1 Wednesday, 29 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 10.30 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

10 WITNESS: JOSEPH OMER MICHEL MAISONNEUVE

11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, we'll take one adjournment, at about

12 12.00, for 20 minutes.

13 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

15 Q. General Maisonneuve, would you tell the Court your full name,

16 please.

17 A. Joseph Omer Michel Maisonneuve.

18 Q. And General Maisonneuve, I understand that you are currently a

19 Major General. You are presently the Assistant Deputy Chief of the

20 Defence Staff for the Canadian Armed Forces in Ottawa; is that correct?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Is it also fair to say, sir, that you've spent about 30 years in

23 the armed forces?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You've been an armoured officer?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And, sir, have you been involved in the command of troops?

3 A. Yes. I have commanded troops all the way up to unit command,

4 which is a regimental command, and also have served time as a staff

5 officer in major operations and in formations in Canada and abroad.

6 Q. And just before we move on to that, a unit, just for people like

7 me who --

8 A. About a thousand -- a thousand people.

9 Q. I see. And, sir, when you said you've also served abroad, have

10 you spent any time in the Balkans?

11 A. Yes, I have. I spent one year as the Chief of Operations for

12 UNPROFOR, from 1993 to 1994. That's my time in the Balkans.

13 Q. All right. And do you have any experience in training troops in

14 all-arms combat?

15 A. Yes, I have trained troops, and I have trained with troops up to a

16 brigade level, which is a formation of about 5.000 people, participation

17 in many exercises and manoeuvres.

18 Q. I see. And in addition to being in the Balkans, do you have any

19 other experience abroad?

20 A. I have spent three tours in Cyprus with the UN mission there.

21 I've also spent two years in France and on exchanges with the US army, US

22 armed forces.

23 Q. Now, sir, did you become involved with KVM, the Kosovo

24 Verification Mission, and if so, when?

25 A. Yes, I did. In November of 1998, I was sent to Vienna to head the

1 KVM support unit for about three weeks, and then I was asked to deploy to

2 Kosovo to head the first Regional Centre to be opened in Prizren. I spent

3 essentially three months there, until the mission was evacuated in March

4 of 1999, and I then went into Albania.

5 Q. All right. We'll get back to your involvement there later on.

6 Now, sir, did you in fact provide a statement to the officials of

7 the Office of the Prosecutor on the 10th of March in the year 2000?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. And have you had an opportunity of reviewing that statement,

10 making some minor corrections as recently as yesterday, the 28th of May,

11 2002?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. And at that time, sir, did you solemnly declare that the contents

14 of that statement with the attachments and with those amendments you

15 pointed out were true to the best of your information, knowledge, and

16 belief?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: Might that statement at this point be entered as an

19 exhibit in these proceedings.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 175.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Now, Your Honours, you have the benefit or will

22 have the benefit shortly of copies of the 92 bis statement of this

23 witness. Pursuant to the request of the Trial Chamber to take part of

24 this witness's evidence live, the version of the statement that we are now

25 distributing has in fact received numbering of paragraphs for ease of

1 reference. So the advanced copy that the Court may have received in order

2 to determine whether it was appropriate to bis him has now got paragraph

3 numbers, and it might be of assistance to you to know that I propose to

4 deal live with paragraphs 21 through 37, which deal with the VJ;

5 paragraphs 42, and then 45 through 50 which deal with his connection with

6 the MUP. And those are the paragraphs that I want to deal with live.

7 Q. Now, General --

8 JUDGE MAY: You're also going to deal with Racak live.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, absolutely. And that is contained in those

10 paragraphs that I've just outlined.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

12 MR. RYNEVELD:

13 Q. General Maisonneuve, is it fair to say, sir, that in your

14 statement, the way it was taken, the first seven paragraphs --

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps might the witness also have a copy of this

16 before him to -- it would assist, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Certainly.

18 THE WITNESS: I do have a copy, actually. Thank you.

19 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

20 Q. Paragraphs 1 through 7 deal with your background, is that correct,

21 setting up of the OSCE?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And then paragraphs 8 through 20 deal with the OSCE/KVM mission

24 that you've -- that are contained in the statement?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. And then at paragraph 21, you -- from paragraphs 21 through to

2 paragraph -- sorry, I think it's -- 37, you deal with the incidents at

3 Racak and your observations of the VJ?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And then moving to paragraph 38, you deal with the Ministry of the

6 Interior, or the MUP, right through to paragraph 52.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Thereafter, you speak about the KLA and the KVM Refugee Task Force

9 in Albania, which starts at paragraph 56.

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. All right. Turning, if I may, to those areas that I, at the

12 Court's request, will be asking you some further detailed questions,

13 you've already told us, sir, that you joined the KVM, I believe, in Vienna

14 in -- I believe it was in 1998; is that correct?

15 A. November of 1998, yes.

16 Q. Now, at some point, did you become the head of the KVM's Regional

17 Centre in Prizren?

18 A. Yes I did. That would have in been the middle of December of

19 1998.

20 Q. And this Regional Centre, is that the RC Prizren? Is that what

21 they're referred to in the documentation?

22 A. Yes, that's what's referred to in the documentation. What it was,

23 the KVM itself covered all of Kosovo but it was divided into five Regional

24 Centres, basically covering the five administrative districts of Kosovo,

25 and Prizren was the administrative district in which my Regional Centre

1 was operating.

2 Q. Thank you. I'm going to leave a little bit of space between my

3 next question to allow for translation.

4 Sir, to your knowledge, were there any VJ brigades with elements

5 positioned in the RC Prizren, which was your area of responsibility?

6 A. Yes. There were essentially two brigades operating in my Regional

7 Centre. The 549th Brigade operated out of Prizren itself. That's where

8 its headquarters was, with the main responsibilities of the border with

9 Albania. And there was an element of the 243rd Brigade, which was based

10 in Urosevac, which also had some elements deployed within the

11 administrative district of Prizren.

12 Q. And you've told us that there were five different Regional

13 Centres. The area of Racak/Stimlje, was that wholly within your area of

14 RC Prizren or was that on the border of -- with another RC district or

15 what can you tell us about that?

16 A. It was actually totally within Regional Centre 5, which is the

17 Pristina Regional Centre, but right outside my area, near the boundary

18 between my area and Regional Centre 5, so it was in RC 5.

19 Q. I see. And returning to the two VJ brigades, the 549th and the

20 243rd, do you know whether they were part of a larger organisation within

21 the VJ?

22 A. Yes. Both of them belong to the Pristina Corps.

23 Q. I see. Well, if I might just distinguish between the two. Let's

24 start with the 549. Do you know what type of a brigade that was?

25 A. It was a motorised brigade.

1 Q. Motorised brigade.

2 A. Motorised brigade, which means it was carried in mostly trucks and

3 dismounted a lighter brigade. Obviously for the reason that it was

4 operating mainly along the border region, and so in very wooded

5 operations, they could not use heavy weapons.

6 Q. You say they operated mainly along the border. Was that because

7 of -- was there a particular area of jurisdiction that they were involved

8 in?

9 A. Yes. That was their area of responsibility, was taking care of

10 the border. They had border battalions that belonged to them and so

11 forth.

12 Q. Do you know who the commander of that brigade was?

13 A. Colonel Delic.

14 Q. And did you ever meet Colonel Delic?

15 A. Yes, I did, on several occasions.

16 Q. And how would you describe him?

17 A. I would describe him as a -- a professional soldier. He was

18 actually quite straightforward and we always had very productive

19 discussions when we met.

20 Q. And did you in fact -- you mentioned that you had discussions.

21 Did you in fact have a meeting with Colonel Delic on the 4th of February

22 of 1999?

23 A. Colonel Delic, I believe, was the 1st of February. Yes, it was

24 the 1st of February.

25 Q. Sorry. I got you the wrong date. 1st of February, yes. And

1 attached to your statement, sir, did you produce minutes that were

2 recorded of your meeting with Colonel Delic?

3 A. Yes, I did. In fact, every meeting that I attended with members

4 of the parties, I would always have a note-taker with me that would then

5 produce a record of meeting. In this case, when I met him on the 1st of

6 February, we had some discussions. Primarily I wished to open a field

7 office near the border, and so we were in discussions of his

8 responsibilities and whether this was within his authorities or not.

9 Q. All right.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, if I could ask you to turn, if you

11 would, please, to the attachment that's -- it's got a number of numbers,

12 but it's dated the 1st of February, 1999, and it's entitled "Record of

13 discussions, visit to commander VJ Brigade Prizren, held at officers'

14 recreation facility."

15 Do Your Honours have that document?

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

18 Q. Witness, do you -- do you have that particular document in the

19 bundle?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. You have that as well. All right. Well, sir, these were the

22 minutes that were taken by your assigned note-taker? What was his name?

23 A. Captain Chris Weissflog.

24 Q. And he is in the list of people that are noted to have attended

25 that meeting; is that right?

1 A. Yes, he is.

2 Q. And there is a legend of initials at the top of that document,

3 showing "D" meaning Colonel Delic, "M" meaning you, and then the other

4 participants are also listed on that document; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. Now, sir, what can you tell us of this -- first of all, you've

7 reviewed this document, and does it accurately compare with your

8 recollection of what went on at that meeting?

9 A. Yes, it does.

10 Q. All right. Now, sir, can you tell us, if you would, please, what

11 significance you attach to these particular notes of the meeting that you

12 had with Colonel Delic?

13 A. Well, in essence, it shows that Colonel Delic did not have a

14 completely free hand. He was not operating individually in his brigade

15 area. He was part of a chain of command, as any military force that I, of

16 course, have come in contact with usually does. He -- I was asking him to

17 -- to agree to open a field office near Pleneja, which was within five

18 kilometres of the border area, and he was explaining that he did not have

19 the authorisation and he had to seek it from higher. I also got a sense,

20 of course, that he was a disciplined officer and that his forces obeyed to

21 his commands. I had previously dealt with him and received the same type

22 of sense from him. If you go to the next page--

23 Q. Just before we do that, if I may, on this document there are dots

24 or bullet points. This reference that you make to the fact that he needed

25 higher command, is that reflected --

1 A. Fifth bullet there.

2 Q. Fifth bullet point. All right. And there's a "D" ascribed

3 there.

4 A. Yes, that's Delic speaking that he wasn't personally against

5 Pleneja but he felt he must have authorisation from his command, i.e.,

6 from higher command.

7 Q. I see. All right. And you were about to address our attention to

8 the next page.

9 A. Right. If you go to the next page, the second bullet down, where

10 he says, "I'm not authorised to decide on this," and he talks about

11 General Loncar, who was the liaison, VJ liaison officer at the Pristina

12 level, and Delic says that he's not the commander, he's a liaison officer,

13 and therefore he had no authority. Loncar had who no authority to agree

14 to the deployment of the field office.

15 Q. And the reference to, "I am not authorised to decide on this,"

16 what was the reference to what he was not authorised to decide on? Are

17 you able to --

18 A. Yes. This is the question of whether we would be allowed to

19 patrol near the -- within the five-kilometre area of the border.

20 Q. I see. And again, that was outside -- he said that was outside

21 the scope of his authority?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Turning to the next page, three of four, about halfway down the

24 page, we see the sixth bullet point down on the page, again there's the

25 initial "D." What, if anything, do you make of that?

1 A. Well, here he -- this is where I got a sense that he was firmly in

2 control of his forces where I was telling him that his people had been

3 intimidating the locals, and he -- he was saying there that intimidation

4 by his forces, he saw that as a breach discipline and that he -- he always

5 thought, or he always told me that he would deal with them.

6 Q. All right. So this -- from your meeting with Delic, then, you

7 came to the opinions that you've earlier stated, and these are some of

8 the --

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. -- things that you point to in terms of why you arrived at those

11 decisions. Okay.

12 Well, if we could move very briefly, then, sir, time is of the

13 essence to --

14 JUDGE MAY: Before we do, do you want these exhibits entered?

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Absolutely, Your Honour. They are part of the bis

16 package, so they are part of the last exhibit number, but it might be of

17 some -- I'm in the Court's hands as to whether you think it would be

18 assistance to the Court to have them with separate numbers.

19 JUDGE MAY: I think it would be of assistance since some of the

20 package are documents which have already been exhibited.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. And not all of the documents that are

22 attached to the bis package, so to speak, will be actually referred to.

23 They're part of the bis'ing but they're not part of the live examination.

24 JUDGE MAY: Let us, therefore, give these separate exhibit numbers

25 now, and any additional documents that you want exhibited which were in

1 the package, you can refer to later, if you would.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can we give this a number, please.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 176.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

6 Q. If I might then turn, if that meets with Your Honours' approval,

7 to the 243rd Brigade. You mentioned there were two brigades. What type

8 of brigade was it and who was its commander, if you recall?

9 A. This was a mechanised brigade, meaning it was -- soldiers there

10 were carried in armoured personnel carriers, and its commander was Colonel

11 Jelic.

12 Q. All right. And -- I'm sorry. You've told us earlier what a

13 motorised brigade was. What is a mechanised brigade?

14 A. That's what I say, their soldiers were carried in armoured

15 vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, and therefore they were equipped

16 with armoured vehicles.

17 Q. My ignorance of military terms is obvious, I'm sorry.

18 And do you know where they were based?

19 A. They were based in Urosevac. This is where the headquarters of

20 the brigade was.

21 Q. I see. And do you know which elements, if any, of that brigade

22 fell within the RC Prizren's area of responsibility?

23 A. Right. The -- the Urosevac brigade had a combat team, a force of

24 about 150 people with tanks and armoured personnel carriers, deployed on

25 the Dulje Heights. This was one of the agreed-to deployed combat teams.

1 But also outside of their barracks, they had other elements which -- they

2 had basically a company of all-arms deployed also in the area of Racak on

3 top of the -- as well as the combat team in Dulje. So they had a couple

4 of elements outside their barracks. The Dulje combat team was within my

5 area of responsibility and, therefore, I had to have relations with the

6 brigade headquarters in Urosevac.

7 Q. I see. Now, you may have answered this in the course of your

8 question [sic], but was Racak then within the 243rd's area of

9 responsibility?

10 A. Yes, it was.

11 Q. Now, sir, did you hear of an incident in early January involving

12 the KLA near Racak?

13 A. A couple of -- a couple of incidents we heard about, one of which

14 happened directly within my area of responsibility. On the 8th of January

15 - so about a week before Racak - there had been an ambush carried out by

16 the KLA in Stimlje pass, which was a very narrow pass that went through

17 the Dulje Heights. And my -- my people arrived on the scene right after

18 the ambush. There had been -- two policemen were killed right at the

19 moment of the ambush and then another policeman, MUP policeman died in the

20 hospital later, and we took the KLA to task on that one.

21 And there was also another incident involving -- and that one was

22 outside my area of responsibility, was within RC5's area of

23 responsibility, involving again the MUP and a police car that I understood

24 had burned or something like that. This was an incident that happened

25 much closer to the time of Racak.

1 So there had been a couple of incidents by the KLA.

2 Q. All right. You said you took the KLA to task on that. Was there

3 a particular individual you dealt with?

4 A. Yes. My main contact for the entire Prizren Regional Centre was a

5 KLA commander who called himself Drini. So I met with him right after the

6 ambush to explain to him that this was not -- these were -- this was

7 firmly against the agreement, against the ceasefire, that he was only

8 inviting retaliation by doing these -- doing these things. And at that

9 point, he commented that he had not personally ordered the ambush, it had

10 been accomplished by a -- one of his local commanders.

11 Q. I see. Well, moving then to the Racak incident itself, the 15th

12 of January. Did you at some point become aware of an operation by Serb

13 forces near Stimlje?

14 A. Yes. On the 15th of January, the -- General DZ had -- who is the

15 Deputy Head of Mission for operations, had called a meeting of all

16 Regional Centre heads in Pec. At about -- well, towards -- throughout the

17 morning, we'd been receiving reports of an operation against Racak by the

18 VJ and the MUP, and -- to the point where it seemed to be a very -- very

19 important -- a major operation, and therefore, General DZ asked me to go

20 down to -- to take over the operation. Because the operation was in

21 Regional Centre 5, the commander of Regional Centre 5 had not yet been

22 deployed, been appointed, and so he asked me -- General DZ asked me to go

23 and take command of the operation even though it was outside of my area of

24 responsibility.

25 Q. I see. And did you or did KVM have verifiers near Racak at the

1 time of the incident?

2 A. Yes, we did. We had a couple of patrols from Regional Centre 5

3 and, of course, when I was tasked to go down there, I actually dispatched

4 a couple of my own patrols as well to go to Racak and assist Regional

5 Centre 5's patrols on the ground.

6 Q. And do you know, generally speaking, what sort of vantage point

7 they would have had? Were they --

8 A. Yes. Our patrols actually were on the heights surrounding Racak

9 and observing the operation. They observed VJ tanks firing into houses

10 that we believe were occupied because we could see plumes of smoke. And

11 in fact, in those houses, we went down after the firing stopped and let

12 the people out of the basements. These are the reports that I received

13 from my -- my verifiers.

14 I myself arrived on the ground at about 4.30 in the afternoon, and

15 as I was proceeding towards there, I was receiving reports of the firing

16 and so on, which stopped about 3.30. The forces from the VJ and the MUP

17 pulled back at that point, and so when I was travelling towards the --

18 towards Racak, the -- the day was coming to a -- it was January, so -- so

19 darkness fell very quickly, and so instead of going into the village of

20 Racak, I was told they were -- that my people had actually picked up some

21 Albanian wounded and were going to bring them to -- to the hospital. So I

22 decided to go to the hospital and to get the hospital ready to receive the

23 wounded. The hospital was situated right beside the police station in

24 Stimlje.

25 Q. All right. Now, if I can just back up a little bit. You've

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1 indicated that you had your verifiers up in the hills. I believe you

2 indicated that they observed VJ tanks firing into houses. When you say

3 "VJ tanks," are we talking --

4 A. T55s were the type of tanks that they were using. So there were

5 T55s. There were also -- I had some of my people in -- observing the area

6 around and in particular that area that I was mentioning where they had --

7 the VJ had also deployed an element and saw some of the howitzers pointed

8 towards Racak and the villages surrounded -- surrounding the area.

9 Q. Did they report seeing any similar type of weaponry in the village

10 itself?

11 A. No tanks in the village, no.

12 Q. And to your knowledge, did the MUP have tanks and heavy equipment?

13 A. MUP did not have tanks. They had -- but they had Pragas and

14 armoured vehicles, VRDMs and so on. They didn't have tanks.

15 Q. So if there was a T55 tank, that would have been VJ?

16 A. That was a VJ, absolutely.

17 Q. Did they report seeing the MUP at the same time?

18 A. Yes, the MUP were in the village. My assessment after receiving

19 all the reports, and I put the assessment in -- in my statements, my

20 assessment was that the VJ had provided long-range support, if you wish,

21 around the village, support to the operation that was carried out by the

22 -- by the MUP. The house-to-house search and the cleaning of the

23 village, if you wish, was done by the MUP, dismounted MUP.

24 Q. I see. General Maisonneuve, because of your extensive experience,

25 do you have any personal experience with the use of tanks or heavy

1 artillery and other heavy weaponry in combat operations?

2 A. Yes, I do, in exercises and manoeuvres certainly.

3 Q. Have you ever trained in or planned anti-insurgency operations?

4 A. No, I have not, no.

5 Q. Why not?

6 A. Well, in fact, heavy weapons -- I'm an armoured officer and so use

7 of tanks and use of armoured infantry is usually done for -- it's not used

8 in counter-insurgency operations. It's usually done for major combat

9 engagements in wide open spaces and against armoured enemy. If you're

10 going to use -- anti-insurgency operations are usually done by much

11 lighter forces than tanks and so on.

12 Q. Are there any reports that the KLA had tanks and heavy artillery?

13 A. No, the KLA do not have tanks. Certainly not to my knowledge.

14 Q. Sir, from your experience, would it ever be appropriate for tanks

15 or anti-aircraft weapons or artillery or weaponry of the kind to fire at

16 civilian structures?

17 A. Absolutely not. In fact, this was one of the points I made to the

18 brigade commander from Urosevac when I did meet him, was that I thought

19 that the use of such weapons in firing against civilian targets such as

20 houses when in fact we had not observed any fire being returned or in fact

21 any fire previous to the tanks firing into the houses was indiscriminate

22 and inappropriate use of force.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, what would be the more appropriate way

24 of dealing with that situation?

25 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, if there is no -- if there's no

1 firing coming from a house, then you would deploy infantry and move up to

2 the house. If you're fired upon, obviously you would return fire, but

3 professional force does not fire unless -- unless there's a need to fire.

4 If there is a need to bring supporting fire down, you would do it with

5 small arms and so forth. So you actually deal with -- with an enemy with

6 usually proportional forces. There's no doubt that if you need to, you

7 would amass vastly superior forces so that you're prepared to deal with

8 anything but if you're not being fired at, you would not indiscriminately

9 fire and certainly not with heavy weapons.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

11 MR. RYNEVELD:

12 Q. Now, sir -- I'll just wait for translation. Were you or your

13 observers aware of a KLA presence in Racak?

14 A. We were aware of -- of light KLA presence, and in fact, it was

15 confirmed by the -- certainly in statements by the KLA to me after, that

16 the village had been lightly not even defended, if you wish, but they had

17 scouts and a few fighters in the village. But this was not a place that

18 we considered was held by a very strong KLA force.

19 Q. All right. Now, you've told us about this particular incident in

20 Racak and the observation of tanks and heavy artillery. During the

21 remainder of your stay in Kosovo, were there other times where you saw

22 Serb forces direct heavy weapons against civilian structures?

23 A. Oh, that happened on several occasions. It seemed to be the modus

24 operandi of the Serb security forces that any type of provocation, no

25 matter how small, would result in an overwhelming use of force

1 disproportionate to the actions of the KLA or the perpetrators, and this

2 was constantly one of the things that I reinforced to the Serbs but also

3 to the KLA when I met with them, saying I don't know why you're provoking

4 them because you know that it always results in disproportionate use of

5 force.

6 For example, in the Stimlje pass where I said the three policemen

7 eventually died there that were ambushed by the KLA, within -- within a

8 few minutes, a tank pulled out of the Dulje combat team position and moved

9 out so it could fire directly into a village called, I believe,

10 Slapuzane. A small village, firing into the village without any

11 provocation, firing at civilian houses and would automatically cause --

12 you know, any time this would happen, it would automatically cause the

13 locals to pick up whatever they had on their -- you know, and move out of

14 the village, stream out of the village to the next village until things

15 quieted down and then they'd come back. But it was -- you know, this type

16 of retaliation always happened, always seemed to me to be, certainly in my

17 opinion, disproportionate and overwhelming and actually just

18 indiscriminate.

19 Q. I see. Sir, returning to the 15th of January for a moment. I

20 think you've told us already that you went to the hospital to prepare them

21 to receive wounded as a result of the things that you had seen; is that

22 correct?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. All right. Did you see the police that evening? When I say

25 police, I mean the MUP.

1 A. Well, yes. I saw a couple of MUP soldiers or members of the MUP

2 that came over to the hospital, and they were arrogant and were wondering

3 why we were trying to get the doctor up and were not at all pleased to see

4 us roust the doctor and the ambulance to provide help to the Albanian.

5 Q. I see. The following day, the 16th of January, sir, what if

6 anything did you do that day that's relevant to the proceedings before the

7 court?

8 A. Well, first of all, on the 15th in the evening, I organised for my

9 patrols to return early in the morning. I also wanted a presence by

10 Regional Centre 5 patrols in the village, and so we decided that we were

11 going to go back and come back early the next morning.

12 JUDGE MAY: General, you're being asked, if you would, to slow

13 down for the record.

14 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

15 So the 16th in the morning, my verifiers arrived approximately

16 7.00 in the morning in Racak, and reports started filtering back from them

17 that they had -- they were finding bodies and that a major operation had

18 actually taken place the night before in Racak. By the time I made my way

19 to Racak, it was approximately 9.00 in the morning. I went in and

20 observed -- I went in Racak myself and observed the -- a few bodies, and I

21 had -- and they were bodies of elderly -- elderly men. And I had then

22 also prepared a meeting with the brigade commander from Urosevac who I

23 thought was going to show up on the 16th of January.

24 MR. RYNEVELD:

25 Q. Before we get to that meeting, if I may, sir, some of your

1 observations. Did you attend an area known as the gully?

2 A. Yes, I did. And this would have been -- but this would have been

3 after my meeting, I believe.

4 Q. All right. Perhaps I'll come back to that. We'll go to the

5 meeting -- we'll try to deal with the 16th in a chronological fashion,

6 then. You tried to arrange a meeting with whom?

7 A. With Colonel Jelic, the brigade commander from Urosevac.

8 Q. That would be the 243rd.

9 A. The 243rd. And he did not show up but his liaison officer did, a

10 Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic.

11 Q. I see. And again, did you have a note-taker with you for that

12 meeting?

13 A. I did. And I believe the notes are attached.

14 Q. Yes.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, if I can ask you to turn to the

16 attachment, it appears to be a two-page attachment, dated the 16th of

17 January, RC Prizren, "Record of discussions visit to 243 Brigade Urosevac,

18 held at Brigade Headquarters at Urosevac" and with four people attending,

19 in the legend

20 THE WITNESS: Page 15, at the bottom of the page, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MR. RYNEVELD:

23 Q. Now, according to the legend, sir -- again, this is a formality:

24 This is an accurate record and accords with your recollection?

25 A. Yes, it does.

1 Q. What can you tell us, sir, about this particular meeting?

2 A. Well, this was a meeting where -- where, of course, I was incensed

3 after -- after seeing the damage and the dead bodies, and I was actually

4 coming to take the brigade commander to task and ask him to confirm that

5 he had been involved, that his forces had been involved. I also mentioned

6 the Tribunal. And at that point, Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic confirmed

7 that the MUP had actually participated, had actually done the action, but

8 had been supported by a Praga and a tank from the brigade, from the VJ.

9 Q. And your allegations and his response are reflected in these

10 notes; is that correct?

11 A. Yes, that's correct. It's --

12 Q. The third -- the third bullet point is "M," that's you.

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. You said you saw atrocities in Racak, you assessed VJ and MUP were

15 responsible?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. "Fifty people killed, non-combatants." Did you tell him that?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. And what else did you tell him?

20 A. Well, I mentioned all the -- you know, the fact that his tanks and

21 heavy artillery had moved out and that the -- they still had not moved

22 back to their barracks, which was against the agreement.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. And then I -- of course, I was speaking with the liaison officer,

25 this was not the brigade commander. So I was not happy not to be able to

1 speak to the brigade commander himself to mention that to him. And then

2 at the end when I -- or at the beginning -- at the end of my state --

3 first statement when I mentioned, "Do you have anything to say?" and you

4 see I think it's bullet about eight down, where he says, "Stimlje was done

5 by the MUP with Praga -- Praga armoured vehicles and one tank," and then I

6 guess understood there that this was the VJ in support.

7 Q. I see. All right. So basically he's blaming it on the MUP with

8 support from the VJ at that point?

9 A. Right. And then I -- that's the -- the next bullet is where I

10 mention the Tribunal and the fact that I thought that this behaviour was

11 certainly not in keeping with a professional army's behaviour.

12 Q. Okay. Now, did you then have a second meeting with VJ officers at

13 a later date?

14 A. Yes, I did --

15 JUDGE MAY: We ought to exhibit that document.

16 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, sorry.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 177.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

19 A. On the 16th, I also met with the MUP commander in Stimlje.

20 Q. Yes. Before we move to the MUP commander in Stimlje -- I'll

21 return to that, if I may, later. I want to go from your meeting with

22 Petrovic, who was the liaison officer for the VJ, to a subsequent meeting

23 you had on the 4th of February, still with the VJ --

24 A. Right.

25 Q. -- and compare and/or contrast what occurred or what you were told

1 at that second meeting.

2 A. Right. The second meeting, I'd been -- right from the 16th of

3 January, I had been attempting to meet with the commander of the brigade

4 from Urosevac and had on a number of occasions requested meetings, and it

5 didn't happen until the 4th of January, and that's recorded in the record

6 of discussion at page 18 at the bottom of the page.

7 Q. Right.

8 MR. RYNEVELD: Do Your Honours have the 4th of February 1999

9 "Record of discussions visit to commander of VJ Brigade Urosevac" at the

10 -- I think it's pages 18, 17, and 16 of the attachments. Thank you.

11 Q. First of all, sir, again attending - we have a legend - again you

12 have your note-taker taking these notes, and again, this accords with your

13 recollection of what transpired?

14 A. It does.

15 Q. And we have you there. We have, among other people, we have

16 Colonel Kotur, the VJ chief liaison officer to the KVM headquarters?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. And "D" is Colonel Krsman Jelic?

19 A. Yes. It actually should be a "J." In the legend, that should be

20 a "J" throughout the --

21 Q. All right. And Petrovic, the chap you spoke to earlier, was also

22 present?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. All right. Well, sir, what happened at that meeting and what if

25 anything is of significance in your --

1 A. Well, first of all, in this -- this meeting I was -- again I was

2 unhappy because he had refused to meet me or certainly had not met me

3 until I had almost forced him and through, I think it's through Colonel

4 Kotur, that I was able to meet him.

5 Again, I mentioned or I -- I asked him where he had been on the

6 day, and he -- he was rather evasive about where he was. He also would

7 not confirm that -- that he had operated with the MUP during the Racak

8 operation. He was saying that in fact his forces had not fired into the

9 village but had fired in the outskirts towards other -- another two

10 villages, Belince and -- I can't remember the name of the other village.

11 But the point was that he did not -- he did not confirm that his forces

12 were actually operating along with the MUP at that meeting.

13 Q. And did he acknowledge that VJ forces were in fact operational?

14 A. Oh, he did, and he -- their approach there was that the MUP and

15 the VJ were operating independently but simultaneously, which was -- which

16 is probably -- it's totally against -- it's just so farfetched because in

17 any military operation, the one thing you want to do when you're firing

18 real bullets is to make sure that you are coordinated down to the most

19 exact manner; and the way you do this coordination and cooperation is you

20 meet ahead of time to discuss areas where your forces will be operating,

21 where you will base your forces. You discuss points of coordination such

22 as reporting lines, areas where you're going to fire, direct your fire,

23 means of coordination, such as radio call signs, you ensure that your

24 frequencies are all the same so that you're all operating on the same

25 radio nets. It's got to be -- I mean, if you're firing real bullets, you

1 don't want to have blue-on-blue engagements.

2 Q. This is an obvious question, but why do you need that kind of

3 coordination?

4 A. Because you don't want to have your friendly forces firing against

5 friendly forces and you want to be able to -- you want to be able to

6 direct your forces and command them properly. So in my -- in my military

7 opinion, there had to be coordination between the MUP and the VJ.

8 Q. To what extent and to what level?

9 A. Well, I would say certainly at the brigade level. This was an

10 operation that involved, you know, significant forces from both the MUP

11 and the VJ, and so I would say a brigade or higher level perhaps even.

12 Q. Did "J," which I guess is Jelic, acknowledge responsibility for

13 that brigade? And I'm asking you to turn to page which is written -- it's

14 number 17. And I think there are a bunch of bullet points that start with

15 a question to you or by you of Jelic whether or not he was the officer in

16 charge for the VJ forces on the ground at Racak on the 15th of January.

17 Do you see that?

18 A. Yes, I do. In fact, he responds that, "This is a brigade and I'm

19 responsible for the whole region." He was in fact responsible for the

20 whole brigade. There is no denying that.

21 Q. All right. And does this page 17 there, it almost seems to be an

22 attempt at a transcript of the narrative conversation that takes place.

23 Is that -- to the best of your recollection, is that an accurate portrayal

24 of how it went?

25 A. Yes, that's how the discussion went.

1 Q. Well, sir, as you're listening to this explanation, what was your

2 impression? Were you buying it or did you accept it?

3 A. No, I did not buy it. I thought he was very evasive in his -- in

4 his explanations and seemed to be tap dancing around the question.

5 Q. And how did this explanation compare, in your opinion, with the

6 explanation you'd received from Petrovic just days earlier?

7 A. Well, it didn't jive. Certainly Petrovic, to my mind, had

8 confirmed that tanks and Praga had been involved, tanks from the VJ had

9 been involved, and luckily, I think in this case, I had managed to speak

10 to Petrovic very quickly after the actual operation so that he had not had

11 time to receive the party line, if you wish, from his brigade commander.

12 Q. Just one more question about this area, sir. Did your observers

13 report to you seeing VJ forces engaging targets between Racak and Belince

14 on the 16th of January as Colonel Jelic attempted to explain to you?

15 A. No, they did not.

16 Q. What did they see instead?

17 A. They said they saw -- they told me that they saw tanks shooting

18 into houses that were on the outskirts of Racak that were occupied.

19 Q. You were about to turn to your meeting of the 16th of January with

20 the MUP when I asked you to turn to that. Could we do that now?

21 MR. RYNEVELD: And that, Your Honours, is covered in paragraphs 45

22 to 50 of his statement.

23 JUDGE MAY: The 4th of February exhibited.

24 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 178.

1 MR. RYNEVELD: Now -- and I'm going to ask you, Your Honours, the

2 document 16th of January, with the MUP, is pages 13, 12, and 11 of the

3 attachments.

4 Q. Again, sir, this is a record of -- of a meeting that you held with

5 Janicijevic?

6 A. Correct, yes, it is.

7 Q. And he was the chief of the MUP, was he?

8 A. He was the chief of police in the area of Racak.

9 Q. All right. And very quickly, sir, could you tell us the

10 significant aspects of the -- of this particular conversation and --

11 A. There are a few interesting aspects. First of all, he described

12 the operation from his point of view. I was looking for -- myself and Gil

13 Gilbertson, who was the deputy head of RC 5 - in fact, he was the one

14 asking most of the questions in this case - we were looking for who was in

15 charge of the -- of the actual operation and who had commanded it and how

16 many people had been involved. He confirmed that there were approximately

17 100 of his members involved. He also confirmed that he was in charge. I

18 believe if you go to page 2, or to the second page of the statement, at

19 the top, about five or six bullets down, he confirms that a hundred men

20 were involved. And about two-thirds of the way down, I asked him if he

21 was in charge of the 100 policemen, and he said, "If it is of your

22 concern, yes."

23 Q. And during that conversation, was it put to him that the VJ

24 basically blamed the MUP?

25 A. Yes. In fact, I about -- again about two-thirds of the way down,

1 just a little below the 100 policemen statement, Gil in fact says that,

2 "We just left the VJ; they put the blame on you." And he denies that

3 they were with the VJ. And the MUP in fact maintain that this was a MUP

4 operation without VJ involvement.

5 Q. And what was your impression of this particular meeting, sir?

6 A. Again, this was another meeting where I thought that the answers

7 did not match what actually happened on the ground, and they produced with

8 great elan the weapons that they said they'd captured during the

9 operation; a 50 calibre machine-gun and a grenade -- grenade launcher.

10 But this did not match my view of what happened and what my observers had

11 seen on the ground.

12 Q. Dealing with paragraph 42 of your statement, how would you

13 generally describe the MUP's behaviour towards the KVM and the Kosovo

14 Albanian population, from what you could see?

15 A. Well, in all my dealings with the MUP, I believe they tried to --

16 I believe our relationships with the OSCE, KVM, and the MUP were --

17 relationship was professional, straightforward. My -- the chief of police

18 in the Prizren area certainly tried to portray himself as a professional

19 police officer who was well aware of community policing, community

20 policing approach, and so that's how he liked to portray himself. But on

21 the ground, I -- certainly we found another -- another approach. We found

22 that at many of the checkpoints, the police were overbearing, arrogant,

23 sometimes beat up innocent civilians. And their behaviour was usually

24 only tempered when we had people immediately at the scene. So in some of

25 the major checkpoints, I refused to let my people leave, and I would set

1 up permanent observation posts because I knew that that was the way that

2 the -- the only way that the police would actually behave according to

3 normal -- what I thought were normal standards of behaviour.

4 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 179.

7 MR. RYNEVELD:

8 Q. All right. Sir, I invited you earlier to give us comments about

9 things you actually saw at the gully, and you indicated that you'd had a

10 meeting and I said we'd come back to it. Let's come back to it.

11 A. Right. After coming back to -- back to Racak, I was told that

12 General DZ and Ambassador Walker were actually going to come to Racak, and

13 so I went back into the village and my verifiers took me up to the area

14 that you referred to as the gully. At that location were about 20 bodies

15 from what I could count. They were laid in a bit of a line. It was one

16 particular area where there were about eight or ten bodies together. From

17 what I could see, they had been shot at close range, most in the head --

18 mostly in the head, the back or the front, and -- and the men were -- they

19 were all men, first of all, and they all -- they did not look like men of

20 what I would consider fighting age. They looked like several elderly

21 people, mostly villagers, some wearing the typical Albanian caps there,

22 and they looked like, as I say, they had been -- they would have been shot

23 from -- from close range.

24 Q. From what you could see, was there any evidence to you, just as a

25 professional person but as a layman, that these -- as to whether or not

1 these bodies were shot in situ or are you able to tell?

2 A. I could not tell that. The one thing I did -- I do remember,

3 though, is the bodies, some of them were covered in dew, and dew comes

4 down, of course, in the morning, so would have been there certainly in the

5 morning.

6 Q. And just so we're clear, what time did you see these bodies in the

7 gully?

8 A. I would say probably around 11.00.

9 Q. A.M.?

10 A. A.M., yes.

11 Q. Now, had you, as part of the KVM, heard reports earlier about men

12 and women being separated and men going missing?

13 A. Well, I'd heard that on, you know, different occasions. Certainly

14 in the case of Racak, I saw a report after the -- after the -- the actual

15 incident and probably a few days later that said that some -- some of the

16 men had been rounded up. My verifiers didn't report that to me directly,

17 but of course the KVM, at their level, had reports from all the Regional

18 Centres, including Regional Centre 5, and I heard reports then that some

19 20 men had been separated from their wives and taken away at some point

20 during the operation.

21 Q. And at the time those reports were prepared, was that before or

22 after these bodies were found in the gully, do you know?

23 A. I can't really say but I would say before they were found.

24 Q. Very briefly, sir - I'm trying to finish you in about an hour - so

25 I have just a few more questions. I think you've answered most of this

1 already, the degree of coordination of forces would be involved in an

2 operation like Racak, and I think you've given us partially the answer

3 that I was anticipating. The other aspect of it would be the firing by VJ

4 or firing by an army unit. How do you avoid friendly fire casualties?

5 A. Well, again as I mentioned, the only way to avoid that is to

6 coordinate ahead of time -- ahead of the operation that -- that portions

7 and elements will fire in a certain area and other elements will fire in

8 another area, and you do that by -- on a map, say, drawing a line or

9 drawing a coordination measure that allows you to say, okay, move your

10 fire from here to there at this time or on my order. And as your other

11 friendly forces progress, the fire gets moved over, if you wish. And that

12 way -- this is the type of coordination that has to take place before an

13 operation.

14 Q. My final question, then, sir, is: What -- if you were asked to

15 sum up, what was your assessment of the military operation in Racak?

16 A. Well, my -- my assessment is that it was -- it would be an

17 operation that -- that was against very lightly-defended -- a

18 lightly-defended locality that used as -- as was the modus operandi heavy,

19 indiscriminate firing in overwhelming fire against civilians and -- and

20 certainly the bodies found throughout the village, which in fact when I --

21 after DZ and Ambassador Walker left, I went back and personally saw one

22 young lady, probably 18 years old, and a 12-year-old boy among the bodies,

23 and so I would say that this was not a legitimate -- legitimate military

24 operation.

25 Q. Thank you, sir. The --

1 JUDGE MAY: Before you finish, we have attached to the statement -

2 it may be as well if you get the witness just to briefly go through them -

3 various reports.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly.

5 JUDGE MAY: I have in mind the -- yes. The report of the 17th of

6 January, I think it is, or 15th and 16th of January, pages 9 and 10.

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I wrote that myself, actually.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It would be helpful just if the witness would go

9 through that.

10 MR. RYNEVELD:

11 Q. If you have a copy of that --

12 A. I do.

13 Q. -- there, perhaps you could just very briefly assist Their Honours

14 with respect to your notations there.

15 A. Right. In fact, Your Honour, that kind of resumes the points I've

16 been making throughout that in fact on the 15th I was at a meeting and I

17 was sent to the area of Racak to look after the operation. I went to the

18 hospital, and we evacuated some casualties, and I decided at that point

19 that we should -- on the 15th, that we should meet with the commander of

20 the brigade in Urosevac to discuss these actions.

21 It speaks then on the 16th of January about our patrols going into

22 -- into Racak, my arrival and briefing, then the meeting at the officers'

23 club in Urosevac with the -- in fact, at that time it was not the brigade

24 commander, it was with Petrovic, the liaison officer. Then the MUP chief.

25 And when it says, "report attached," those are two reports that you've

1 already, I believe, admitted as exhibits.

2 Then I briefed the Deputy Head of Mission Operations and the Head

3 of Mission, and -- and that essentially recounts the rest of the day.

4 And at the end is my assessment, as I mentioned, I believe,

5 earlier, of the events as I saw them. That's the evening of the 16th.

6 When I came back, I wrote this report, that I -- my assessment was that

7 the VJ had provided long -- long-range fire support from the high ground

8 surrounding Racak while the MUP did the house-to house clearing and the

9 dismounted operations within -- within Racak.

10 JUDGE MAY: That should be given an exhibit number.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 180.

12 MR. RYNEVELD:

13 Q. If you could turn next, if you would, to your report on page 8. I

14 believe Their Honours expressed an interest in that. Just wait for a

15 moment, though.

16 MR. RYNEVELD: Sorry, Your Honours. I've asked the witness also

17 to look at your page 8, because I believe that's the other area of

18 interest to the Court that you've expressed.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just before you do that, I just wanted to ask the

20 general on what did he base the assessment that the VJ provided long-range

21 support?

22 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That's based on my discussions

24 with my verifiers on the ground who had been actually -- and I actually

25 also went up to, you know -- throughout the day that I was touring around

1 the village of Racak, I actually went up to the high ground above Racak

2 where my verifiers had seen the tanks providing support. And of course, I

3 make that assessment from -- based on their reports and reports of all the

4 other verifiers in the area and my own military assessment of how I would

5 carry out such an operation. If it had been a heavily-defended locality,

6 that's how I would have carried out the operation.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you.

8 MR. RYNEVELD:

9 Q. Would you then very briefly, Major General, turn to page 8, which

10 is the report of activities of the RC 1 Prizren for the 17th of January,

11 1999.

12 A. Right. This -- obviously I wrote this one on the evening of the

13 17th after the operations of the day, and we were -- we were advised at

14 this point that on the morning of the -- on the -- on the morning of the

15 17th, that the Yugoslav authorities wished to -- to have a -- perform an

16 investigation, and that they wanted to do so with -- with a large element

17 of security provided by the MUP. So I met with the Deputy Head of

18 Mission, General DZ, in Stimlje before 8.00, and we agreed that I would

19 then take three patrols into the city -- into the village, sorry, of Racak

20 and its surroundings to -- to keep an eye on what was going on actually in

21 the village. There was a KLA presence in the village at that point, and I

22 coordinated the movements of my patrols while General DZ was meeting with

23 the presiding judge.

24 Around 11.00, she had refused to actually go into the village

25 escorted by the KVM and still wanted to go in with a heavy MUP force, and

1 in fact, they began their movement shortly thereafter, and I had to

2 evacuate the OSCE patrols who were very close to the firing that was

3 ongoing.

4 Q. A couple of questions to elaborate on that, if I may. Do you

5 remember, was Judge Marinkovic the presiding judge?

6 A. She was the presiding judge, yes.

7 Q. Do you know a Colonel Ciaglinski?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Did you hear from him in any way before your evacuation?

10 A. Oh, yes. In fact, I was in contact with -- with General DZ and

11 with Ciaglinski on the radio, and they are the ones that advised me that

12 she had decided not to agree to go in with a light force but wanted to go

13 in with a heavy force, and they basically told me to get the people out as

14 quickly as possible. That's when I coordinated the evacuation of my

15 verifiers.

16 JUDGE KWON: Just a minute.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE KWON: On this report, I see these conditions the KLA was

19 asking at the time. They asked MUP move back of hills; is that right?

20 THE WITNESS: That's right.

21 JUDGE KWON: Was it agreed with the judge or the Serb authorities

22 in advance?

23 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. What happened is we had been

24 keeping in contact with the KLA in the villages and hoping that they would

25 actually exercise restraint as well. We didn't want a huge fight to break

1 out here and have all kinds of casualties on both sides, so we were -- we

2 had been saying, you know, the presiding judge is going to come in with

3 KVM, if we can manage to convince her to do so, so she can do an

4 investigation, an independent investigation, and you know -- so we were

5 trying to being very accommodating to both sides. But of course, tempers

6 were very high, and the KLA did not want -- want this to happen. They

7 didn't want any Serb presence in the village whatsoever.

8 In spite of that, we continued to negotiate with them. And in

9 fact it happened about the same time as she said, no, I'm going in with a

10 heavy presence, that's when we received -- the KLA, okay, we'll agree,

11 with these four conditions. So it was too late. It came after the fact,

12 if you wish. So we weren't able to -- she hadn't agreed to them anyway,

13 so it was too late and she --

14 JUDGE KWON: What concerns me is a matter of some principle. It's

15 matter of sovereignty. A judge cannot enter the village without the

16 protection of her own country. So that -- that seems to be the problem.

17 What would be your assessment on that?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That's -- that's a good point.

19 And in fact, we had no problem with having a -- having a light escort,

20 i.e., if she had said I want to take one or two personal protection

21 guards. But the MUP had deployed a complete company of MUP in armoured

22 vehicles on the outsides -- on the outskirts of the village, and they

23 wanted to go in and -- almost as another military operation. And that's

24 what ended up happening; they went in with armoured vehicles and so forth,

25 into the village.

1 JUDGE KWON: So it might be some useless question, but if the OSCE

2 people had remained there and accompanied the investigating judge, had the

3 KLA also fired the shootings against the group?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, they did. The KLA actually, you know, started

5 retaliating but then moved out because they had a light presence, and in

6 fact, the MUP began firing as opposed to going in and just escorting the

7 judge. They mounted this as another military operation.

8 JUDGE KWON: So even against the KVM people, if they had remained.

9 THE WITNESS: If they had remained there, yes. In fact, that was

10 the concern of DZ, myself and all of the OSCE, was us getting caught in

11 the middle of the operation.

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

13 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I've been not too good

14 with the exhibit numbers. Did we give page 8 an exhibit number?

15 THE REGISTRAR: No. Exhibit 181.

16 MR. RYNEVELD: And one question, if I might be at liberty. It's a

17 question that I forgot to ask. Just my last question, then.

18 Q. Sir, did you become aware of whether or not the Serb forces had

19 suffered any casualties during the 15th of January 1999 incident?

20 A. I subsequently became aware that they had suffered one injury.

21 There was one injury to one of their members.

22 Q. And from a military perspective, what does the difference in

23 casualties tell you, if anything?

24 A. Well, if -- you know, 50 mostly civilians or -- I'll just say

25 civilians on one side and one casualty only on the other side means that

1 in fact the area would have seemed to be very lightly defended.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Those are my questions. Thank you very much, Major

3 General, would you answer other questions.

4 JUDGE KWON: How about the rest of the documents?

5 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry. Was it not entered as an exhibit under

6 92 bis?

7 JUDGE KWON: Meetings with the KLA commanders and some notes.

8 JUDGE MAY: It may be helpful to deal with those.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly. I was simply following Your Honours'

10 instruction that you wanted me to deal with those two particular areas, so

11 I'm happy to deal with that now, if you want that live.

12 JUDGE MAY: Pages 7 onwards, it may be helpful just to deal with

13 those.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Sure. Thank you.

15 Q. Yes. Witness, if you could look at pages 7 and 6, which is the

16 17th of January notation of the record of discussions with the gentleman

17 you've already referred to in evidence as Drini.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. What can you tell us about that?

20 A. Well, this was meeting that I had in fact quite soon after -- on

21 the 17th of January with KLA about -- about Racak. He seemed to be --

22 Commander Drini, at this point, was obviously very disappointed at the

23 actions. He is the one that told me at this point that he had -- that the

24 village had been very lightly defended, which was what our verifiers

25 confirmed, and that the -- the attack there actually served to set a

1 climate of fear amongst the people. In fact, this was corroborated later

2 by our -- our people.

3 After Racak happened, it -- on several occasions, we would get --

4 we received phone calls at 2.00 in the morning from villagers in some

5 other village, villagers who were terrified because a MUP or unidentified

6 white vehicle had driven through the city at 2.00 in the morning, and they

7 -- the statement they always made was, "We don't want another Racak to

8 happen." So Racak had actually set the scene for -- for great fear

9 throughout -- throughout Kosovo.

10 So this was a -- this was a meeting to discuss the arrangements

11 there and what had happened and so forth. And what the -- to ensure that

12 the response from the -- from the KLA was going to be muted and that they

13 were going to continue to stick to the principles of the arrangement --

14 the agreement.

15 Q. Turning next --

16 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 182.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I take it Your Honours want me to deal

18 with the remaining documents as well. I may as well just quickly go

19 through those.

20 Q. The 28th of January 1999, page 5, appears to be a record of

21 discussions again with Drini, held at the KLA meeting house.

22 A. Yes. And this one here was about -- was after the events in

23 Rogovo where about 25 Albanian people were killed, most of whom in this

24 case certainly looked like they were KLA members. And I also wanted to

25 discuss with -- with Drini at this point the opening of different field

1 offices and what -- his actions in different areas. He, at one point,

2 attempted to place a deadline on the KVM, and I in, I think about the

3 fourth bullet from the bottom, I explained to him that the KVM did not do

4 deadlines. This was more of a regular meeting with Drini.

5 Q. Your general impression of your meetings with Drini were what?

6 Sorry.

7 A. Well, again straightforward. He had been -- he had been a

8 professional officer in the Yugoslav national army, the JNA, had done

9 Staff College, in fact had gone to Staff College with the commander of 549

10 Brigade, Colonel Delic, which is one of the interesting situations you

11 find yourselves in in some of these situations.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: Number for this document.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 183.

14 MR. RYNEVELD:

15 Q. Then there are some handwritten pages dated the 26th of February,

16 1999, and the 4th of March, 1999. One is called -- the 4th of March is

17 called, "Points from Drini." Is that your handwriting?

18 A. No. That is Douglas Young, who is one of my verifiers. He's the

19 one who actually had the meeting. I was not at this meeting. But this is

20 a meeting when in fact he was -- Drini was actually taken to task for

21 having targeted Serb villages, and that's at the point at which he

22 mentioned that he knew the Geneva Conventions. And we were adamant that

23 some of the problems that we were facing were because of -- of

24 uncontrolled elements on both sides.

25 MR. RYNEVELD: Next number.

1 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 184.

2 MR. RYNEVELD:

3 Q. There's different handwriting for the 26th of February document.

4 A. Right. The 26th of February was a meeting at which my -- again my

5 note-taker here was a Captain Weissflog. It was a meeting that took place

6 after Randubrava, which was another incident where the KLA were attacked

7 by the MUP there. Randubrava is a little village near Prizren, and this

8 was more of a -- again a general meeting to discuss those events.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 185.

10 MR. RYNEVELD:

11 Q. And finally, you don't appear to have been present at a meeting of

12 the 23rd of January for Kostrice, but I take it these people were some of

13 your verifiers, were they?

14 A. Yes. Mike Morwood was the second in command of my -- of my

15 Regional Centre, and the others were my verifiers as well.

16 Q. And the significance of this document, sir?

17 A. Now, this one is on 23rd of -- 23rd of January, which was

18 following another event where there was a car ambushed at Bela Crkva. We

19 were discussing -- we were discussing the future and the -- again, this

20 was another meeting where he was trying to put the 15-minute rule on us

21 where if we didn't take action, KVM didn't take action within 15 minutes

22 of an incident happening, that they were going to deal with it themselves,

23 and that's when we told him that we don't do deadlines.

24 Q. And in these meetings, it's clear that the KVM was explaining to

25 the KLA the terms and conditions that you were operating under; is that

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7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

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18

19

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21

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24

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1 correct?

2 A. That's correct. We were certainly -- we tried to -- to be

3 impartial, and in my view we were.

4 Q. Thank you, sir. Those are my questions.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Oh, last document number.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 186.

7 JUDGE MAY: We will take the adjournment now. We'll start again

8 at quarter past.

9 General, would you remember in this and any other adjournment

10 there may be in this case not to speak to anybody about your evidence

11 until it's over, please.

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We'll adjourn now.

14 --- Recess taken at 11.53 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 12.15 p.m.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

18 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

19 Q. [Interpretation] In cooperation with the Albanian terrorists, you

20 were preparing the illegal criminal aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia;

21 right?

22 A. That's preposterous. No, I was not.

23 Q. Oh. So your answer is you did not; right?

24 A. What was your question, that I was preparing NATO? No, I was not.

25 And I was not in cooperation with anyone. I was an impartial

1 international observer.

2 Q. All right, we'll establish that. You started your statement by

3 claiming the following in the first sentence: That you witnessed a crime.

4 Since you have not been called here to judge whether something was a crime

5 or atrocity or not, tell me, what are the official reports of the court

6 authorities or the government authorities or of experts from Yugoslavia or

7 elsewhere that you bore in mind when giving such an assessment of what

8 happened?

9 A. My assessment is given in -- in light of my opinion and the events

10 that I saw on the ground.

11 Q. You said that the task of the OSCE was to verify and monitor

12 whether all the parties to the conflict were abiding by the

13 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. What were the conflict parties, and in

14 your opinion, the terrorist organisation, the so-called KLA, could it have

15 the -- could it be treated as a party to a conflict? This is on page 2,

16 in the last paragraph.

17 A. The parties that were in the agreement itself were the -- the Serb

18 authority forces on one side and the KLA and Albanian locals on the other

19 side. In terms of whether a conflict existed or not, this is a matter of

20 legal -- matter which I'm not qualified to respond to.

21 Q. Actually, you wanted to make the KLA a legitimate legal force and,

22 inter alia, you wanted to make it more accessible. Is that right?

23 A. I don't understand the question. Accessible to what?

24 Q. Well, more accessible in terms of cooperation, more open to

25 cooperation.

1 A. The mission that I saw the OSCE as having was the verification of

2 the agreement between yourself and Mr. Holbrooke, which had a number of --

3 which had a number of elements to it, one of which was to respect the

4 ceasefire, to reduce levels of Serb forces, to -- to respect human rights

5 and so forth. To do so, I did -- I had contact with the KLA, as they

6 called themselves, and the Albanian local population, as well as the

7 parties from the Serb authorities, both MUP, VJ, and administrative

8 authorities.

9 Q. I am saying the following: That you wanted to make the KLA a

10 legitimate force and that, in that sense, you wanted to make them become

11 more open to others. Therefore, I would like to recall a document

12 presented by the other side. You are the author of that document. It's

13 called "The Implementation of Measures for Implementing Contacts." The

14 page of the Serbian version is 03036214. It says literally, if the KLA

15 wants to be recognised as --

16 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Mr. Milosevic. If you're going to put

17 a document to the witness, he must see it so that he's able to respond to

18 it. Has this document been exhibited?

19 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't believe it was, Your Honour. It may have

20 -- my recollection doesn't serve me on this particular document, but my

21 associate Mr. Higgins is checking as we speak.

22 JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can find it. Yes.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. This is what it says literally in the document: "However, if the

25 KLA wants to be recognised as a legitimate force that is trusted, it has

1 to be encouraged to become more accessible."

2 So you're trying to present a terrorist organisation as a

3 legitimate force. Please admit this as an exhibit. This is an OSCE

4 document, and you're the author of this document. Here you are. I'm

5 tendering it in its entirety.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let us find the document. Have you got the English of

7 it there, Mr. Milosevic?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, no, but I just have

9 the Serb translation, and it has a number from the other side and 03036214

10 -- 12 is what it says. Here it is.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Why were you dealing in this anyway? Why were you wondering what

13 had to be done in order to make the KLA a legitimate force, a force that

14 would be trustworthy, at that?

15 A. I believe that the job of any international force, such as the

16 KVM, has to develop trust with both parties or all parties to a conflict.

17 In this case, I believe that the document you're referring to was a

18 document that was looking towards measures that may be required in the

19 event of an agreement between the Serb authorities and the -- the Albanian

20 parties. And if that was the case, then we needed to put in place a

21 certain regime of -- of not only verification but of shadow is what we had

22 called it, where we would be accompanying the parties after an accord to

23 ensure that both sides would comply with the accord. And so the whole

24 question of trust, there's no doubt that when we dealt with both the Serb

25 side and the Albanian side is that we acted on -- on a belief that trust

1 would be developed between the parties, between the international

2 community, which I represented as the OSCE, and the parties.

3 MR. RYNEVELD: If I might interrupt just at the moment since Your

4 Honours have asked. We have, we believe, located the statement, an

5 English copy of that document, which is MM/6, can be brought to the

6 courtroom in a moment or two. It was not exhibited, but I believe it is

7 an attachment to his original statement.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. My question was: Why did you deal with this anyway? Why was it

10 necessary for the KLA to be a legitimate force? I link this to the

11 question that was put to you by Mr. Kwon in relation to sovereignty. Do

12 you think that terrorist groups can, in any state, be treated as a

13 legitimate party to a conflict?

14 A. I can tell you the way I was trying to deal with both sides, and

15 that includes the Serb authorities, by the way. I was trying to develop a

16 level of trust where I could deal with them and actually request things

17 from them and be told that things would -- certain things would happen so

18 that we could verify their compliance with the agreement. And the

19 agreement, again, was between yourself and Mr. Holbrooke, but included

20 within the agreement was a certain behaviour by both your forces, the Serb

21 authority forces, and the Albanian local forces, some of which were the

22 KLA, self-proclaimed KLA, the local authorities -- Albanian local

23 authorities, and the local population. And so we behaved totally -- we

24 tried to behave totally impartially and verify the compliance of both

25 sides to the agreement. It wasn't a matter of making anyone legitimate,

1 but if we were going to deal with the Albanian side, we had to deal with

2 them on the same basis of trust that we had with your forces.

3 JUDGE MAY: Do we now have the document?

4 MR. RYNEVELD: I have one copy of the document.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Copies can be brought down momentarily, but in

7 fairness to the witness, perhaps he ought to see the document about which

8 questions are being asked.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The witness should see the document.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. It is MM/2B, by the looks of things.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The interpreters cannot

12 hear the speaker.

13 JUDGE MAY: Microphone. Microphone.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please speak into the

15 microphone.

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's no good. The interpreters cannot

17 hear you. Could you speak into the microphone.

18 Now, has the -- rather than this, has the witness got the document

19 MM/ --

20 THE WITNESS: I have the document, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE MAY: You've got it. We in fact have it --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

23 JUDGE MAY: It was served with the original bundle, and it's

24 MM/2B. I think this is it, 23rd of February, 1999? Is that right,

25 General?

1 THE WITNESS: That's the one I have in front of me, Your Honour.

2 In fact, it is the one that I mentioned which was a planning document

3 which was never put into effect, but it was during the Rambouillet

4 negotiations and we were leaning forward, if you wish, and planning for

5 the eventual, hopefully, an agreement and looking at the measures that

6 would be required in the event of such a -- an event. And as you see,

7 that is -- in the introduction, that is what I say here.

8 JUDGE MAY: And while we're on it, is there any reference that you

9 can remember to making them a legitimate organisation that the accused is

10 asking you about?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, if you look at -- if you look at paragraph 4

12 -- the paragraphs are numbered. On page 2, paragraph 4 under KLA, it

13 talks in there about the KLA's wish to be recognised as a credible and

14 legitimate force, not that we wish to recognise them.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I quoted a sentence under paragraph 4A where you say: "However,

17 if the KLA wishes to be recognised as a legitimate force that is believed,

18 it has to be encouraged to become more accessible."

19 That is the core of the matter, and I tender this into evidence,

20 but we have to move on.

21 I'm asking you whether you distinguish between --

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they do not have a

23 copy of the document.

24 JUDGE MAY: I trust it will not matter. Let us exhibit the

25 document the next Defence number.

1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Defence Exhibit D20.

2 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. General, if you'd like to hand that back

3 into the Court if you would, please, and we can exhibit it.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This takes up a lot of time.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm giving documents that have

7 already been registered, I mean that the other side already has. I really

8 think that this much time should not be wasted.

9 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it, then.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because their authenticity is not

11 questioned in any way.

12 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. So do you distinguish between a political agreement between the

15 government of the Republic of Serbia and the political representatives of

16 the Kosovo Albanians and terrorists who kill, kidnap, and commit all sorts

17 of other crimes on the ground?

18 A. Well, in this case, it was -- it was my duty on the ground to

19 verify the agreement. The agreement called on both parties - your side,

20 that is the Serb authorities in Kosovo, and the representatives of the

21 Kosovo Albanians of all types - to comply with the provisions of the

22 agreement, which were to in fact behave according to human rights. And

23 the only way that -- one of which was to behave in accordance with human

24 rights, to verify -- to comply with the ceasefire. And the only way that

25 I could verify that and ensure that it did take place was to deal with all

1 parties, on your side and on the Albanian side.

2 Q. Let us keep the questions and answers short, please. In your

3 opinion, is the KLA a terrorist organisation or not? Just say yes or no.

4 A. In my opinion, the KLA is an organisation that was -- that arose

5 as a result of the -- the strife that the Albanian people were feeling on

6 the ground. It was an assemblage of paramilitary forces, almost a rebel

7 organisation.

8 Q. All right. Are you aware of the assertion made by Robert Gelbard,

9 the US envoy to the Balkans, that this is a terrorist organisation? I

10 have already introduced this into evidence so I'm not going to tender it

11 again. Are you aware of that statement?

12 A. I'm not aware of it.

13 Q. And you must be aware of Security Council Resolution 1160 dated

14 the 31st of March, 1998, and 1199 of the 23rd of September, 1998, then

15 Resolution 1203 dated the 24th of October. All these Resolutions refer to

16 terrorism in Kosovo. Isn't that correct? Therefore, why do you advocate

17 having a terrorist organisation given legitimacy?

18 JUDGE MAY: That is not a fair question to the witness because it

19 misrepresents what he said. He did not advocate legitimacy. He told you

20 that he had to deal with both sides.

21 Now, you've been told, Mr. Milosevic, before that we waste a lot

22 of time by trying to reargue points which you assert and which the witness

23 has answered.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. You explain in your statement that KDOM practically became one

2 with the Kosovo Verification Mission. This is page 3, paragraph 4. It

3 practically melted into it. Those are your words. However,

4 Drewienkiewicz, when he testified on the 11th of April, said that part of

5 KDOM remained independent, to be precise, the US part of KDOM that

6 remained in Kosovo throughout. He said literally --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. "We managed to absorb part of KDOM. However, that part of American

10 KDOM which remained independent stayed on at Kosovo throughout." Is that

11 right or is that not right?

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that this was a quotation

13 from the transcript.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. So who is right? Is it you or him? You say that KDOM melted into

16 the Kosovo Verification Mission whereas he says that part of it remained

17 independent. So who is right?

18 A. In terms of the -- the -- when the KVM was put in place, the KDOMs

19 that already existed on the ground, most of the KDOMs were actually

20 absorbed, and the -- the agreement in fact that you signed with

21 Mr. Holbrooke actually talks about the OSCE was going to absorb the KDOMs

22 that were already on the ground. In fact, this is what happened within my

23 Regional Centre, is I -- I deployed and took under command the UK KDOM and

24 portions of the US KDOM. But I also believe that the portions of the US

25 KDOM remained outside the KVM.

1 Q. All right. You knew that then as well. Why is it that you

2 managed only to absorb part of American KDOM and who stopped you from

3 doing this? Or, rather, the question is: Did you lodge any kind of

4 protest with the Security Council or anyone because it was impossible for

5 you to place the American part of KDOM under the KVM?

6 A. As I told you, I had a portion of the American KDOM under my

7 command, under the KVM, and therefore, I was able, within my area, to

8 operate with my forces without any difficulties.

9 Q. But I assume that there is no contest, that according to the

10 agreement, KDOM had to be absorbed into the Verification Mission, folded

11 into it. I believe that that is not being challenged. Yes or no.

12 A. In fact, some of the higher level agreements were not within my

13 responsibility. I was given forces which included US KDOM, UK KDOM,

14 portions thereof. I used them, and I -- in fact, I built up my forces on

15 those portions of those two KDOMs.

16 Q. Can it be inferred then -- can it be inferred then that members of

17 American KDOM who were not folded into KVM Kosovo, that they actually

18 acted contrary to the agreement? Yes or no.

19 A. You would have to ask them that, because all the forces of the

20 KDOM and the KVM that I saw acted in accordance with the agreement.

21 Q. And did you have any communication with American KDOM that was not

22 under KVM control? Did you get any reports from them?

23 A. None.

24 Q. Where were they deployed, the members of American KDOM who were

25 not under your control like in Racak, Dragobil, Glodjane, all these

1 places? You don't know? And in your opinion, why was there no agreement

2 between you and the Albanians? I mean, let me clarify this question.

3 When Drewienkiewicz testified on the 11th of April, he said: "We

4 understood that one of the reasons why there was no agreement with the

5 Kosovo Albanians who had hoped that this would be a tandem agreement to

6 the agreement we signed in Belgrade in October was the fact that there was

7 a public threat made that any Albanian who had any kind of agreement with

8 Ambassador Hill or anybody from the international community would either

9 be killed."

10 So there was obviously no agreement with the Albanian side at any

11 level, and I believe that that was one of the factors why there was no

12 agreement of this nature. Do you agree with this assessment?

13 A. I'm not aware of the statement by General Drewienkiewicz or what

14 you're talking about here, I'm afraid.

15 Q. So even if you don't know of this statement, did you know of the

16 threats of the KLA, that they would kill any Albanian who would sign

17 anything?

18 A. No. I'm not aware of that threat, no.

19 Q. But you do know, from the period when you were in Kosovo, that

20 certain Albanians who were loyal citizens of Serbia were killed by the KLA

21 and were victims because they turned a deaf ear to these KLA threats. Are

22 you aware of that?

23 A. I'm not aware of that.

24 Q. Oh, you're not aware of that either, are you? You were head of

25 the Regional Centre, as you explained. When you came, your first

1 experience was that the Serb forces, as they are being called here, were

2 cooperative all the time, and you had free access to local

3 representatives. Is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So what happened then? What changed this attitude? Was it the

6 fact that you did not act in accordance with the agreement?

7 A. What happened to change what? I don't understand what you're

8 saying.

9 Q. There was a change. You said first that the Serb forces were

10 cooperative all the time and you had free access to local

11 representatives. And you confirmed that that was right. Now, what

12 happened? What changed this attitude? Was it the fact that you did not

13 act in accordance with the agreement?

14 A. The attitude of the Serb forces in my area was, for the most part,

15 cooperative; i.e., when I wanted to have a meeting with the Serb

16 representatives, I requested a meeting and for the most part I received

17 acquiescence and managed to do so. After the Racak incident, the Urosevac

18 brigade commander, however, did not behave in accordance with the way my,

19 if I can call him that, my brigade commander - the brigade commander in my

20 area - behaved. He refused to meet me or certainly did not meet me until

21 three weeks later when I managed to get Colonel Kotur to convince him. So

22 that was a change, and certainly wasn't because of a change in my

23 behaviour or the behaviour of my verifiers.

24 Q. I would like to remind you of the following: In the document that

25 was provided by the other side, and you were the author of the document,

1 it was disclosed along with your statement, it is called, "First

2 Impressions, Prizren Regional Centre." On page number 03036013, that is

3 the Serb version, and the English version 0075622, in the last paragraph,

4 it says: "Throughout, the Serbian authorities were cooperative and we had

5 free access to the local representatives."

6 So I am going to tender this document of yours as well. I have it

7 both in the English and Serbian languages. So please take a look.

8 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to move on. I don't

10 want to waste any time.

11 JUDGE MAY: If you're putting things to a witness, he must have

12 the chance of seeing it.

13 MR. RYNEVELD: It's MM/2, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE MAY: MM/2. We have that, yes.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

16 JUDGE MAY: Which was the bit you were quoting to the witness,

17 Mr. Milosevic?

18 THE WITNESS: At the top of page 2, Your Honour, it says:

19 "Throughout, the Serb authorities were cooperative and we had free access

20 to local representatives."

21 This is dated 23 December. It is, in fact, my first impressions

22 after arriving about a week before, and I don't dispute that, that at that

23 point, authorities were cooperative and I did have access when I requested

24 it.

25 JUDGE MAY: Next Defence exhibit.

1 THE REGISTRAR: D21.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. All right. In your statement on page 7, in paragraph 1, you

4 particularly highlighted the following, that Delic, that is the commander

5 of the brigade who you talked to, he pointed out that Loncar was not his

6 commanding officer.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Do you know that there was a commission of the federal government

9 for cooperation with the OSCE?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. That commission, including Loncar, could not have been in the

12 chain of command, either of the army or of the police. Are you aware of

13 that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Also, are you aware of the fact that Loncar actually became a

16 member of that commission? He was the person who was there in Pristina

17 and he was supposed to cooperate with the OSCE, and this was done at

18 Walker's request in view of their former cooperation in Eastern Slavonia,

19 that they knew each other and had a good cooperation. Oh, you're aware of

20 that too, aren't you?

21 And do you know that on the commission of the federal government,

22 there was a total of 16 members and that Loncar was a retiree who, at

23 Walker's request, was appointed to this team and that he was therefore in

24 Pristina, otherwise, the chairman of the commission of the federal

25 commission and that was appointed by the Federal Government was Nikola

1 Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government. Are you aware

2 of that?

3 A. I'm not aware of all the details that you've just given me but I

4 was aware that Nikola Sainovic was --

5 Q. Very well. In your statement, you deal with the contents of the

6 talks between yourself and Delic, and as far as I was able to gather, he

7 said on the occasion, "I'm just doing my job and preventing terrorists

8 from infiltrating with weapons." He was guarding the border belt; isn't

9 that right?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Otherwise, this is also contained in the text which was disclosed

12 by the Prosecution, which I should also like to tender into evidence. And

13 you confirmed it, but I should like that document to be entered into the

14 record. It is your own text: "I'm just doing my job and preventing

15 terrorists from infiltrating with weapons. My personal opinion is that

16 you can help us only in one way and that is to exert pressure on Albania

17 so as to stop the shipment of arms across the border." And you say: "I

18 agree. The Resolution of the Security Council ask that Albania stop

19 bringing in weapons." I hope that that is not something that you're

20 challenging.

21 JUDGE MAY: Let us see the document.

22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's a document we have seen before

23 and, yes, that's what Delic said and that's what I replied.

24 JUDGE MAY: Is this in the exhibit which we have? No need for it

25 to be exhibited again, then.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. He asked you to exert pressure on Albania to prevent this shipment

3 of arms, and you agreed to do that; right? And I quoted this a moment ago

4 because it was contained in the UN Security Council Resolution which

5 demanded that Albania cease this practice; isn't that right?

6 A. I agreed that I had to pressure the Albanian side but I could not,

7 obviously, pressure the country of Albania. But every meeting I had with

8 the KLA or with local representatives, I -- I admonished them to ensure

9 that they would not bring -- bring weapons and smuggle arms across the

10 border.

11 Q. In your area, there was heavy fighting between the terrorists and

12 the regular forces of the Yugoslav army and police force; is that correct?

13 And in fact, you say that on page 3 in the last paragraph of your

14 statement. You say: "There was fierce fighting between the terrorists

15 and the regular forces of the army and the police"; right?

16 A. There had been, yes.

17 Q. This region, this area which came under your authority was one of

18 the strongholds of the KLA; is that correct?

19 A. I don't think -- it would depend how you would signify or define a

20 stronghold. Certainly there was a strong KLA presence in my area, as

21 there was in other areas, yes.

22 Q. And is the observation correct that the Kosovo border region was

23 and remains the smuggling route for drugs, arms, humans, and that only

24 with the abolishment of the KLA could the border be secured? Would that

25 observation be correct, to your mind?

1 A. Definitely the border area was an area where there was a lot of

2 smuggling across the border. Whether the abolishment of the KLA would be

3 a way to stop it, I can't say whether that would work or not.

4 Q. Well, that's what it says in the OSCE document which has also been

5 registered by the opposite side. It is your statement too. It says:

6 "For several centuries, the Kosovo border region was used as an important

7 route of contraband and smuggling for drugs, arms, human beings,

8 livestock, et cetera --" I apologise to the interpreters for reading out

9 so fast. "-- and of late, weapons and members of the KLA too."

10 Now, "If the KLA were to be abolished completely, this lack of law

11 and order in Albania and Albanian border patrols will make the authorities

12 in Kosovo secure their borders." That was also something that the OSCE

13 mission wrote, and I'd like to tender that into evidence as well, that

14 particular document.

15 Now, I'm sure you're acquainted with the fact that the KLA was

16 procuring weapons and rockets as well. You were told that personally;

17 isn't that right?

18 A. Personally by whom? I had heard rumours that that was the case.

19 Q. Just rumours? They didn't tell you personally?

20 A. Who would tell me personally?

21 Q. Well, for example, in the document of the other side, whose author

22 you are, which was disclosed with your witness statement, on the minutes

23 of the 17th -- the meeting of the 17th of January, 1999, the --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down in quoting

25 figures.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. The English version is K0075715, it says that the regional

3 commander of the KLA, Drini, told you that he needed to get supplies of

4 arms with special range firing abilities and rockets of the Katyusha type.

5 So these weren't rumours. He told you that specifically although you

6 don't remember him saying so.

7 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness --

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Isn't that so?

10 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... General, can you

11 deal with that or would you like to see the document?

12 THE WITNESS: I think I have it here, Your Honour, if you'd like

13 to give me a second. Is there a date to that document?

14 JUDGE MAY: 17th of January. I understand it to be the meeting

15 with Drini.

16 Don't interrupt.

17 The meeting with Drini. It's our Exhibit 182, for the record.

18 THE WITNESS: Right. I have it here.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I'm quoting this. "D" is Drini, and it says: "D" Drini, Regional

21 Commander, "M" Brigadier General Maisonneuve, and "C" is Chris Cobb-Smith,

22 the liaison officer, et cetera, et cetera. The rest isn't important.

23 "D: In the context of talks as to the exposure to special fire, he spoke

24 about the need to procure special range weapons possibly of the Katyusha

25 type."

1 A. So he did say that, I guess, at this point.

2 Q. I have this here. I have the English. "In the context of

3 receiving indirect fire, he spoke of the need to acquire indirect fire

4 weapons, maybe Katyusha rockets." That is what is contained in your own

5 report. So it is not a question of rumours, it is information that you

6 received at the meeting with the commander whom you call Drini. And a

7 moment ago, you mentioned him and said that you had regular meetings with

8 him. You used the term "regular," I believe, regular meetings. Isn't

9 that so?

10 A. That is so, yes.

11 Q. And what are you, as the KVM -- what did you do to prevent

12 activities of this kind which were obviously, as we noted a moment ago,

13 were contrary to the UN Security Council Resolution to the tasks that you

14 had? So what did you undertake to prevent activities of this kind?

15 A. Well, actually, what we undertook was to ensure that, first of

16 all, we would mention it at meetings that we had with -- with both sides,

17 with -- particularly with the Albanian side. And as well, we patrolled as

18 much as possible the areas around the border. Now, the problem we had, of

19 course, was that the Serb forces would not allow us to get close to the

20 border and to have freedom of movement, as the agreement had said, in the

21 area. So we were partly kept from doing our job by the Serb side as well.

22 Q. Well, that is in contradiction with what you observed a moment

23 ago, that they didn't prevent you but were cooperative. Did they prevent

24 you or did they not prevent you?

25 A. I said they were cooperative in our dealings, I did not say that

1 they were cooperative in allowing us freedom of movement in all the areas

2 that we were supposed to have. But when they did request -- when I

3 requested a meeting, I did usually get acquiescence.

4 Q. And you knew full well there were KLA plans to revive hostilities

5 in January 1999 and that the following steps taken by the KLA was to

6 transfer the campaign into the towns. They informed you of that; isn't

7 that correct?

8 A. No.

9 Q. All right. If it isn't, then let me remind you that in the

10 document whose author you are, which was disclosed along with your

11 statement, on page 03035957 Serbian version, points 4 and 8, and K00570.4

12 and 7, it says: "Plans to revive hostilities are completed. The

13 transference of the campaign to the towns is an active element of the

14 forthcoming steps to be taken by the KLA," or words to that effect.

15 JUDGE MAY: What is the date of the document?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you in just a moment. It

17 is the minutes from the meeting with the KLA on the 23rd of January,

18 Kostrice, 1500 hours, Morwood, Cobb-Smith, Lefever, Drini - one, two,

19 three, four from the top - "Plans of the KLA for hostilities on a broad

20 scale have been completed."

21 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's -- let us -- Mr. Milosevic, let

22 us find the document. It's Exhibit 186.

23 THE WITNESS: Right. I have the document here, Your Honour. In

24 fact. It was -- it was --

25 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish. Yes.

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, this is a meeting at which I was not --

2 this was done by the four people that are there, the three from the KVM

3 and the one from the KLA. I did see the document after, in fact, yes.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So this was something you knew about. You said a moment ago that

6 you didn't know about it. And at the beginning, you say that you're

7 giving information not only on the basis of your own personal impressions

8 but also on the basis of the reports sent in by your verifiers, which is

9 quite logical because if all that was needed were your own personal

10 impressions, I don't think you would need 1.300 verifiers. And it says

11 here in the original document, your document K0075720: [In English] "KLA

12 plans for a more general resumption of hostilities were complete." And at

13 the bottom, it says: [In English] "Taking the campaign to the towns was an

14 active element in the 'next military steps' of the KLA."

15 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness deal with it.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay. As I said, I did see it, I guess, at the

17 time. In fact, that's my signature at the bottom that I say that I'd seen

18 it.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. And as a KVM -- as the KVM, what did you do to prevent this

21 development of events? These are serious things, to transfer terrorism to

22 the towns, to revive hostilities, et cetera, et cetera. What did you

23 undertake, as the KVM, to prevent all this?

24 A. Well, we -- we had a very aggressive patrol scheme, an aggressive

25 scheme of liaison with the parties to ensure that they would not take any

1 kind of action such as that. That's the -- in fact, that was the problem

2 with the KVM was the matter of how do you impose a solution? We could not

3 impose a solution; we could not force the parties, either the Serb side or

4 the Albanian side, to comply. We had to actually speak to them, to liaise

5 with them and to make them understand that their behaviour should be a

6 certain way.

7 In the case of the Albanian side, we often received threats and

8 admonishment and they would tell us that they were going to take some

9 action, and we continued to -- to explain to them that we weren't going to

10 reply to threats. We were not going to use threats and agree to do --

11 behave a certain way. With either side. We didn't agree to any threats,

12 and we would refuse to be threatened.

13 So this was not the first time they talked to us about hostilities

14 and so on. This was barely a week after Racak, so they were very -- they

15 were very tense still and -- and we were trying to get them to relax and

16 not to retaliate after the Racak operation.

17 Q. And do you consider, Mr. Maisonneuve, that at that point, in view

18 of the seriousness of this type of information that you received, that a

19 public condemnation and publication of threats of this kind would have

20 been fruitful in order to suppress activities of this kind? Public

21 condemnation by the KVM and making these threats public, would that have

22 been fruitful in suppressing these activities?

23 A. The KVM received all meeting records. We sent them up to them as

24 -- as documentation. Then it was up to the KVM to actually take action.

25 Let me tell you, though, that whenever the KLA actually carried out such

1 actions, we did come forward and denounce them. And a particular example

2 is the three policemen that were killed in the pass on the 8th of January.

3 We put out a press release and we were very forward in denouncing these

4 actions by the KLA, just as we were very forward in denouncing the actions

5 of the Serb -- Serb authorities.

6 Q. All right. As for the killed policemen, I understand that, but

7 I'm asking you this: These threats that were very serious and which you

8 received officially, at an official meeting where minutes were kept, were

9 they not reasons to condemn this and to make them public, to publish them

10 in order to suppress these activities? Yes or no.

11 A. In terms of making things public, this was not within my domain.

12 I did not have the authority to make anything public. I would send them

13 up to the KVM headquarters and they would decide what was public and what

14 was not. And we received threats like this all the time, from both sides,

15 by the way.

16 Q. All right. So that came under Walker's competence, did it, not

17 your own?

18 A. [Previous translation continues]...

19 Q. You say you arrived in December 1998, that you arrived in

20 Pristina, and that you mentioned that 35 people were killed who were

21 members of the KLA, and this was a legitimate military operation; isn't

22 that right? That's what it says on page 4, paragraph 2 of your statement.

23 You say that: "In all respects, it was a legitimate military operation."

24 Is that correct?

25 A. That was my assessment.

1 Q. All right. Now in your statement, on page 11, paragraph 3, you

2 say that, in your area, there were acts on the part of the KLA which could

3 be assessed as war crimes and from that it emerges that you were informed

4 with the activities being taken by the KLA. According to your knowledge

5 or the knowledge gained by your colleagues, the KLA in March, 1998, was

6 already preparing for war, and according to your information, the KLA

7 recruited people for war already at that time. Is that correct or not?

8 A. I don't know what document you're referring to in this case here.

9 I don't think I made any assessment of what was going on in March of

10 1998. I was not on the ground at that time.

11 Q. Yes. But I'm thinking of your -- of your overall knowledge and

12 information as to the preparations for war, recruitments being carried out

13 and especially for this assessment and evaluation. And you're asking

14 about the document. It is page 11, paragraph 3 of your statement, where

15 you say that the conduct of the KLA could be characterised as a war crime

16 -- war crimes. "I am aware of behaviour by the KLA that could be

17 assessed as war crimes."

18 A. Right. I did in fact have in, I believe, the end of February of

19 1999, the KLA actually took two Serb civilians hostage, and I spent a

20 long, long time negotiating with the KLA and speaking to them to let them

21 -- to let them go, and I -- in fact, I spent a long time with the Serb

22 authorities, explaining what was going on and taking care of ensuring that

23 both sides were aware of what was going on. Because of our results, the

24 KVM intervention, in fact, they did -- the KLA did manage to release one

25 of the prisoners alive and the other had been killed and beaten. And

1 those were observations that we made at the time. So I believe that is

2 also against, obviously, human rights.

3 Q. And since in your statement on page 11, paragraph 3, you say that

4 the heads of the coordinating centres liaised directly with other KLA

5 representatives, (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted), on page 1 -- the number is 03036808. That

9 witness was for the Nerodime area. And he says that in March 1998,

10 following orders from the main headquarters of the KLA, they left and went

11 to other parts to recruit people for war. And that is to be found in his

12 statement.

13 Are you aware of that? Do you have knowledge of that?

14 A. No, I don't.

15 Q. All right.

16 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours --

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. And in 1998 --

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. In 1998, many of the KVM link this to a year of change. Is it

6 true that these changes were precisely the consequence of the activities

7 of the KVM?

8 A. I'm afraid I don't understand the question, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Rephrase the question, please.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. The great -- major changes that took place in the sense of the

12 expansion of the KLA in 1998, the KLA expanded in 1998, is it true that

13 these changes are precisely the result of the activities of the KVM?

14 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, the KVM deployed as of October, November,

15 December of 1998, so that's very much towards the end, and I don't know

16 how the -- it could have influenced any KLA expansion.

17 Q. That's what I'm talking about, that end-of-year period. Up until

18 the arrival of the KVM, you see, they were completely thwarted. Now, to

19 clarify this question, Ramush Haradinaj, for instance, one of their heads,

20 the heads of these KLA criminals whose activities are well-known to the

21 other side too, in a book, "Stories of War and Freedom, Talks with Ramush

22 Haradinaj," on page 116 and 117, says that the arrival of the verifiers,

23 the OSCE verifiers to Kosovo enabled the revival of the KLA, and the

24 meetings with the verifiers were very long, lengthy --

25 JUDGE MAY: I don't think we're going to be helped by this. I

1 don't know what you're talking about. Some book, is it?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is a book. I have the

3 introduction and the beginning. Achieved agreement by Holbrooke, save the

4 KLA, et cetera. The Verification Mission. I haven't got the entire book,

5 but I will be providing a copy in English for you but I'd like to tender

6 this into evidence because this document speaks about --

7 JUDGE MAY: No, we're not going to have it tendered into evidence.

8 It's just a book and somebody's opinion.

9 Yes.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not somebody's opinion. It is

11 testimony by somebody who --

12 JUDGE MAY: It's not testimony. Testimony is evidence which is

13 given from the stand over there in this case. It's nothing else. Now,

14 let's move on.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, even the witness of the

16 Prosecution, for which you did not want to have the name mentioned a

17 moment ago, explains in his statement that in 1998, upon the arrival of

18 the KVM, changes took place and that