mr. Milosevic and the order to mask -- cover up the

21 graves, and that these bodies had been brought in before the NATO

22 intervention and that the origin of those bodies, unfortunately, was that

23 in the units of Sreten Lukic and not the state security of Serbia, and

24 that that is why a cover-up was under force, a cover-up for the truth and

25 the mass graves, although our official organs were well aware of it.

1 Q. Were these the only mass graves of which you learned or were there

2 others?

3 A. No. I just discussed one. I didn't have the psychological

4 strength to go into the others.

5 Q. Sreten Lukic at the time the head of the MUP in Kosovo; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. We'll come back now, then, to deal with the circumstances in which

8 you came to leave Yugoslavia. What happened to you?

9 A. Well, after I had started preparing my book and sourcing the

10 material for the book linked to Kosovo and the crimes connected with

11 Kosovo, a short time after that, and after my telephone conversations had

12 been intercepted and that they came to learn that I was preparing a book

13 which would be expounding the kind of things I am saying here today, I was

14 quite simply kidnapped in the street, and two hours later so was my wife,

15 at the beginning of October 1999.

16 Q. How long were you held for, altogether?

17 A. We were both kidnapped, drugged, and taken to two different

18 private prisons, where we spent two days each, my wife and myself, that

19 is.

20 Q. What happened to you in prison? I don't want to distress you and

21 we don't need to go into it in great detail, not because it may not have

22 been --

23 A. No, and to save time too. But it was torture of the Latin

24 American variety, from administering injections to being beaten up, to be

25 suffocated, and I'm building up this source and these materials for my

1 book, but I don't want to present them all. But there was an attempt to

2 show a sort of non-existent international plot and conspiracy against Mr.

3 Slobodan Milosevic.

4 Q. And the -- were you questioned?

5 A. If you can call it questioning, if beating with a sack over your

6 head and being drugged can be called questioned, then I was questioned.

7 That's how I was questioned.

8 Q. And what was the topic of the questioning? What was its apparent

9 direction?

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is page 18 of the summary. I'm sorry

11 not to have directed you to it earlier.

12 A. Well, it was geared towards knowing why I was investigating this,

13 the Serb graves and the mass graves, why I was in contact with the SDB, do

14 I really want to write this book, and so on and so forth. And around

15 public -- private matters of that kind.

16 Secondly, we discussed the investigations. That was the reason

17 for my being tortured, because they wanted me to acknowledge the so-called

18 conspiracy against Mr. Milosevic, his private security, and so on, British

19 conspiracy, and that I had contacts with intelligence services. And then

20 they tortured me and my wife and wanted us to say that it was -- we were

21 engaged in espionage. Now, we managed to survive this torture. I was

22 drugged, my wife was not drugged. She was only beaten.

23 And then the next stage of the investigation took a somewhat

24 different turn. In that next stage, these individuals said that they were

25 the people who wanted to overthrow Milosevic, in fact, and that everything

1 I went through was in fact a test on their part to see how fit I was to

2 survive and that they wanted me to link them up to the people from the

3 British intelligence service so that we could cooperate to toppling Mr.

4 Milosevic.

5 Q. You were released. How much longer after your release did you

6 stay in Serbia at that time?

7 A. Well, I was released two hours prior to the abortive attempt to

8 assassinate Vuk Draskovic, and I stayed on for another month.

9 Q. And then eventually you were able to leave the country?

10 A. Yes, legally, because I saw that a killing was being prepared this

11 time.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think I'm going to pause there, and

13 perhaps we can deal with the other topic in general. Might it be

14 convenient to deal with that itself in private session? Because names may

15 get mentioned. The argument about the admissibility.

16 JUDGE MAY: I think the matter should be dealt with, if possible,

17 in public, because it's a matter of principle, without mentioning any

18 names. If you want to refer to the statement, perhaps that would be a

19 convenient way to deal with it.

20 MR. NICE: My notes would suggest that this issue relates or would

21 become relevant to page 2, paragraph 3. Now, I'm not sure about that one.

22 That's the one I'm not sure about. I've got an annotation at the foot of

23 paragraph 3 which may relate to this sort of material. And then the rest

24 of the material turned up today, and I have annotations starting at page

25 17, paragraph 96. 97, 98. Then at page 20, paragraph 108.

1 JUDGE KWON: How about paragraph 87, page 15?

2 MR. NICE: I didn't note that one at the time, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE KWON: If you could check it out later.

4 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. Now, it seems to me that when we come

5 to page 17 -- I've dealt with 17. When we come to page 20, the issue

6 arises in a similar way in respect to paragraph 113, but rather

7 differently in relation to paragraph 108.

8 I'm passed a note that Your Honour is quite right about the

9 earlier page, paragraph 87.

10 Paragraph 113 is the usual problem. Paragraph 108 I think is a

11 different problem, because paragraph 108 is not dependent upon anxiety

12 about the well-being of others, and it's a matter perhaps for the witness

13 to give further explanation of his reasons for not wishing to give this

14 evidence publicly. It may be convenient if I asked him about that once

15 more, so that we can understand the difference.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. NICE: So that he can understand the difference as well.

18 Q. Mr. Tanic, as you realise, the Chamber is about to consider

19 evidence that turns on what you were told by other people, you being

20 concerned to protect their names in order to protect them from risk. Now,

21 before we come to deliberate -- or before the Chamber comes to deliberate

22 on that and to hear argument about it, there's another passage of evidence

23 which related to the conversation or encounter certainly you had with the

24 accused in April 1999.

25 What's your reason, so that we can have it, for preferring to give

1 that evidence in private session, given that you've said everything else

2 you've had to say about the accused publicly and given also that, as we

3 know, you're protected in these proceedings by facial distortion in order

4 that your future security may be properly preserved? So what's your

5 concern about the evidence in April 1999?

6 A. It is my overall relationship to the Tribunal. I wish to show

7 maximum respect. Mr. Milosevic rejects everything I say, beginning with

8 my very existence in these affairs onwards. So I'm ready to give the

9 Tribunal just those statements which I can confirm by at least two or

10 three independent sources, so that it becomes quite clear that --

11 Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm going to stop you there. It's the Tribunal and the

12 lawyers who address it who decide issues of law, sufficiency of evidence,

13 and matters of that sort, not for you. So the question is quite simple.

14 There's no reason not to give that evidence; if you don't wish to give it,

15 just say you don't wish to give it, and then we'll move on, but there's no

16 reason in what you've advanced for not giving the evidence. Are you

17 prepared to give that evidence?

18 A. Well, not because there is official communication with Milosevic

19 at that time. That is sufficient for public -- for a public statement,

20 public testimony. Nothing changes in this communication. He did the same

21 thing he did in the private communication, which I can't prove. So it's

22 the same thing. I have not cut short this information to the Tribunal.

23 Q. Very well. Are you prepared, then - it's for the Tribunal to

24 weigh - are you prepared to tell us what was said at that meeting in April

25 1999, please?

1 A. I am prepared to state what was said in official communication

2 with Mr. Milosevic, and that is the same substance as the other kind.

3 JUDGE MAY: It is pointless going on fencing like this. Let us

4 move on.

5 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. Well, I think that comes to an end of

6 that paragraph.

7 Paragraph 113 falls into the same category, the general category,

8 and page 131 [sic] certainly, and I think that's all I have.

9 The Tribunal is in a position to provide closed session under --

10 or in camera proceedings under Rule 75, subject also to Rule 79, and Rule

11 79 is fairly narrow. It deals with closed session for public order or

12 morality. Safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim

13 or witness is provided in Rule 75, or the protection of the interests of

14 justice, which is rather more broad. It may be that it's the protection

15 of the interests of justice that is one thing that the Chamber should have

16 in mind in considering the present position.

17 When we come back to 75, making sure it hasn't been amended,

18 because I still haven't got an up-to-date version with me. I'll read from

19 the amended version:

20 "A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding to determine whether

21 to order..." and then "(i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or

22 the media of the identity or the whereabouts of a victim or witness or of

23 persons related to or associated with a victim or witness by means such

24 as..." and then it runs through protective measures not including closed

25 session.

1 And then without listing a series of criteria, identifies (ii),

2 "closed session in accordance with Rule 79." And then (iii),

3 "appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims

4 and witnesses, such as one-way closed-circuit television."

5 So that looked at in the most technical sense, simply because Rule

6 79 is not given further criteria in Rule 75, the category of persons

7 identified in 75(B)(i), which is inclusive of persons related to or

8 associated with a victim or witness might not, prima facie, cover this

9 particular circumstance, although if it would be appropriate, and we would

10 invite you to say it really must be, to incorporate that wider reasoning

11 for closed sessions, then it could be. And in any event, the interests of

12 justice -- it's not described as the interests of justice, it's described

13 as the protection

14 of the interests of justice -- would allow what this witness seeks.

15 He seeks to be able to give his evidence in certain particulars,

16 withholding from the full public scrutiny the names of people from whom he

17 derived information. The names will, of course, be known to the accused

18 and may be provided by the accused to those assisting him in the

19 preparation of his defence as to the amici, and in those circumstances,

20 there is no unfairness on the accused. His rights are fully preserved.

21 He's able to cross-examine. It might be necessary to have discrete areas

22 of closed session or private session testimony for the cross-examination,

23 but he's quite able to deal with the case, and there is no loss to him.

24 The witness's concerns, of course, reflect that there are others

25 who may hold views contrary to his, who may be concerned by illegal means

1 to thwart these proceedings, and who would thus pose a very real threat to

2 sources of information upon which he acted. The Court knows of the

3 concerns we've had about the dissemination of information, but so far,

4 apart from the matters I've drawn to your attention in the past, nothing

5 further has come to light. And now, of course, the accused's assistants

6 are committed to the Rules of the Tribunal. So there's a realistic

7 prospect of material heard in private session not leaking out, and the

8 accused has told you himself on an earlier occasion that his word is

9 enough for these things and he doesn't have to be bound by your Rules.

10 So that the witness identifies a real distinction between what is

11 provided here in -- or could be provided here in private session, to make

12 the trial fair, and what could only be provided, in his judgement,

13 publicly, at risk to those individuals. My understanding is that there

14 have been earlier occasions of selective private-session evidence being

15 held, I think once in the Tadic case.

16 JUDGE MAY: That's not a difficulty. We can order part of the

17 evidence to be given in private session.

18 MR. NICE: I was saying also for the protection of people other

19 than witnesses, although I think in the Tadic case it was probably for a

20 relation. And with this sort of case and with these sorts of issues,

21 although we are doing everything we can to ensure that everything is given

22 in public in this case, this sort of evidence, which is potentially

23 valuable or very valuable to the Tribunal, does expose certain individuals

24 to risk.

25 Now, there's, of course, a difference between -- and it's a

1 difference that the accused has himself really articulated - between

2 naming the people, whether they are named as co-perpetrators or whether

3 they are simply people closely associated with government at the time, and

4 he's named those entirely straightforwardly. There's a difference between

5 those people and the functionaries who don't fall within those categories,

6 who may not themselves be associated with any wrongdoings of the kind

7 charged here but whose provision of information to this witness, in the

8 public good, could be deeply damaging to them. And so we would invite you

9 to say that it's entirely proper, for these comparatively limited number

10 of instances, to allow private-session testimony, in both direct and

11 cross-examination, for the Chamber in due course to decide what weight to

12 place on that evidence if it decides that there is any diminution in its

13 value by reason of its being in private session.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, wouldn't you say that the Rules are

15 primarily designed for the protection of victims and witnesses and that

16 insofar as the protection of other persons is concerned, there would be a

17 higher threshold to be met to gain that protection?

18 MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I'd agree with the second

19 proposition, although I think the first proposition is clearly right,

20 because the Rules, when they were being drafted, probably had victims and

21 witnesses more specifically in focus. But I would respectfully doubt

22 whether a court would operate on a higher threshold of safety or danger --

23 a higher threshold of danger or lower threshold of safety, if it was aware

24 that testimony was about to be given which would expose someone to real

25 risk.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you know, one reason for the higher

2 threshold might be the availability of reliable evidence to the Chamber.

3 That evidence would certainly be easier to get in relation to a victim and

4 witness than in relation to other persons. So it's a question of how will

5 the Chamber be satisfied as to the need for protection of a person who is

6 neither a victim nor witness? So it's a question of evidence to satisfy

7 the Chamber, and it seems to me that it would be much easier to get that

8 evidence in relation to victims and witnesses.

9 MR. NICE: Well, that's a different proposition, and I think the

10 threshold of evidential material may typically be different. Yes. I

11 don't necessarily disagree with that. But it's the very nature of the

12 material that the witness is providing here that would - and we can see it

13 from the summary - which would point to the obvious danger that providers

14 of that material might be in, given the nature of people who still hold

15 very strong views in a country that has, as we know, quite a high level of

16 crimes recently associated -- killings, indeed, recently associated, or

17 comparatively recently, associated with these events. People have

18 disappeared, and, as we know, people have been shot, and so on, for one

19 reason or another, but it's of that sort of country.

20 So if we look at just one or two of the particular passages, and I

21 think probably page 17 is as good as any, without going into the detail of

22 either the sources or the topics upon which they were providing

23 information to this witness. Paragraph 96, but perhaps more particularly,

24 97, one can see particular places referred to. And then I think also if

25 you go over to page 107.

1 JUDGE MAY: The paragraph?

2 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. Paragraph 107, page 19. And then finally,

3 page 22, paragraph 131. One can readily imagine how people providing

4 information on those topics might very well be at considerable risk from

5 the intervention of others but how their provision in private session will

6 mean that the accused is well able to conduct and have a fair trial.

7 I think that's all I can say on it.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.

9 MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour. This is an issue where we should look

10 at the Rules first of all. I note His Honour Judge Robinson's

11 observations about Rule 75, which does seem, on our reading, to be a

12 provision more directly connected with protection of victims and

13 witnesses. When one looks at 75(B)(i), again victim or witness or of

14 persons related to or associated with a victim or witness, looks rather to

15 deal with more of a witness's personal situation as he finds himself in a

16 courtroom at that time, the protection of others who are close to him.

17 And we would say that this provision is more specifically designed for the

18 witness who comes from a place where his family is, his associates, people

19 related to him, could in some way be affected by his giving particular

20 evidence. That isn't the case here with this particular witness and his

21 circumstances. It is not the normal one and would fall outside Rule 75 in

22 its general application. We say it's more Rule 79 issue that the

23 Prosecution are bringing here, relying more upon the protection of the

24 interests of justice.

25 This is an issue where an accused is entitled to have evidence

1 which a witness gives in public and to be accountable for that which he

2 says. Reliance upon sources which are not identified publicly does put

3 him at a disadvantage, although the names may be given in closed session

4 and identities able to be investigated by his associates in preparation of

5 his defence. This kind of material can also help an accused if it is made

6 public, because others associated with these events and information at the

7 time are able to scrutinise what is said and able to offer themselves to a

8 defendant as witnesses on his behalf if they disagree with what is said.

9 The equality of arms principle does, to a great extent, require, as much

10 as possible, for a Defence to be in public so it is capable of being

11 analysed by external sources, scrutinised, and witnesses to be held

12 accountable for what they have said publicly. The difficulty is, with a

13 closed session, that that becomes less likely and it can affect the

14 equality of arms which the Court must seek to achieve in providing a fair

15 trial.

16 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Tanic. You want to say

19 something. This is really a legal argument, as you must understand, but

20 if there's something you want to say about your evidence, you can.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I'm not going to

22 interfere in the legal argument. This has to do with my evidence. I

23 believe that this question is unduly hampering my testimony, and therefore

24 I am prepared to state in public what I said I would like to say in public

25 [sic] session. I don't want to make the work of the Trial Chamber, of the

1 Office of the Prosecutor, more difficult, so I'm prepared to do that.

2 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

3 MR. NICE: That's very helpful. I'll go back over those

4 paragraphs. I do, for my own reasons, and in order to communicate

5 something to the accused, need about 30 seconds in private session. It's

6 got nothing to do with the current testimony, it has something to do with

7 the witness. May I do that literally now, while we've broken the

8 testimony?

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

10 [Private session]

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12 [Open session]

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.

14 MR. NICE: Right. Well, I think I'm going to go as swiftly as I

15 can. We're going to revisit certain topics that you've given us some

16 answers on earlier. Again, briefly, please, if you can.

17 Q. Paragraph 87, page 15. You spoke of the Horseshoe plan, and

18 indeed you spoke of the peaks of power - those were your terms - who

19 opposed it. Who were the peaks of power who opposed and refused to

20 implement this plan?

21 A. The army -- the use of the army and police for these purposes were

22 opposed by Jovica Stanisic, head of state security of Serbia, Zoran

23 Mijatovic in the capacity of his deputy, that is to say, head of the

24 centre of the services of state security of Belgrade. That is practically

25 80 per cent of the SDB. General Momcilo Perisic, in his capacity as chief

1 of general staff. General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, in his capacity as

2 head of the intelligence service of the army. It is known as the KOS.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 A. Then there are other persons as well. I'm sorry, there are other

5 persons who also opposed this.

6 Q. Very well. Go on.

7 A. Then the leading persons in the operations of the SDB and the

8 military security. Then -- I have to pull myself together in order to

9 recollect all of this. Then politicians from the so-called Reformist

10 Group within the government of Serbia, or rather, within the Serbian and

11 Yugoslavia political scene. Mr. Zoran Lilic, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, Mr.

12