1 Monday, 8 July 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours. I intimated last day that

7 Ambassador Vollebaek is available today, and I had asked whether perhaps

8 the last witness might be able to -- I think I used the phrase wrapped

9 around this witness. Ambassador Vollebaek is here now, and I would

10 propose, with the Court's permission, to proceed with Ambassador Vollebaek

11 and then continue thereafter with the continuation of the previous

12 witness, if that meets with the Court's approval.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE MAY: I think technically you need leave to call

16 Mr. Vollebaek because he wasn't on your original list.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Then I seek oral -- this is an oral application to

18 call Ambassador Vollebaek at this time. I do believe that his materials

19 were served quite some time ago.

20 JUDGE MAY: The statement was disclosed and it was disclosed in

21 B/C/S by the 15th of March.

22 MR. RYNEVELD: That's correct, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: Accordingly, there is no prejudice in calling him now

24 and leave will be given.

25 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

1 JUDGE MAY: He's only available today, is that right?

2 MR. RYNEVELD: That was my understanding, however, upon his

3 arrival a little while ago, apparently his flight schedule is not quite as

4 tight. He could continue on until tomorrow, if necessary, but having made

5 arrangements with the last witness, who is now not here, I don't want to

6 waste a moment's court time.

7 JUDGE MAY: No. We will call this witness and deal with him, if

8 at all possible, today.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: That would be wonderful. Thank you.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness with take the declaration.

11 WITNESS: KNUT VOLLEBAEK

12 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

13 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat, Mr. Vollebaek.

15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.

16 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

17 Q. Now, Ambassador Vollebaek, I understand, sir, that you started

18 your diplomatic service in the Norwegian diplomatic service in 1973?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And is it also right, sir, that you became the Norwegian Minister

21 of Foreign Affairs in 1997 and served in that capacity until March of the

22 year 2000?

23 A. That is also correct.

24 Q. Now, sir, while you were the Norwegian Minister of Foreign

25 Affairs, did you serve in any other office with the OSCE?

1 A. Yes. In the capacity as Norwegian Foreign Minister, I was

2 chairman in office of the OSCE during the year 1999.

3 Q. And your present function today, sir, is?

4 A. I am Norway's ambassador to the United States of America.

5 Q. Now, sir, I'm going to ask -- back you up to the year of 1993.

6 Did you hold any particular office at that time in relation to the

7 international conference of former Yugoslavia?

8 A. Yes. From the 1st of June, if I recall correctly, until the end

9 of 1993, I was what was called deputy co-chairman of the international

10 conference on former Yugoslavia.

11 Q. And while engaged in that capacity, sir, did you have any

12 involvement in negotiations between particular governments?

13 A. Yes. My main responsibility during those months was to negotiate,

14 or try to negotiate, I should rather say, a settlement between the

15 government of the Republic of Croatia and the government of the so-called

16 Republic of Krajina.

17 Q. And during the course of those negotiations or attempted

18 negotiations, as you phrase it, did you have any dealings with the accused

19 in these proceedings, then President Milosevic?

20 A. Yes, I did. Not a lot, but we thought that Belgrade had some

21 influence on the Republic of Krajina and so we referred to Belgrade from

22 time to time. Then Foreign Minister Jovanovic I met with on several

23 occasions, and I also met with President Milosevic. At least I remember

24 one meeting with him in connection with -- we tried to set up secret

25 negotiations in Norway between the Serbs and the Croats. I guess we -- at

1 that time we were somewhat inspired by other Norwegian colleagues that had

2 achieved something in the Middle East and we thought we could do something

3 similar in this connection. And at that time I met with President

4 Milosevic for him to put pressure on the Serbs in Knin to go along with my

5 proposal for these negotiations in Norway.

6 Q. And did Milosevic at that time appear to be willing to assist you

7 in achieving your objective?

8 A. He did. This was in the early fall, if I recall this correctly.

9 I think the meeting in Norway took place in November, so this must have

10 been -- or maybe October. So this must have been in September, early

11 October. And I went to Belgrade and had a meeting with him, as I said,

12 and at that time, the government of Croatia had battles going on both with

13 the Muslims in Bosnia and at the same time then with the Serbs in Knin, in

14 the Krajina Republic. And I asked for his help, and he said that he would

15 assist me because he felt that it would be difficult for the Croats to

16 fight two fronts at the same time, and according to him, it was more

17 important to fight the Muslims than the Serb -- the Croats should be able

18 to fight the Muslims and in order for the Croats to fight the Muslims, the

19 Serbs should kind of step back and let the Croats fight the Muslims.

20 And his statement, as I still recall very vividly and as I thought

21 of sometimes during 1999 was that the reason why he did this, that we

22 could not have a Muslim republic in Europe.

23 Q. Perhaps you've already explained it, but what did you understand

24 him to mean when he said something about not having two fronts?

25 A. Well, he indicated to me that he was impressed, as I understood

1 it, with the Croat military power, but in spite of the fact that the

2 Croats were good fighters, good military, to have two fronts at the same

3 time would be too much for them. And as I understood him, he thought it

4 was important for all of us, I guess he implied, to fight the Muslims.

5 And then in order to -- to let the Croats concentrate, so to say, on the

6 Muslims, he would ask the government in Knin to participate in the talks

7 that we were going to have in Norway and then, for the time being at

8 least, not pursue military activities.

9 Q. I see. Ambassador Vollebaek, in 1993, what was Milosevic's

10 position? Like, what position did he hold with what government?

11 A. Well, as far as I can recall, he had the same position as he had

12 in 1999; he was President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

13 Q. Why did you go to him in order to attempt to persuade other --

14 other governments or other entities to come to Norway to negotiate?

15 A. Well, we were under the impression that the government in Knin was

16 heavily supported, strongly supported, by the government in Belgrade and

17 then, in casu, then President Milosevic. We knew that members of the Knin

18 government went to Belgrade very often, and we thought and presumed that

19 President Milosevic had a strong influence on the government in Knin. And

20 since the representatives of the Knin government then went to Norway for

21 these talks, later on I was strengthened in my belief that there was an

22 influence from Belgrade on the government of Knin.

23 Q. Because they showed up at the --

24 A. They showed up, yes.

25 Q. I see. Sir, just to take you to more recent times, we've heard in

1 these proceedings considerable evidence from various individuals about the

2 OSCE, but as I understand it, sir, you were the -- you were the chairman

3 of the OSCE. You were the chief executive officer, as it were, in that

4 capacity, were you, of the OSCE?

5 A. Yes. We had a secretary-general, or the OSCE has a

6 secretary-general, which is an employee, but the chairman in office is a

7 politically elected function. It changes every year, so it's held by a

8 Foreign Ministry of one of the member countries for one calendar year, and

9 Norway had been selected then to hold this position for the year of 1999.

10 And since I happened to be the foreign minister at that time, it was my

11 task to be the chairman in office of the organisation for that year.

12 There is -- there is a troika system, which means that you start

13 in -- as a member of the troika the year before and you continue the year

14 after. So I started working with the -- with the issues already in 1998.

15 At that time, it was Professor Geremek, the Foreign Minister of Poland,

16 who held the office as chairman.

17 Q. I see. So you spent a year sort of getting ready to take office

18 the following year?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Then you hold office, and then you sort of hold office for a year

21 to assist the newcomer so that there's, I take it --

22 A. Continuity.

23 Q. -- continuity in the position. I understand. But during 1999

24 when you were the chairman, how many member states were there? How many

25 countries were there that made up the OSCE?

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1 A. There are 54 members. I think there still are 54 members of the

2 OSCE. In 1999, Yugoslavia was suspended, so their chair was vacant, so

3 only 53 countries were present in the organisation.

4 Q. Why was Yugoslavia suspended? Do you know?

5 A. That happened because of the Balkan conflict and the decision by

6 the organisation to suspend it due to the fact that Yugoslavia did not

7 live up to its obligations as a member of the OSCE.

8 Q. To your knowledge, have they now been reinstated?

9 A. They have.

10 Q. Now, you've already made reference, sir, to the previous chairman,

11 Geremek. Was there, in 1998 while you were already working with Geremek,

12 were you aware of a special mandate with respect to Kosovo?

13 A. Yes. The OSCE had by itself, so to say, a mandate for the

14 peaceful settlement of conflicts, for democratisation, for human rights in

15 Europe, but in the dealing with the Kosovo conflict, there were, if I

16 recall correctly, two Resolutions by the Security Council. If my memory

17 doesn't fail me, I think it was 1160 and 1199, but anyway, those

18 Resolutions gave or asked the OSCE to take upon themselves to try to find

19 a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. And in order to fulfil that

20 request by the Security Council, there were negotiations between the

21 government of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and there was an agreement signed

22 between Foreign Minister Geremek, and I think it was signed by Foreign

23 Minister Jovanovic of Yugoslavia in October 1998 that should then lead up

24 to the presence of OSCE in Yugoslavia and specifically then in Kosovo.

25 Q. You are aware, I take it, of a document known as the Holbrooke

1 agreement? Is this in substitution for or in addition to or totally

2 separate from what has been colloquially referred to as the

3 Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement?

4 A. My understanding is that the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement should

5 be in support of the role of the OSCE and of the peaceful settlement. I

6 didn't always feel it that way, I must admit, when I spoke to

7 Mr. Milosevic about it, because when I -- well, the formal basis for our

8 presence was, of course, the OSCE agreement, and we had a mandate on that

9 basis. But at the same time, it was this additional agreement, as you

10 said, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, that, I must admit, I've never

11 seen, but it came up in the conversations I had with Mr. Milosevic, and --

12 but it came up in a way that when I asked for something, when I demanded

13 something of him, he claimed that this was without the agreement he had

14 with Mr. Holbrooke. So -- and I could not verify that.

15 Q. I see.

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, remind me of this: We have the OSCE

17 agreement in evidence, do we?

18 MR. RYNEVELD: We do, yes, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you could remind me sometime what the number

20 is.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

22 JUDGE MAY: I know we have the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement.

23 That I remember. In October 1998.

24 MR. RYNEVELD: There is a document, and we'll find it in just a

25 moment, that's actually signed by Geremek and that's the document.

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Judge Kwon kindly reminds me. It's tab

2 94. As I remembered, the Milosevic agreement is there.

3 MR. RYNEVELD: I believe it's in the binder of materials

4 constituting Exhibit 94 that were introduced through General

5 Drewienkiewicz. I just don't know what tab number without reference.

6 JUDGE MAY: The answer is it's tab 2.

7 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

8 JUDGE MAY: And the other agreement is tab 1.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Yes. I thought they would be fairly

10 early in the binder.

11 Q. Now, just a couple of quick questions, sir. We know that the OSCE

12 was made up of 54 member states, et cetera, et cetera. What function,

13 what particular issues or interests did the OSCE attempt to safeguard

14 during its -- during its mandate?

15 A. The OSCE was following up, so to say, of the so-called CSE, the

16 conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, and that conference was

17 then made into an organisation, a permanent body, which was the OSCE.

18 The conference was based on the Helsinki treaty of 1975. It was

19 established during the Cold War as an organisation working with

20 disarmament, with the human rights, trying to pursue efforts for

21 democracy, minorities. So there was a whole range, actually, of - what

22 shall I say? - activities in order to seek a peaceful change from a

23 totalitarian system in then eastern and central Europe and into a

24 democratic system for the whole of Europe. And at the same time, as I

25 said, strongly involved in disarmament.

1 Q. In 1999, during your chairmanship of the OSCE, did you have any

2 discussions with Mr. Milosevic, among others, about the role that the OSCE

3 might play in the Kosovo conflict? And if so, what kind of reception did

4 you get from Mr. Milosevic?

5 A. You said 1999, during my year as chairman in office?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Yes. I had several meetings with him. As I recall it, I think I

8 had three meetings and I had some telephone conversations.

9 Since Kosovo was, as I saw it at that time, the main task of the

10 OSCE - we had a number of other tasks at the same time but the Kosovo

11 conflict had become such a hot issue, a very serious issue - I felt that I

12 had to concentrate a lot of my efforts as chairman in office of the OSCE

13 on precisely Kosovo. And for that reason, I decided to go to Belgrade

14 early, and I think my -- in my term as chairman. And I think my first

15 meeting with then President Milosevic was on the 11th of January in 1999,

16 when we then discussed the work that we were going to do, the various

17 activities that we were going to do.

18 At that time, if I again recall correctly, some Serbs had been

19 abducted or hijacked, kidnapped by Kosovo Albanians, so that became a very

20 important issue, trying to release those -- and that was maybe my main

21 task during that visit instead of preparing for the ordinary work that the

22 OSCE should be doing.

23 We had established what was called the Kosovo Verification

24 Mission. I understand that you have had witnesses earlier that dealt with

25 that. And my next meeting was 21st or something of January, and that was

1 to discuss the expulsion of Ambassador Walker. Ambassador Walker was the

2 head, as you well know, of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and President

3 Milosevic, and I suppose the government, whatever, had decided to declare

4 Ambassador Walker persona non grata. There was unacceptable to us. It

5 was, as I saw it, a violation of the agreement we had with the government,

6 and I had to try to stop the expulsion, and I -- he was not expelled.

7 And then my last meeting with Mr. Milosevic was on the 1st of

8 March, if I again recall correctly. At that time, the Rambouillet talks,

9 the talks had -- were under way. I think there was a period, a kind of a

10 lapse in the talks, and I went to Belgrade to see if we could try to

11 convince Mr. Milosevic and the government and to pursue the negotiations

12 as we wanted them to pursue.

13 Q. We'll get into some of those meetings that you've just outlined

14 for us with some more specificity. Maybe I should back you up just for a

15 moment.

16 Did you also have any meetings with Mr. Milosevic in 1998, prior

17 to taking on the role as chairman personally?

18 A. Yes, I did. I think the first meeting I had as Norwegian Foreign

19 Minister was in April of 1998, and at that time I knew that I was going to

20 be the chairman of OSCE for the next year so we discussed, obviously, that

21 role and that function and then we discussed the normal -- whatever

22 foreign ministers discuss with the heads of states, and specifically, of

23 course, the very serious situation in Kosovo and in the Balkans in

24 general.

25 Q. I should ask you, sir, what was Mr. Milosevic's view on the role

1 of the KVM? Was he initially eager to have them present?

2 A. My understanding was that he never liked KVM. I guess he was

3 against an international presence in Kosovo in general. And KVM was

4 supposed to be a larger group than -- you have had something earlier that

5 was called KDOM. I must admit that I'm not very certain about the mandate

6 of that group, but anyway, KVM was going -- it was not an armed group, it

7 was a civilian force, but it -- I think we aimed at having something like

8 2.000 people so it would be a more -- their presence would be more felt.

9 And it was my understanding that he was not very keen on that, but it was

10 accepted and the first meeting I had with him on the 11th of January, as I

11 said, he accepted the agreement, of course, that was signed between his

12 foreign minister and Foreign Minister Geremek.

13 Q. All right. Now, without getting into specifics of the meetings

14 that you have had - and we'll get back to those in a moment - I'm going to

15 ask you now to retrospectively look at the collective meetings you've had

16 with President Milosevic, as he then was, and can you tell the Court, if

17 you would, please, what impression you formed about his authority or lack

18 of it.

19 A. Well, Your Honours, I think Mr. Milosevic had a lot of authority.

20 He -- his presence was very much felt when he was present, and at least I

21 was left with the impression that he was a man in control and in command.

22 Q. And during some of these meetings, were any of his other senior

23 assistants or officials or ministers present?

24 A. Yes. In all meetings except for the meeting that you referred to

25 earlier in 1993, I cannot recall to have had any meetings with him alone.

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1 I had members of my staff with me, and he had, as I recall it, a number of

2 his officials, other political members, military leaders with him.

3 Q. When you met with Milosevic and his other senior ministers, were

4 you able to form any impression as to who ultimately made decisions? Did

5 the ministers make decisions or did Milosevic make decisions or could you

6 see who made decisions?

7 A. Again, Your Honours, this is, of course, based on impression. I

8 was never present in any of the internal discussions that the government

9 of Yugoslavia had, but in -- as I said, in all the meetings I had with him

10 together with other people, he was the one that mainly spoke. He was the

11 one that mainly drew conclusions. And in some of the meetings we had, for

12 instance, in Kosovo with -- I guess his name was Andjelkovic or something

13 like that, his representative in Kosovo, there was no doubt that

14 everything was referred back to Belgrade. I mean, there was nothing that

15 they could decide without having this confirmed. And when we spoke and

16 they spoke about Belgrade, I was, anyway, under the impression that we

17 talked about Mr. Milosevic.

18 Q. I see. Sir, you made reference a few moments ago to the first of

19 a series of meetings. Perhaps we can talk first about the meeting in

20 January of 1999. I believe the date you gave was the 11th of January.

21 Perhaps -- what -- I'm sorry. The subject matter of the meeting on the

22 11th of January, I believe you mentioned, referred to some VJ soldiers?

23 A. That's right. Well, it was supposed to be an ordinary meeting,

24 preparing for the work that we were going to do, but just before I

25 arrived, some -- some VJ soldiers had been abducted by Kosovo Albanians,

1 and this made an outcry in Belgrade and this was the issue that was

2 brought up. And we were asked, or maybe even more than asked, demanded to

3 see if we could release -- have them released. So we had a lot of

4 activities with reference to that, trying to get those released, which we

5 succeeded in having. So that became one of the main issues in addition to

6 more the ordinary discussion on how to deal with the role of KVM in

7 Kosovo.

8 Q. Do I understand you correctly to say that your organisation was

9 involved and successful in assisting in the prisoner exchange or the VJ

10 soldier exchange?

11 A. That is my belief, yes, that we did so.

12 Q. All right. Did you have subsequent conversations after the 15th

13 of January, after Racak, with Mr. Milosevic?

14 A. Yes. On -- when the Racak massacre happened, of course that was a

15 very serious incident which we took very seriously, and based on what Mr.

16 Milosevic found as the inappropriate reaction of Ambassador Walker, he or

17 the government decided to declare Ambassador Walker persona non grata and

18 wanted to expel him.

19 In that situation, I knew that the whole KVM mission would fall

20 apart. I mean, one could not expel the head of the mission without

21 looking at the whole mission. And for that reason, I had immediately a

22 telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister Jovanovic to discuss it

23 with him, asked for a meeting with President Milosevic, and I was -- I had

24 this meeting on the -- I think it was on the 21st of January, and the --

25 my objective was to have this decision undone or changed. It was

1 unacceptable, and I said it was a violation of the agreement we had. It

2 said in the agreement, if I recall correctly, it states quite clearly that

3 it is up to me, as chairman in office of the OSCE, to appoint or fire the

4 head of the KVM mission. This has nothing to do with the country in which

5 they are serving.

6 Q. Let me stop you there. And just so that we're clear, you had

7 appointed Ambassador Walker as the head of the KVM; is that correct?

8 A. Yes. Or it was Professor Geremek as chairman in office, but it

9 was the chairman in office of the OSCE who should appoint him according to

10 the agreement that was signed between Jovanovic and Geremek, and it was

11 also up to the chairman in office to tell the head of the KVM to step

12 down, if he so desired.

13 Q. So your view was that this was something that was in your mandate,

14 not -- not the mandate of the country that was being observed.

15 A. That is correct. And more so, I don't think it was only my view

16 but I think it said so in the agreement.

17 Q. Yes. All right. Was there a further discussion with the accused

18 about Mr. Walker?

19 A. Yes. We had a number of discussions, I would say, on Mr. Walker,

20 and Mr. Milosevic found -- I mean, he disliked his appearance, to my

21 understanding, a lot, and he found that his reaction after the Racak

22 massacre was inappropriate. His comments had been not in accordance with

23 his position, I think he said, and that was the reason then why he wanted

24 him expelled. And he offered, if I recall correctly, offered to have a

25 Norwegian as the head of the KVM. He asked me, "Why couldn't we have a

1 Norwegian as the head of the KVM?" And I said this was not up to him to

2 select the head of the KVM.

3 So we had a long discussion that day, or even into the early

4 night, I would say, about KVM and Ambassador Walker.

5 Q. Ambassador Vollebaek, I'm going to wait between your questions and

6 -- or your answers to my questions because of translation. Because we

7 both speak the same language, I'm afraid that we haven't been allowing for

8 the translators, so I'll pause.

9 A. Sorry. I'll try to behave.

10 Q. No. It's my fault.

11 Now, did you ultimately resolve this apparent conflict concerning

12 Ambassador Walker?

13 A. Yes. We solved it in the sense that it was decided, according to

14 Mr. Milosevic, by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to

15 freeze the expulsion. We had a long discussion on different phraseology

16 and conditions, and I could not accept any conditions because there were

17 no -- as I saw it, there were no conditions that were -- he was not

18 entitled to impose any conditions. And at the end of the conversation, he

19 proposed or accepted that there should be a freeze of the expulsion,

20 unconditional freeze, and that was then put forward, as I understood it,

21 to the government of FRY. And I, of course, also had to consult with the

22 members, the troika members of the OSCE and also with the Contact Group

23 members if this was acceptable to them. And it was acceptable to my side,

24 and I was later then called back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

25 Belgrade, and the foreign minister told me that the government had

1 accepted that this -- this freezing of the expulsion should take place.

2 Q. The result of that was Ambassador --

3 A. That Ambassador Walker could continue as head of KVM until the

4 withdrawal.

5 Q. During the course of these negotiations, was there any discussion

6 about forensic -- independent forensic examinations of the bodies found at

7 Racak?

8 A. Yes. This was an issue that I think primarily was raised by the

9 KVM itself because they had the mandate and the duty to look into these

10 incidents that happened on the ground.

11 As I recall it, Mr. Milosevic refused. I think they had some

12 local Serb forensic expert to look into it first. Then, in order to make

13 this kind of international, he asked, if I recall correctly, a group from

14 Belarus, but we insisted that there should be someone from the OSCE side

15 accepted that we had chosen.

16 We had a long discussion on this, and -- but the end was that

17 there was a Finnish group, headed by, if I remember correctly, Dr. Ranta,

18 that was allowed in. But again, if my memory doesn't fail me, they came

19 in almost a week after the massacre happened. So they came in quite late

20 and they complained about that. They said that of course the bodies had

21 been moved, things had happened. So they were criticising that they had

22 not been able to come earlier.

23 Q. But the result of the negotiation was that the Finnish team was

24 also permitted to come in and participate in this forensic examination

25 although they complained it was much too late.

1 A. That's right, but they did come in and they did make a report.

2 Q. All right. I just want to back up and just ask a question that

3 I'd forgotten to put to you earlier, sir. You referred earlier to a

4 meeting with someone, and I believe you mentioned the word "Andjelkovic."

5 Is that Zoran Andjelkovic?

6 A. Yes. My memory may fail me, but as -- I cannot confirm his first

7 name, but as I recall, he was the local representative of the federal

8 government or the government of Belgrade in Pristina. So he was my main

9 interlocutor, a kind of host, when I visited Pristina. And I had meetings

10 with him, some with him in his capacity as representative but also then as

11 head of the council that they had with representatives of various -- kind

12 of an elected body. So he -- as I understood him, he was then appointed

13 by Belgrade as a caretaker governor, whatever, of Kosovo.

14 Q. Is this the gentleman you said that from time to time would say

15 that he'd have to check with Belgrade?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. And by that, you understood him to mean Milosevic?

18 A. I did.

19 Q. Now --

20 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm at paragraph 12, Your Honours.

21 Q. During your meetings with the accused, you said apart from that

22 one meeting, I believe in 1993, he always had other people with him?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And including some of the people you've already mentioned, were

25 there any military personnel, generals or anything like that, in his

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1 company during your meetings?

2 A. Yes. As I recall it, I think there were generals or military

3 personnel in all the meetings. Well, I stated I had three meetings with

4 him before -- in 1999 before the military activities of the Kosovo

5 conflict, the bombing started, and as I recall it, there were military

6 personnel present in all these three meetings, yes.

7 Q. And you've told us earlier that it appeared that it was the

8 accused that made decisions, or at least that was your impression of it.

9 Did that also include discussions concerning matters where the military

10 were present?

11 A. Certainly, yes.

12 Q. Did those discussions sometimes involve military matters?

13 A. Yes, they did, to the extent that we were talking about the

14 presence, the military presence, in Kosovo. We were talking about what we

15 saw as attacks or -- what should I say -- activities against the KVM by

16 the military that we said was unacceptable to us. So -- and there were

17 also then activities along the borderline with Macedonia. So there were

18 several issues without me actually remembering each concrete issue, but

19 military issues and activities were discussed.

20 Q. Do you know Milan Milutinovic?

21 A. I cannot say I know him, but I met him in the presence of

22 Mr. Milosevic.

23 Q. Was he present at some or all of these meetings?

24 A. My impression is that he was present at all, but I may be wrong.

25 But he was present at some of the meetings, yes.

1 Q. And what did you understand his role to be when you met him? What

2 was his title?

3 A. Well, at that time, he was President of the Serb Republic.

4 Q. Now, in your meetings, you discussed, I take it, the international

5 observer role in Kosovo; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, because the main task of the OSCE at that time was the KVM,

7 the Kosovo Verification Mission. We demanded, according to the agreement

8 we had with the government of Yugoslavia, was then to seek a peaceful

9 settlement, to ask or to try to make possible the return of the number of

10 refugees that had left Kosovo. So these -- how to facilitate that return,

11 how to seek or how to start, maybe, negotiations between the government of

12 Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian population was, of

13 course, the main task for me and the main topic that we had during our

14 conversations.

15 Q. During the course of your negotiations or discussions, was an

16 international military presence one of the topics at any stage?

17 A. Yes. At least in the conversation we had on the 1st of March.

18 Because since we saw that the situation did not improve, it, rather,

19 deteriorated in Kosovo, as I mentioned, KVM was an observer group without

20 any military force and we saw that we could not fulfil the mandate that we

21 had, the only way that we thought that we could pursue our activities was

22 with a military presence. And this was also discussed during the

23 Rambouillet talks and was a part of the Rambouillet proposal. And so I

24 brought up and pressed for Mr. Milosevic's acceptance of a military

25 presence.

1 Q. How was that suggestion received?

2 A. Not very favourably. He was very upset for many reasons. He

3 stated clearly that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, as he said,

4 that -- I mean, it was unheard-of that you had international troops,

5 military forces on the soil of a sovereign state. In addition to that,

6 since Yugoslavia was suspended from the OSCE, he -- he saw no reason why

7 OSCE should impose anything like this on him. And he compared, actually,

8 this military presence to the -- to the Soviet invasion of Prague because

9 he said that -- well, he -- as I said, he was rather upset, and he said

10 that he would not accept my proposal. And he said that Yugoslavia had

11 stood up against Stalin, and they had stood up against Breschnev, and they

12 should also stand up against Mr. Vollebaek. So he -- I had a nice

13 comparison there. And I tried to tell him that this wasn't by invitation.

14 I mean, he was still then the president, and it would be under -- I mean,

15 upon invitation. It was nothing compared to either what Stalin did or

16 what the Soviet Union did in Prague in 1968, but that was how he felt it.

17 Q. I'd ask you if you would explain for the Court, please, what you

18 meant earlier when you indicated that one of the reasons that you

19 discussed an international military presence was because the OSCE was

20 unable to fulfil its mandate. What did you mean by that? What problems

21 did you have as civilians?

22 A. Well, as -- as I said, I visited Kosovo three times before the war

23 broke out, and I saw, I think specifically my second visit, I saw that

24 there was a great trust in KVM from the population in Kosovo. They had

25 seen improvement in their situation, much more security. Some villagers

1 had returned to their villages. I visited, myself, both posts manned by

2 Yugoslav military personnel and KLA personnel and saw that we had a

3 mediating role, we had a role of a buffer, and there was a rather

4 optimistic atmosphere, I would say. This was then in late January of

5 1999. And the morale among the KVM observers, monitors, was also quite

6 high because they felt they had a role to play.

7 Then when I came back in early March, that situation was totally

8 changed because there had been a number of incidents. There had been an

9 increased military -- Yugoslav military presence, in violation of the

10 agreement that we had. People had started fleeing again or leaving their

11 homes. You had attacks on members of the KVM. And the local population

12 felt that we didn't do anything for them. I mean, they had lost a lot of

13 confidence in us. And all this resulted in the fact that we could not do

14 what we were supposed to do; starting negotiations, facilitating return of

15 refugees to the country. I mean, new people were leaving.

16 And it became quite clear to me that in order for us to do what we

17 were supposed to do also with respect to democracy building, with respect

18 to the free press, with respect to a number of the activities that we were

19 supposed to do, this could not be done without the military presence that

20 could actually hold the military factions apart from each other. Because

21 you had, as is well known, the KLA, which also had military activities,

22 and with the Yugoslav military activities, the local population was caught

23 in between, and that was impossible for us to do anything or to avoid this

24 because we had -- we were unarmed.

25 Q. I see. Now, during the course of your discussions, did you hear

1 the accused indicate to you about the potential for ethnic makeup of

2 Kosovo, what groups might be able to reside in Kosovo?

3 A. Yes. He always talked about a multi-ethnic Kosovo, and I guess he

4 charged me and us with being too pro-Albanian and not taking into

5 consideration the Serb population, the Roma population, the various other

6 groups that you had in Kosovo. And he -- so he was very strongly

7 committed then to, as he said, to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. I told him that

8 we also were concerned with the other groups.

9 I had a number of meetings with representatives of the Serb

10 opposition, for instance, representatives of the Serb groups in Kosovo,

11 and we were discussing their situation. And I gave clear instructions to

12 KVM also to look into whatever incidents where the Serb population and the

13 Roma people were under attack from the Kosovo Albanian side.

14 Q. In discussions about these ethnic groups, were there any

15 conditions attached to their residents in Kosovo in terms of majority of

16 individuals and respecting decisions of the majority?

17 A. Could you elaborate a little bit more on that question, sir?

18 Q. I'll rephrase. I'll rephrase. Did you find out from the accused

19 who he deemed to be the majority ethnic group in Kosovo?

20 A. Well, I -- I'm not certain that we actually, to my recollection,

21 actually discussed what was the majority as such. He felt very strongly

22 that the Albanians would have to comply with the -- with the Serb rule, so

23 to say, because that was, of course, as he saw it, Kosovo was a part of

24 Serbia, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. And he refused -- well, I would not say refused, but he did not

2 want to discuss a great deal autonomy. We were playing with a number of

3 models where Kosovo could have a greater deal of autonomy and referring to

4 earlier constitutions and things like that. But he was very adamant that

5 since Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, the -- in spite of the fact

6 that at some stage he would accept the Albanian language maybe and some

7 cultural identifications, this was a part of Serbia and as such they would

8 have to accept the Serb overall rule, so to say.

9 Q. I see. All right. During the course of your discussions, did you

10 raise with the accused the alleged atrocities that you had heard about

11 from your observers, and did you discuss those with Mr. Milosevic?

12 A. Certainly. This was, of course, issues that we brought up every

13 time, and not least when we had the meeting on the 21st of January. The

14 Racak massacre was a very prominent item, precisely because -- well, it

15 had happened, and the OSCE had made a quite strong statement, I think it

16 was on the 16th of January, condemning the massacre, and we asked for an

17 investigation, and also then since the consequence of this was the attempt

18 to expel Ambassador Walker, this Racak massacre was very much an issue.

19 Q. Sir, I don't want to spend valuable court time revisiting a number

20 of documents that have already been entered in in tab 94, but are you

21 aware whether or not the OSCE would provide daily reports about their

22 observations and reports about incidents that they had witnessed or their

23 members had witnessed?

24 A. Certainly. They made -- I would think they made daily reports.

25 At least, they made reports, I think they were on a daily basis, that were

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1 sent back to Vienna, to the OSCE headquarters, about whatever happened,

2 and also about the Racak massacre.

3 Q. Your Honours, we -- we started at 9.30. I'll continue. I thought

4 we were coming up to the break.

5 You referred, sir, to three meetings earlier in yourself, on the

6 11th of January, the 21st of January, and the 1st of March. You've

7 discussed those. I'm going to take you now to the 24th of March.

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Did you have a telephone conversation with the accused on that

10 date?

11 A. Yes, I did. At that time, the Paris talks, as I think they were

12 called at that time, had broken up, and it became more and more evident

13 that we were heading towards an armed conflict. And I felt very strongly,

14 as the chairman of the OSCE, that it was in my -- it was my duty to try to

15 do whatever I could to avoid an armed conflict. And I had a conversation

16 with Secretary-General Solana, who was at that time Secretary-General of

17 NATO, and I said to him that I would like to try one more time if I could

18 convince Mr. Milosevic to go along with some talks and allow a military

19 presence and so that we could see if we could avoid the military conflict

20 that we understood was coming.

21 I did not know -- as you will recall as happened, the bombing

22 started that evening. I did not know at that time, but I knew that it was

23 growing near. And I made a telephone conversation to him, to

24 Mr. Milosevic around early -- or late morning/early afternoon, if I recall

25 correctly, and tried to explain to him the serious situation, and also

1 told him that I was available if I could do something. Of course, he

2 disagreed with my view, he disagreed with my proposal. I explained to him

3 that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that it was

4 difficult for us to see any solution.

5 As you may know, the KVM had withdrawn earlier, just some days

6 earlier, again as a result of the breakdown of the negotiations and the

7 security situation that became increasingly deteriorating for the KVM

8 monitors and also the lack of possibility of fulfilling the mandate, as I

9 mentioned earlier. And we saw then a build-up of military personnel in

10 Kosovo after this. There had been an exodus of refugees. A number of

11 refugees had left, there was pressure on the border towards Macedonia and

12 Albania, and we had reports from UNHCR and ICRC after the -- that KVM had

13 left about the situation that was deteriorating.

14 Q. So you called him.

15 A. I called.

16 Q. And perhaps you could outline for us to the best of your

17 recollection the points that you discussed with Mr. Milosevic on that

18 occasion. You've told us that -- did you tell him about seeing the

19 build-up of troops, et cetera?

20 A. That's right. I had seen this when I was there in March, on the

21 1st of March. It was -- as I said, it was a different atmosphere on the

22 1st of March compared to my visit in late January. And I had then seen

23 people leaving with their belongings, and those members of KVM with whom I

24 was travelling, they were quite concerned because they said that this was

25 a new situation, they hadn't seen this lately, so they were very concerned

1 about this.

2 We had -- the military presence was very prevalent, and clearly a

3 build-up compared to what I had seen earlier. We saw also fire. I could

4 not detect exactly what that fire was, but later on that was confirmed by,

5 among others, ICRC and I think also UNHCR, but anyway ICRC and the KVM,

6 for that matter in March before they withdrew, that houses were being set

7 ablaze.

8 Q. All right. Perhaps I can take some of these points one at a time.

9 In relation to the build-up of military forces, et cetera, did you

10 complain about that?

11 A. Yes, I did. I said that this was in violation of the agreement.

12 To that, Mr. Milosevic said that they were there to protect me, which I

13 didn't think was necessary, to say it mildly.

14 Q. You mention, sir, that the reports were that people were fleeing

15 with their belongings. Did you also get reports about whether they were

16 congregating once they fled?

17 A. Yes. We were in touch, of course, with the -- well, both KVM were

18 following them and seeing what happened to them, but also we were in touch

19 with the government of Macedonia. It was very concerned with the

20 situation because a number of people came into Macedonia. The same

21 happened in Albania but maybe the problem was even greater on the border

22 with Macedonia. But again, when I confronted Mr. Milosevic with that, he

23 said that they were just picnicking, so I shouldn't be concerned. They

24 were just on a trip, having picnic. I think I said that it was strange to

25 have a picnic with all your belongings on a tractor trailer, but that was

1 the answer I got.

2 And the same with the burning houses, actually. He told me that

3 it was nonsense that there were any houses burning. They were only straw

4 that KLA or the Kosovo Albanians put the fire to -- put fire to in order

5 to pretend that houses were burning.

6 I said that I had seen some of this myself and I had credible

7 reports from international observers that this was happening, and I said

8 that in response to his statement that I was watching too much CNN,

9 because he said that I was fooled by CNN. And I then said that I had seen

10 this myself on some occasion, or one occasion, and then I had also had

11 reports about the same events or incidents.

12 Q. Did you comment on the way these people were being handled and

13 what -- did you give any advice to the accused as to what he ought to do?

14 A. Certainly. I -- I told him, as I said, that we had -- he should

15 return to the negotiating table, he should allow military presence in

16 order for us to keep the military groups apart so that the refugees could

17 return, and he had to stop violating the agreement we had and to stop

18 harassing people. So -- but according to him then, nothing wrong was

19 happening, so it was difficult to give him advice because there was -- I

20 mean, according to him, I was wrong and there was no reason for him or his

21 government to change the activities or the behaviour with respect to

22 Kosovo.

23 Q. Did you hold out any hope for further negotiation?

24 A. If he complied with my requests, yes. If we could have a military

25 presence, if he was willing to open up again for talks, I said that since

1 I had spoken earlier to Secretary-General Solana, I knew that we could

2 stop the NATO activities, and I knew also that I had the full support of

3 the OSCE troika and the Contact Group in this. But -- but he kind of

4 discarded me completely. He put me off and said that I was wrong. So I

5 had -- the only thing I could say at the end of the conversation was that

6 I was sorry that his vision of the world or the conflict was very

7 different from mine and that there was nothing I could do at that stage

8 but that I was there, I was available, so he could call me any time if he

9 changed his mind, which he didn't do.

10 Q. Did he indicate to you any interest in continued discussions?

11 A. No, none whatsoever.

12 Q. I'll back up to something that you referred sort of in passing to

13 in order to explain a previous conversation. You mentioned that --

14 something to the effect of, "As you know, we withdrew the KVM on an

15 earlier date." Can you tell us approximately when that was and why that

16 was?

17 A. It happened between the 19th and the 20th, if I recall correctly,

18 of March. I think it started -- the decision was taken on the 19th of

19 March and I think it started early morning of the 20th of March.

20 As I said, the situation for KVM had deteriorated very much. We

21 felt that there was a threat to the security of the monitors, and at the

22 same time, they could not fulfil their tasks and their mandate.

23 I had been under some pressure for some time to withdraw KVM,

24 partly, I think, because of the threatened security for the various

25 monitors, that some countries felt that their citizens were not protected

1 well enough and this became political issues in some of the countries, as

2 I understood it. And also that the mandate was not fulfilled. People

3 started asking, "Why are you there?"

4 We had very much Srebrenica in mind, and I think we felt very

5 strongly that we could not be in a position where we repeated a situation

6 where you had an international presence standing by, idly watching

7 atrocities happening. This was very much in our mind when we were

8 discussing and seeing what we could do in Kosovo.

9 At the same time, I also thought that the situation for the

10 civilians would deteriorate if we withdrew. I wanted them to be there as

11 long as possible, that I could in any way defend having them there,

12 because still I thought and hoped that they could do something. And as

13 long as the negotiations in Paris went on, I thought that there still was

14 hope that we could change the attitude of Mr. Milosevic, his government,

15 and might have then an agreement on which we could base our activities.

16 So I would not -- I wouldn't like to withdraw before I really had to.

17 But when the negotiations in Paris broke down and the -- we had

18 some incidents that involved KVM people, that they were attacked by Serb

19 military groups or Serb paramilitary groups maybe, but anyway, they were

20 under -- we had reports that they were attacked or harassed might be the

21 right English word, and I knew, after having been to Kosovo myself, that

22 the trust of KVM was in danger because we could not fulfil the mandate.

23 Then after then consultation with the troika members of the OSCE, and I

24 think I consulted with all the members of the Contact Group, at least some

25 of the major members of the Contact Group, I decided to pull out. It was

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1 also on advice of Ambassador Walker, who was head, as you know, of the

2 KVM. And we had had this discussion before. Ambassador Walker might have

3 wanted to withdraw even a little bit earlier, but when he then stated very

4 clearly that he could not guarantee the security of the members of the

5 monitoring group any longer, I could not, sitting in Oslo, take the

6 responsibility of keeping people in place. So that was the reason why we

7 decided that they should withdraw, and the withdrawal then took place on

8 the 20th of March.

9 Q. Now, sir, immediately after the KVM withdrawal on the 19th, 20th

10 of March, 1999, did you personally witness large movements of refugees out

11 of Kosovo?

12 A. That was a little bit later. This was after the bombing had

13 started. I do not recall the dates, but it must have been early April or

14 -- yes, after the bombing had started. I visited Albania and Macedonia,

15 and we had set up -- the OSCE was then in Macedonia, and we provided the

16 UNHCR and some of the other organisations with material, cars to help them

17 handling the refugees. And I visited a couple of refugee camps and had

18 discussions with the Macedonian government on the handling of refugees in

19 Macedonia.

20 In Albania, I was standing at the border crossing when the

21 refugees came, and I must admit, Your Honours, that I have never seen so

22 many tractors in my whole life as I saw that morning. There were an

23 endless line of tractors with whole families on them. And it was, I

24 think, one of the most moving movements in my life when you stand at the

25 border crossing and meet people that have been fleeing for -- well, some

1 for hours because they didn't come that far away but some for some days,

2 and telling stories about how they -- well, of how they had to flee

3 because their house had been taken over by people that came to their

4 apartments or houses and said that they should -- they should leave, or

5 they came back from -- some people said they came back from their evening

6 stroll and their house was occupied. And others then had been more

7 evicted from their houses forcibly, but there were all kinds of very

8 strong stories. I don't speak Serbian, I don't speak Albanian, but I had

9 interpreters who told me this.

10 And then seeing also the situation with the help that was given.

11 The system of assistance was very important. And one of the things that

12 we did was to take down the names and addresses. We had -- we were the

13 third checkpoint, so to say. The first was a bottle of water, the second

14 was a piece of bread, and the third was to take down the names and

15 addresses. Because one of the last things, apparently, that the Serb

16 authorities did before they left Kosovo was to take away all their pieces

17 of identity, even the number, the licence plates on the tractors were cut

18 or clipped off or -- so that they should have no evidence of where they

19 belonged. And so we saw it as our main task to make sure that we knew

20 where these people were, where did they come from, so that they could tell

21 that immediately and we could take that down.

22 And I was, I will admit, being then, in addition to being chairman

23 of the OSCE, I was also foreign minister of a NATO country, as you recall,

24 Your Honours, NATO was responsible for the bombing, of course, and I was

25 somewhat nervous that these people would charge me with being at least one

1 of the culprits. And none of them said anything about -- blamed NATO for

2 the bombing of the country. And they said they did not flee because of

3 the bombs - that was not a problem for them - but fled because their

4 houses were taken over by Serbs, military or non-military groups, and that

5 they had been told to leave, and they were forced to leave. So there was

6 absolutely no complaining.

7 And I think personally that, in spite of the fact that we had, of

8 course, a number of discussions about the withdrawal of KVM when we did

9 withdraw, the fact that we did not stand idly by and watch atrocities

10 happening made the population trust us so that we could move in very soon

11 after the conflict, after the war. And I visited also Kosovo after the

12 war and met with people that cheered and greeted us, both as a member of

13 NATO but also then as chairman of the OSCE because we had taken such a

14 very clear stand on the atrocities that we saw coming.

15 Q. One further question about your visit. Did you later return to

16 Kosovo and notice what had happened to various houses or villages or --

17 are you able to give the Court a firsthand -- what you saw firsthand about

18 what had happened to the Albanian villages?

19 A. Yes, I did. I think I visited Kosovo twice after the war, and we

20 were very concerned with the situation at that time also for the Serb

21 minority. So during my first visit, I had a meeting with Patriarch Pavle

22 in Pec, which was the head of the Serbian Orthodox church, and I had also

23 decided that I would like to go to Decani, which is a very famous Orthodox

24 monastery, and stay over night as a kind of symbol of solidarity with

25 whoever was citizen of Kosovo, and I did that.

1 On the way to Decani -- well, in several places you saw the

2 results, but on the way to Decani, I still remember that there was a whole

3 village where all the roofs were off, and it was obvious that this was not

4 due to bombing but it was fire or -- I'm not an expert on explosives but

5 it was obvious that this came from the ground and not from the air because

6 the interior of the house was being burned off or destroyed. And all the

7 evidence that I received was that this had happened to Kosovo Albanian

8 houses by Serbs, military or paramilitary or whatever, during that period.

9 I also visited with one of the Orthodox bishops a mass grave where

10 there were about, if I recall correctly, 18 bodies. This -- that grave

11 had not been opened yet, so -- but there was one lady that came and

12 thought that her relatives were buried there, and we had -- she was

13 looking then for identification, and there was a process of opening that

14 grave, and we had a discussion with the bishop about the responsibility of

15 the Serbs and how we could now bridge gaps and ask for forgiveness and

16 things that become important in a process of reconciliation.

17 Q. I want to move to a totally different topic now, if I may,

18 Ambassador, if you've had an opportunity to fully answer the questions

19 earlier.

20 During the course of your chairmanship, did you have meetings with

21 people other than the accused? Did you meet, for example, with leaders of

22 the Kosovar Albanians or the KLA or did you participate in any liaison

23 meetings between the accused and some of these representatives?

24 A. In my period there was no meeting between Mr. Milosevic and Kosovo

25 Albanians that I was present in, but I had a number of meetings with

1 Kosovo Albanian leaders. I met with Mr. Rugova who was then one of the

2 more prominent leaders already at that time of the Kosovo Albanian

3 community. I met with him on several occasions. I -- I met also with a

4 number of others. I must admit, Your Honours, that I do not recall all

5 the names. I met with Mr. Sosa in Albania, and I met with what I guess we

6 thought was the head of the KLA, Mr. Hashim Thaci, but that was in Oslo in

7 June, I think it must have been, so it was after the war had started. June

8 of 1999.

9 Q. June of 1999.

10 A. Yes. I met with him when we were talking about what should happen

11 after the war and how also KLA would have to participate in a peaceful

12 settlement.

13 Q. So this would be after the conflict --

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. -- had been completed. Yes.

16 A. As I recall, I had no meeting with the KLA before 24th of March,

17 1999. We thought that some of the political leaders we met with had links

18 to KLA, but they were not, as I knew then, in any way formal members or

19 representatives of KLA.

20 Q. Did you liaise in any way between Mr. Rugova, who you mentioned,

21 and the accused on other issues at any time or was there a meeting or did

22 you sort of hold independent meetings with each to liaise on topics or --

23 A. It was independent meetings. As I said, there was no meeting

24 where they were both present.

25 Q. I see.

1 A. But I -- since our mandate then was to try to find a peaceful

2 settlement, we were preoccupied with or had to look into the situation of

3 the Kosovo Albanian population in Kosovo. And I was discussing with

4 Mr. Rugova what would be his conditions, what would be his desires, what

5 would be the objectives that they wanted fulfilled in order to be able to

6 live within the borders of Yugoslavia under the Yugoslav authority in a

7 peaceful way, and these demands or requests I presented to Mr. Milosevic

8 and vice versa his replies I also did refer to when I spoke to Mr. Rugova.

9 Q. All right.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I just want to deal with 21, 22, and

11 23 in an encapsulated form.

12 Q. Sir, during your dealings with the accused in these proceedings

13 and your discussions of the Kosovo conflict in the dealings with respect

14 to the Albanians, did you form any impressions about the accused's

15 position in regard to what was most significant to him in these

16 negotiations?

17 A. Well, I -- I think Kosovo, to him, was very important because he

18 looked upon it, and he may still look upon it, as the cradle of the Serb

19 culture. There was very little willingness to discuss any kind of

20 autonomy or any kind of -- to go further on any kind of possibility of

21 some kind of self-determination for the Kosovo Albanian people.

22 I did not want, at that time, any new borders in Europe, but I

23 said as chairman in office of the OSCE, I agreed and it was very important

24 for me to say that we should not draw any new borders and I did not want

25 an independent Kosovo. But it was obvious to me that the Kosovo Albanian

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1 population had to be given much more autonomy when it came to language,

2 culture, et cetera. And this was very difficult for Mr. Milosevic, as I

3 understood, because he felt that that would open up for a secession of

4 Kosovo, and that was totally unacceptable for him. He was very adamant

5 that Kosovo had to be a part of Serbia since that was the cradle of Serb

6 culture and language.

7 Q. All right. Now, did you form any impression, quite apart from the

8 one you've just mentioned, about any personal motivation?

9 A. Well, I think that this is part of what I also maybe felt in 1993

10 when I met with Mr. Milosevic at that time, that it is a question of

11 power, but in addition to, as I said, the Kosovo situation, which I think

12 he felt was different from Bosnia and Croatia because of the sentimental

13 feelings attached to Kosovo, I personally saw much of his behaviour as

14 part of his desire for personal power and that he needed a power basis,

15 and he -- that was -- that was part of his -- well, it was -- what shall I

16 say? The reason for his behaviour but also maybe his -- he needed this

17 for his personal power.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: I note the time. I believe those are my questions

19 in chief. Thank you.

20 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now for half an hour.

21 Ambassador, I must give you the standard warning we have to give to all

22 witnesses: Don't speak to anybody, please, about your evidence until it's

23 over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. Would

24 you be back, please, at half past.

25 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

1 --- On resuming at 11.33 a.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you tell me how much time I'm

4 going to have, Mr. May, so I'm not surprised by a subsequent decision of

5 yours?

6 JUDGE MAY: We will consult.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE MAY: Two hours.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That seems to me to be too little,

10 but in view of your practice hitherto, this is nothing new to me.

11 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vollebaek, do you consider, in view of the

13 decision to withdraw the Verification Mission which you yourself took,

14 that you are one of the few people who bear the burden of personal

15 responsibility for the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia?

16 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I do not consider that. As I have told you --

17 and with Your Honours' agreement, I would like to address Mr. Milosevic

18 directly. Because as I told you, Mr. Milosevic, on numerous occasions,

19 that you are responsible. I did that on the 24th of March but I also did

20 it on the 1st of March when we met. You knew what was coming in view of

21 what we had told you. I was in a position that I, for some time, saw the

22 Kosovo Verification Mission having a role, because I saw that it improved

23 the conditions of the population in Kosovo. Then I saw that you had an

24 escalation of military power in Kosovo, which meant that we were faced

25 with a number of incidents, atrocities, that we could not hinder, avoid.

1 And we also had a security risk for our monitors. And in view of that, I

2 had to make the decision to withdraw. But I resisted as long as I could

3 because I first wanted to see if we could avoid a conflict, and also to

4 give you, Mr. Milosevic, a chance to change your mind and cooperate with

5 us.

6 Q. All right. Let's remain within the realm of questions. So do you

7 in fact consider, as it is not in dispute that you yourself personally

8 took the decision, at least in formal sense, do you consider that that

9 decision of yours in fact in the moral and ethical sense is the most

10 weighty because, as you said, you took the personal decision as being the

11 co-chairman for the international conference of the former Yugoslavia and

12 cooperation, the purpose of which was peace. Yes or no.

13 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure I understand the question.

14 JUDGE MAY: The witness has dealt with that, I think. Unless

15 there's a new point. If so, perhaps you'd tell us what it is.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the point is that

17 individually, in view of his position as chairman of the Organisation for

18 European Security and Cooperation, that is to say an organisation the

19 purpose of which is European security precisely, which means peace, that

20 in the moral and ethical sense this personal decision is the most

21 difficult. Isn't that so?

22 JUDGE MAY: Was it a difficult decision?

23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, yes, it was a very difficult decision.

24 It was one of the most difficult decisions I made. But I -- if this

25 implies that I am in any way responsible for the war in Kosovo, I would

1 flatly reject it, Mr. Milosevic, because as, Your Honours, I've told you

2 earlier, we could not perform and fulfil the mandate we were given because

3 Mr. Milosevic's army and paramilitary troops, whatever, did not fulfil

4 their side of the obligation. They had their side of the agreement and

5 were roaming around, making atrocities that we could not stop. And we

6 could not be watching this.

7 So as I see it, the conflict would have -- there was a conflict

8 already. The withdrawal did not start the war. The war was there already

9 when I decided to withdraw.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. All right. But I hope you were conscious of the fact that that

12 decision would enable the greatest military machinery that the world has

13 known thus far would be deployed and used against a small country which in

14 nurtured good neighbourly relations with all states surrounding it and

15 which did not jeopardise or threaten any of those countries. Is that

16 correct or not?

17 A. Your Honours, I think the accused is making statements more than

18 asking questions, but that is nothing new. We have had these type of

19 conversations before, Mr. Milosevic and I. And I think that this is -- it

20 is my view that this is not correct.

21 You will remember, Mr. Milosevic, that the Security Council had

22 passed two Security Council Resolutions, 1160 and 1199. They had been

23 referenced to what is called the Chapter VII language of the UN treaty.

24 And you will know that there had been precedent statements in the Security

25 Council precisely dealing with the risk of regional conflict. It is

1 positively wrong when you say that your attitude, your actions, your

2 behaviour did not threaten the regional stability. We saw that with

3 respect to Macedonia, we saw it with respect to Albania, and we had seen

4 it earlier with respect to the other states in the former Yugoslavia.

5 This had been repeated on and on again.

6 And even though I agree with you that what happened in Kosovo was

7 an internal matter to the sense -- in the sense that what happened inside

8 the borders was an internal matter, it was still a breach of any kind of

9 human rights agreements and, in addition, the OSCE agreement that was the

10 formal basis for the KVM and my responsibility.

11 Q. And are you saying, in fact, that Yugoslavia jeopardised Macedonia

12 or Albanian perhaps?

13 A. I am saying that a long time before the 24th of March there were

14 refugees leaving Kosovo in order to avoid the atrocities that were

15 committed by you.

16 Q. Tell me, did Yugoslavia jeopardise any neighbouring country when

17 you took the decision to withdraw the mission and to enable NATO to

18 unleash the war against Yugoslavia?

19 JUDGE MAY: The witness hadn't said that that happened at all.

20 That wasn't the reason, as you heard.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. All right. Tell me this, then, sir, Mr. Vollebaek: As a

24 Norwegian originating from a country of the Vikings, valiant warriors,

25 does it seem to be a form of warrior behaviour that a force such as NATO

1 should attack a country with 11 million inhabitants?

2 JUDGE MAY: This is a matter of comment, not a proper question.

3 Ask your next question.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. And do you consider that by withdrawing the mission upon orders

7 from NATO, you in fact --

8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. That contains an assertion which the

9 witness should deal with.

10 Was the mission withdrawn on the orders of NATO?

11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the answer to that question is no. It

12 was -- well, first of all, it was my formal decision. As chairman in

13 office, I had to take the formal decision. It was taken upon an advice

14 by Ambassador Walker, who was the responsible head of the mission, and he

15 told me that he could not any longer take responsibility for the security

16 and safety of the monitors, which I had to take very seriously.

17 Secondly, it was taken in consultation with the other members of

18 the troika of the OSCE, meaning that -- well, Poland was one, and I guess

19 Romania was the other. And in addition to that, in contacts with the

20 members of the Contact Group. But the decision was mine, and there was

21 absolutely no imposition by NATO.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. All right. You claim that you did not withdraw the mission

24 following orders from NATO to enable the bombing to take place, and now to

25 that you add that NATO didn't even exert any pressure upon you or

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1 influence you in any way and that you didn't consult NATO at all with

2 respect to the withdrawal of the mission.

3 A. Your Honours, as I told when the Prosecutor was asking me, I

4 consulted the secretary-general of NATO with respect to if I should try

5 another time to avoid a military conflict. But that was on the 24th of

6 March, after the withdrawal. But the reason for the withdrawal, as I have

7 stated several times, Your Honours, was that we could not fulfil the

8 mission, and we could not have a situation as we had had in Srebrenica

9 where the international community was standing idle, watching atrocities

10 happening. And we saw atrocities happening, and we saw a building up of

11 military force, and that was the situation I was faced with. And this,

12 Your Honours, as I understand this, is the fault of Mr. Milosevic. He was

13 in breach with the agreement. He was told that, and he did not want to

14 comply with the agreement. So in my understanding, he must be responsible

15 for the withdrawal and not anyone else.

16 Q. All right. Very well. That means that you did not withdraw the

17 mission upon NATO's suggestions. I'm now going to read out what was said

18 here by the president of the military NATO committee, General Naumann, a

19 few days ago. He says: [In English] "[Previous translation continues]...

20 concerned about the security of the OSCE observers and invited the OSCE to

21 consider NATO's recommendation to withdraw them since we saw that the

22 bombing was imminent."

23 [Interpretation] Full stop there. And the next sentence: [In

24 English] "The OSCE then took the decision to withdraw them I think on the

25 20th of March."

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be placed on the overhead

2 projector. It's taken from the transcript, the LiveNote from this trial.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put it on the ELMO.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And the chairman of the military committee of NATO says that they

6 called upon the OSCE and recommended to withdraw them "since we saw that

7 the bombing was imminent."

8 JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, you heard it, but perhaps you'd like to

9 have a look and see what the witness said. If you can assist us with it,

10 say so. If not, tell us that.

11 Can you put it on the ELMO, please.

12 It should come up on your screen. If you can read it.

13 THE WITNESS: Hardly, I'm afraid, but I can.

14 JUDGE MAY: Normally, witnesses are not asked to comment on what

15 other witnesses have said, but if you can assist with that since the

16 accused has raised it, perhaps you would.

17 THE WITNESS: I -- Your Honour, I don't think that this is in

18 contravention or contradicting what I've said. Of course we were in close

19 touch with NATO, a number of NATO countries, and also NATO as such in the

20 situation that we were having, because NATO was also going to have a role

21 if there would have been a military presence in Kosovo. And we were

22 discussing the military pressure or -- that we were having. This was a

23 part of the discussion before the -- both before the withdrawal but also,

24 of course, before the bombing.

25 As I stated in my replies to the questions asked to me by the

1 Prosecutor, I was under -- I wouldn't call it pressure, but I was asked on

2 repeated occasions to withdraw when it became obvious that we could not

3 fulfil our mandate and when there was a security risk to the members of

4 the monitoring mission. So this -- but I held out as long as I thought

5 that we could do something useful.

6 I think, Your Honours, that the accused is putting this

7 upside-down, actually. The bombing of NATO, or to put it differently, the

8 withdrawal did not facilitate the bombing of NATO -- by NATO. But the

9 bombing by NATO was a consequence of the military actions and the lack of

10 cooperation by Mr. Milosevic and his government. And in a sequence of

11 things that were results of his activities, there was also the withdrawal

12 because we could not do whatever we were supposed to do.

13 So I can honestly state that I was not under any kind of pressure.

14 I knew that if he did not cooperate, the -- there would be bombing because

15 that was public knowledge. And also as the minister of foreign affairs

16 and in a NATO country, I discussed this with other members of NATO, but to

17 my knowledge, there was no fixed date. I could say that it was drawing

18 near, but there was no fixed date. As I stated earlier today, I did not

19 know that the bombing was coming on the 24th of March when I called Mr.

20 Milosevic, but I knew it was evident that it would be coming.

21 So to kind of present the withdrawal as the reasoning or the

22 facilitation of the bombing is to put everything upside-down, Your

23 Honours.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. You, therefore, claim that NATO would have started the bombing

1 even if your mission had stayed in Kosovo; is that it?

2 A. Your Honours, if I -- if I may answer this question in a slightly

3 different way.

4 Mr. Milosevic, you would know even better than I that the greatest

5 damage done to Kosovo is not the NATO bombing. You seem to imply here

6 that NATO caused a lot of damage. Yes, there was some damage. Of course

7 in a war, there is some damage. But I've stated earlier today that I've

8 seen much more damage done by your people in Kosovo during the war

9 situation. But what is more important is that you, your government, your

10 military forces, started forcing people to leave Kosovo a long time before

11 there was a discussion of NATO bombing. No one wanted -- on the 1st of

12 January, when I took over as chairman in office of the OSCE, you will

13 recall at the first meeting we had - even the meeting before in 1998 -

14 that I was aiming at having Yugoslavia back into the OSCE. I thought that

15 I should achieve that in cooperation with you. I reckoned that you would

16 cooperate with the OSCE on the basis of the agreement that was signed

17 between your foreign minister and Professor Geremek in October of 1999 --

18 1998, excuse me. And this was the basis. And then we saw that you did

19 not fulfil your obligations, and your people forced the population to

20 leave and created a situation that we could not be responsible for.

21 We cannot have a situation where you have international

22 communities standing idle in various places and watching atrocities

23 happen. But I think - with Your Honours' permission - that this is what

24 you wanted, Mr. Milosevic. You wanted a small war, a little conflict that

25 was burning on and on, and you were willing to give in a little bit each

1 time we met so that this conflict could be continuing on a kind of

2 back-burner or a small whatever you say in English, a small flame, and you

3 could stay in power. And you were surprised that this was not possible

4 any longer.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the transcript be removed from the ELMO and

6 given back to the accused.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. And are you aware of the fact that most of the sources, including

9 your own, during that period of time noted that most of the violations of

10 the cease-fire, the attacks that were going on and the crimes that were

11 going on were perpetrated in fact by the KLA and that the army and police

12 of Yugoslavia reacted to the attacks launched by the KLA? Are you aware

13 of that?

14 A. No, Your Honours, I am not aware that most of them were

15 perpetrated by KLA.

16 JUDGE MAY: If that is the case, if the sources, as is alleged,

17 support that, that's one of the matters which this Trial Chamber is going

18 to have to determine.

19 Yes. I interrupted you, Mr. Vollebaek.

20 THE WITNESS: That's okay, Your Honour. What I was going to say

21 is actually that this came up in the various conversations I had with

22 Mr. Milosevic, and I am afraid I do not have access to my different papers

23 and reports. I have some of them here, so if you would like, I can go

24 through some of them. But I do recall that in one of the meetings, I

25 think that must have been on the 11th of January, already, or maybe it was

1 later in January, Mr. Milosevic and foreign minister Jovanovic came up

2 with a long list of acts that they thought were committed by the KLA, but

3 I had an equal list. I don't know which one was the longest one, but I

4 had also a lengthy list of atrocities and incidents committed by the

5 Yugoslav forces.

6 But I do recall that in each conversation, Mr. Milosevic stated

7 what he just stated, but it is possible for Your Honours to go back and

8 look into the various OSCE reports. And if you would like to count every

9 incident, you might do that, but I do not think this is -- as I see it --

10 I agree that it's up to Your Honours to make a decision, but as I saw it

11 at that time, this was not the point. The point was that the people in

12 Kosovo didn't feel safe. The people in Kosovo experienced atrocities.

13 And the people in Kosovo was forced to leave.

14 And since Mr. Milosevic was the president at that time, his people

15 were in charge, he was also responsible for the lack of safety for his own

16 people.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. All right, then. Are you aware of the atrocities committed by the

19 KLA from which the Serbs and Albanians suffered and also members of other

20 ethnic groups in Kosovo throughout 1998 and the beginning of 1999, and the

21 intensification of those atrocities - attacks, killings, kidnappings and

22 so on and so forth - by the KLA throughout that period of time? Did you

23 know about that or not?

24 A. Mr. Milosevic, when you say "those atrocities," I think that is

25 not very specific, but I know of some incidents and these incidents were

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1 taken up by KVM, by OSCE, with the Kosovo Albanians, and it was also then

2 condemned.

3 You seem to imply, Mr. Milosevic, that we were one-sided. I will

4 object to that. I was absolutely not one-sided. We wanted to create or

5 continue to have a multi-ethnic Kosovo. And you will recall that I

6 repeatedly stated that I did not want an independent Kosovo. It was not

7 my aim to create a new country in Europe. But we were faced with a

8 situation where people were actually persecuted, I would call it, by what

9 was supposed to be the government, and that was unacceptable to us.

10 Q. All right, Mr. Vollebaek. You have said this morning in response

11 to the questions in chief that I worked for Kosovo as a multi-ethnic

12 community, that it was I who worked for that myself. Is that correct or

13 not?

14 A. Your Honours, I don't think I said you worked for it, but you

15 stated it. I think that is the big difference, Your Honours. You had --

16 you were never for war, as I recall it, you were always talking about

17 peace. You were always talking about ethnicity, Mr. Milosevic. But that

18 doesn't mean that you worked for it because your actions and acts, as I

19 repeatedly told you, and you will recall that, was contrary to peace and

20 to multi-ethnicity because one part of the population of Kosovo were

21 leaving in majority.

22 I think by the -- I don't recall the number, but you had several

23 hundred thousands of Kosovo Albanians that fled Kosovo. So this was not

24 -- this is not a question of what you said, but it's a question of what

25 you did, and that is a big difference to me.

1 Q. Yes. But I hope we will at least agree that this wave of refugees

2 from Kosovo started after the bombing, Mr. Vollebaek. Is that so or not?

3 A. It's not so, Mr. Milosevic. There was a number of refugees, a

4 great number of refugees that left a long time before the bombing started.

5 And as I stated earlier this morning, none of the refugees I met on the

6 border between Kosovo and Albania said that they were fleeing because of

7 the bombing. They all said that they were fleeing because their houses

8 and property were taken over by Serbs, military and non-military, that --

9 some of them claimed that their exodus was organised. I cannot verify

10 that but that was said. But anyway, as I stated earlier today, no one

11 blamed it on the bombing, but all blamed it on Serb actions in Kosovo.

12 Q. All right. We all know what they said. But if I say something,

13 that may not be true; but if they say something, that must be true. Is

14 that what you're implying, Mr. Vollebaek?

15 JUDGE MAY: That is simply a comment.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Please. Those refugees you refer to, you said yourself this

18 morning that you had seen refugees after the beginning of the bombing,

19 both on the Macedonian and on the Albanian border. Is that right?

20 A. That is right.

21 Q. Now, please tell me, when you talk about internally displaced

22 persons who had to be displaced, who left their homes in order to avoid

23 the clashes between our army and the police on the one hand and the KLA on

24 the other, is that in a way reflected in what you said this morning? And

25 you said - I noted it down - "The local population was caught in crossfire

1 between the two forces, the army and the KLA." Is that right?

2 Isn't it logical, then, that in places where the KLA initiates and

3 provokes an attack which is responded to by the army and the police, the

4 civilian population flees in order to avoid the consequences of those

5 clashes?

6 A. Your Honours, I feel that this is -- these questions are rather

7 repetitive, but, yes, there were occasions when there were clashes between

8 KLA and the -- as I know, I was told or it was reported to me, I was not

9 on the ground, but I received reports from KVM about clashes between KLA

10 and the Serb military or police and that the civilians had to flee or

11 leave their houses or villages due to that. But this was not the case

12 during the bombing.

13 And if Your Honours permit me to divert a little bit, because I

14 feel that the accused seems to imply that the refugees were not telling

15 the truth when they met with me and when they left. Maybe in order to

16 create a better impression.

17 I happened to visit Cechnya late, very late in 1999. I was close

18 to Grozny, and I was surrounded by Russian military --

19 Q. Please, Mr. Vollebaek. We don't have time --

20 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness explain. He's going to explain

21 something. Let him do that.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My time is limited, Mr. May. You

23 limited it yourself.

24 JUDGE MAY: I know. We have that in mind. Let the witness

25 explain.

1 THE WITNESS: I shall be as brief as possible. To tell us a

2 little bit about the situation, I was surrounded by Russian military, and

3 there were refugees coming out from Grozny. They knew that there were

4 Russian military around but they were furious against the Russians. They

5 were really angry and told about how this safe corridor was not safe, how

6 they had been attacked and how they were suffering. If NATO bombings had

7 been the reason for these refugees fleeing, why couldn't they have

8 addressed me in the same way and told me face-to-face that you are

9 responsible? They had nothing to gain. They had lost everything, and

10 they had absolutely nothing to gain from pleasing me.

11 So I think it is very important, Mr. Milosevic, that you don't try

12 to undermine the witness that these refugees give, because they all gave

13 the same witness about how they had had to flee due to your actions in

14 Kosovo and not NATO.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. And how many refugees did you talk to that day, Mr. Vollebaek?

17 A. I have absolutely no number to tell you, Mr. Milosevic. I think

18 that is not important at all. I saw thousands of them, and I could pick

19 anyone. I could be there as long as I wanted, there was no one hindering

20 me in talking to anyone. But I spoke to enough to be convinced that they

21 told the truth.

22 Q. I asked you how many refugees you talked to in order to determine

23 such a major fact out of those hundreds of thousands -- dozens of

24 thousands, sorry, you saw that day, as you claim.

25 A. I didn't say dozens of thousands, I said several thousands, first

1 of all. And secondly, in addition to those I spoke to, a number of other

2 people spoke to. We had the OSCE people there, talking to every single

3 one. I didn't speak to them personally. But as I told earlier today, we

4 took down the data, we took down the names and addresses and licence

5 plates that you had actually removed in order for them to lose their

6 identity. We gave them back their identity. So the OSCE representative

7 spoke to everyone that passed through that border post.

8 Q. All right. I won't waste more time. I just want to tell you that

9 I had just quoted notes from official meetings, such as one with Robin

10 Cook in London in spring 1999, at which it was claimed clearly and

11 decidedly that most of the incidents were initiated by the KLA. And there

12 are other sources except the British ones who state the same thing. Are

13 you aware of that or not?

14 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... says about this,

15 and really, too, we're asking him about -- questions about meetings at

16 which he was not present is not going to help. He's given his evidence

17 about what he knew about the KLA.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. All right. You wrote in your statement -- let me read it to you:

20 "There was no doubt that President Milosevic thought it extremely

21 important for Kosovo to stay within Serbia. We felt that the whole time."

22 And so on and so forth. You said I gave you presents of books about

23 Kosovo to prove how Kosovo belonged in Serbia, and churches in Kosovo,

24 about Kosovo being the cradle of Serbian culture. "I thought that that

25 was his personal belief, and he felt very strongly about it." You said a

1 moment ago that I spoke about Kosovo needing to be multi-ethnic or not.

2 Now, tell me, do you believe that Kosovo is or isn't a part of

3 Serbia? I'm not quite clear on what you're saying here.

4 A. Your Honours, I'm not certain if this question is relevant.

5 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can help us by repeating to us what your

6 view was at the time when you were negotiating with Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE WITNESS: You will know that -- Your Honours, that Kosovo had

8 had different status over the years, different status with respect to

9 autonomy. There was no doubt in my mind that we should aim at having

10 Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia, but the constitution of Kosovo had changed

11 several times over the last years or decades, and there was a disagreement

12 between the government in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leaders whether

13 Kosovo was actually a part of Serbia as such. As you know, the Federal

14 Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of several republics.

15 I found at that time that it was important for me to state that I

16 didn't want to divide the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I didn't want

17 an independent state of Kosovo. But the role of Kosovo without -- within

18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia I left somewhat open. And I understood

19 and thought that it might be given some more autonomy than what it had at

20 that time.

21 I guess that one would say -- I must admit that I have not studied

22 the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbia lately,

23 but my understanding was that the latest constitution implied that Kosovo

24 was a part of Serbia, but that was then disputed by Kosovo Albanian

25 leaders.

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1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. And do you know, Mr. Vollebaek, that under all constitutions since

3 the autonomous province was in existence, that is since the Second World

4 War until today's constitution, Kosovo has always been a part of Serbia.

5 And certainly before the Second World War too, Kosovo was part of Serbia.

6 Are you aware of that?

7 A. Your Honours, I'm not certain what this implies. Even if, Your

8 Honours, one should admit that Serbia was an integral -- that Kosovo was

9 an integral part of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic was under -- or there were a

10 number of international agreements that entitled the population to use the

11 language, to be able to continue having cultural activities and to have

12 schools, universities, and these things were taken away from them. Even

13 if a province is an integral part of your country, that doesn't entitle

14 the president to make atrocities against the population in that part of

15 the country.

16 Q. And you believe that at a certain stage the Albanians at Kosovo

17 were deprived of the right to use their language, to promote their

18 culture, publish their newspapers, et cetera.

19 Could you please tell me, at what stage did that happen? When

20 were they deprived of that right and were they deprived of it?

21 JUDGE MAY: We are now getting far from the witness's evidence.

22 He deals with 1999. Also, there's a meeting with you in 1993 if you want

23 to ask him about that.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask him about anything and

25 everything within the strict limits that you have imposed on me. All of

1 these are important issues, Mr. May.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. So since you are saying that they were deprived of something, did

4 it ever happen from World War II until 1999, or at the time when you were

5 involved in Yugoslav issues, did it ever happen that Albanians in Kosovo

6 were deprived of the right to use their languages, have their own

7 institutions, have their own newspapers, cultural societies and so on and

8 so forth, and to use their own language in all official communications?

9 A. Your Honours, if I may, then, refer to my period, if I may call it

10 that, 1999. There was no doubt that this was the main reason for the

11 conflict. The Kosovo Albanians felt that they were deprived of the right

12 to use the language, they were deprived of their right to -- to have their

13 own educational system. This was one of the main issues that I was

14 discussing with Mr. Rugova. And there is no doubt, Your Honours, that

15 there was a radicalisation on the Kosovo Albanian side, precisely because

16 of the attitude taken by Mr. Milosevic.

17 I -- the first time I met with Mr. Rugova, I think, was in April

18 1998 when I at the same time more or less had a first meeting with Mr.

19 Milosevic when I was foreign minister, and there was quite a development,

20 as I saw it, in Mr. Rugova's attitude from that time and when I met him

21 again in 1999 because of the deterioration of the situation and the

22 pressure he was under. He was not able to be as forthcoming, as open, as

23 - what shall I say? - moderate as he was in 1998 when I met him again in

24 1999 precisely because of the activities taken by Mr. Milosevic and his

25 government.

1 Q. All right. Tell me, then, since it is obvious that we have no

2 time to establish that kind of facts, after such a precedent that was made

3 making NATO in charge of the OSCE, is it possible at all for this

4 organisation to have any kind of credibility?

5 JUDGE MAY: There's no need to answer the question generally, but

6 what is being suggested is that NATO was in charge of the OSCE.

7 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, with all due respect, this is nonsense.

8 I mean, I happened to be a foreign minister of a NATO country, but I dealt

9 with all the 53 members of the OSCE, and we -- as you know, the OSCE is an

10 organisation that works on the basis of consensus. And we had to agree on

11 whatever action we took and whatever attitude we had. And one of my

12 closest allies or - what shall I say? - advisors in this period was the

13 foreign minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, with whom I dealt with a lot

14 because we knew, or hoped, that Russia had an influence in Belgrade.

15 Maybe they didn't have as much as we hoped for and thought, but anyway, we

16 were working closely with them. So to imply that NATO was in charge of

17 the OSCE is, as I said, Your Honour, with all due respect, nonsense.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. All right. And what about ideas -- and let us now divert from the

20 area of management in the strict sense. Did the ideas of European --

21 could the ideas of European security and cooperation be more compromised

22 than they actually were compromised by virtue of the fact that this

23 organisation played a role in the bombing of a part of European territory

24 and was party to a crime committed against a European country?

25 JUDGE MAY: We have already dealt fully with this, and this is not

1 the place, as you know quite well, for political speeches. Now, what is

2 your next question?

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. All right. Since you now live in the United States where you are

5 the Norwegian ambassador, did you perhaps have occasion to acquaint

6 yourself with the position of a very renowned American which says -- who

7 says: [In English] "Constituents --"

8 JUDGE MAY: If we are going to have the views of various

9 journalists, I think there's little point going into it.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not views of

11 various journalists. This is the position of Walter J. Rockler, expressed

12 and published, and this man was a Prosecutor in Nuremberg, a famous

13 American humanist and lawyer.

14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. It's not the view of a journalist, it's

15 the view of a Prosecutor from Nuremberg. With due respect, it is equally

16 irrelevant.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I would like to hear the answer

18 of Mr. Vollebaek --

19 JUDGE MAY: His opinion, too, on the opinion of the Prosecutor

20 would be equally irrelevant. Now, ask some other questions about his

21 evidence.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But this has a direct impact on the

23 essence of his testimony about the role of the NATO, and I don't know why

24 you are against it if it would take only a few seconds.

25 JUDGE MAY: If you want to put something about the role of NATO,

1 you can. But you're not going to ask him about the views of other people,

2 which are simply that, views.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll assume that as my

4 own view and then I'll ask him if he agrees with my opinion.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. The attack on Yugoslavia constitutes the most brazen international

7 aggression [In English] attack to --

8 JUDGE MAY: No. This is irrelevant. As you know quite well,

9 Mr. Milosevic, this is the issue which the Trial Chamber are going to have

10 to determine, and this witness's views as to the views of Mr. Rockler are

11 totally irrelevant.

12 Now, have you questions about the evidence or not? If not, we'll

13 bring this cross-examination to a close.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have very many questions, as you

15 very well know, Mr. May, and I will continue with my cross-examination.

16 But you are not interested in the views of others. I can see that. I

17 don't know if you are interested at all in the opinion of the people of

18 Norway, of young people or citizens of democratic countries who do not

19 share at all --

20 JUDGE MAY: The views of young people are equally irrelevant.

21 Now, let us get down to the questions about this witness's evidence. He

22 gave evidence about meetings with you, and if you've got some questions

23 about it, you should ask. Particularly if you want to challenge his

24 account; you should put it into him.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, allow me, please, to put

1 the questions that I believe appropriate, and of course I will contest a

2 lot of what has been said here. And I am not in doubt that he will easily

3 convince you, but he cannot convince even the people of his own country as

4 to the role of NATO.

5 JUDGE MAY: Now, if you have a question, ask it and stop making

6 speeches.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Let us follow up on this briefly. Since you were trying to

10 convince me to continue negotiations and to enable some sort of

11 international presence, did you understand that to mean exclusively the

12 presence of military forces led by NATO and commanded by NATO? Did you

13 imply only that when you used the term "international presence"? Is that

14 right or not?

15 A. I -- we were discussing, for instance, with Russia to participate

16 in the military presence. As you will know, Your Honours, Russia also

17 participated in the Rambouillet talks, and the basis for the -- for the

18 military presence would be the Rambouillet agreement.

19 Q. Please. I am not asking you about somebody's symbolic

20 involvement. I'm asking you very directly: When you said "international

21 presence," did you mean exclusively military forces commanded and led by

22 NATO? Yes or no.

23 A. Your Honour, it is difficult to answer Mr. Milosevic. That is

24 nothing new to me because he -- Mr. Milosevic, this is what we have been

25 doing time and again when we were talking together. I clearly said I

1 meant more than just NATO presence. You heard me say that. And you then

2 imply your twist or whatever or interpret what I'm saying. And, well, I

3 said yes, I meant more than NATO.

4 Q. So some force under the command of the UN or OSCE not commanded by

5 NATO. Is that what you're saying now?

6 A. Mr. Milosevic, due to the fact that you behaved the way you did,

7 we never came to the point where we could discuss how we should organise

8 this. If you had been willing to participate in the negotiations, this

9 could have been dealt with and we would have avoided a major war and a lot

10 of suffering of people.

11 We were -- we wanted whatever action to be taken under the

12 umbrella of the United Nations, of the OSCE, but we knew that, for

13 instance, the OSCE did not have enough -- or this is not a military

14 organisation so we had to call on others to assist us in order for us to

15 do whatever we were going to do. And this military assistance would have

16 probably to have been a strong NATO component but not exclusively NATO.

17 Q. And it would not have been under the command of NATO, and it would

18 not have been led by NATO; is that what you're saying?

19 A. Your Honours, I think it's irrelevant to discuss whatever would

20 have been. We are discussing, to my knowledge -- or I'm giving witness

21 what happened, not what would have happened if other things had happened.

22 JUDGE MAY: Just so we can understand the position, when you were

23 discussing the use of a military presence with the accused, did you make

24 it plain that it was more than NATO that you had in mind?

25 THE WITNESS: What I do recall -- I must admit, Your Honour, that

1 I do not recall details of the conversation. First of all, I had several

2 and also sometimes I got little bit carried away because I got, I must

3 admit, angry, so I do not recall everything I said. But what I do recall

4 very strongly was that I said and insisted that this military presence

5 should be on the invitation by the government of Yugoslavia. It was --

6 Mr. Milosevic would have a role to play in this. He could look at whoever

7 was part of it if he would have been willing to participate and discuss

8 this with us. But there was never a discussion, because he said there was

9 no question of any foreign military presence. He didn't refer to NATO, he

10 referred to foreign military presence. I never thought -- I don't think I

11 had an opportunity to discuss whether it should be NATO or non-NATO

12 because the mere fact of a military presence was unacceptable to him.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Please. Are you aware of the fact, for instance, that on the 28th

15 of February the Russian agency ITAR-Tass was reporting from Rambouillet,

16 that the Contact Group may offer, as a compromise, an option under which

17 the UN, the OSCE, and so on, and it also mentions flags other than NATO,

18 and that France press agency said that the Serbian delegation insisted on

19 that very day that the issue of peacekeepers should be resolved in such a

20 way that peacekeepers be responsible to a body such as the OSCE or the

21 United Nations? Are you aware of that?

22 A. No. I do not recall that ITAR-Tass report.

23 Q. All right. Very well, then. Now, as all this was contained in

24 documents and cannot be contested, do you happen to remember in this

25 regard the statement made by Madeleine Albright on the very next day, and

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1 she said the following: [In English] "We accept nothing less than

2 complete, including NATO-led forces. The United States' position is that

3 it has to be a NATO-led force. That is the basis of our participation in

4 it."

5 [Interpretation] That is her statement. And then two days later,

6 she repeated that position at a press conference, and I'm going to quote:

7 [In English] "It was asked earlier when we were all together whether the

8 force would be anything different than a NATO-led force. I can just tell

9 you point blank from the perspective of the United States, absolutely not.

10 It must be NATO-led forces."

11 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What is the relevance of any of this

12 to the witness?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance lies in the fact that

14 what is talked about here is some sort of peace operations, alleged ones,

15 whereas in fact what is being spoken of is the NATO occupation of Kosovo.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. And judging by the agreement on implementation, this would have

18 meant in fact NATO's occupation of Yugoslavia as a whole. Is that correct

19 or not?

20 A. Your Honours, I think this is irrelevant, but I -- of course there

21 was no question of an occupation. I -- as I have stated earlier, I

22 insisted that this should be and had to be on the invitation of the

23 government of Belgrade, because we could not have a military presence

24 there on the ground without the consent of the government of Belgrade.

25 So this is -- but I feel, Your Honours, that the accused is trying

1 to make a kind of new case here. And with all due respect, I must say I

2 feel that this is beyond what I have stated in my written witness.

3 JUDGE MAY: Would you let us be the judges of that.

4 THE WITNESS: I will. I will ask you for your advice then, Your

5 Honour.

6 JUDGE MAY: We will decide what's relevant and what isn't. As you

7 appreciate, this accused is representing himself, and therefore he has to

8 have some leeway.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Now, have you got any other questions which

10 do relate to this witness?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know why you keep asking me

12 that question. You've given me two hours, so I will use that time, those

13 two short hours, Mr. May, to ask my questions.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Do you know -- are you aware as you've been -- Norway was a member

16 of NATO from the very beginning. Although you tried to endeavour to play

17 a neutral role, you weren't able to do that. Are you aware of the defence

18 planning guidance, 1994 to 1999, Pentagon's --

19 JUDGE MAY: No. No. I think we've really heard enough on this

20 topic of NATO's role, and I'm going to stop any more questions about it.

21 The witness has been answering questions about this for an hour and more.

22 Now, you have not yet asked him questions about the meetings which

23 you had, and in the next hour which you have, I suggest you do, because

24 that's what his evidence was about.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Vollebaek, Mr. May, is here --

1 actually, in his testimony here, he said that as the foreign minister, he

2 was included and involved in the activities of NATO, of which Norway is a

3 member. And I think I do have the right --

4 JUDGE MAY: You have -- what you have is the right to ask the

5 witness questions, as you have done, for an hour on this topic. But what

6 you don't have the right to do is to abuse the time of the Court and the

7 process by continually going over the same topic over and over again and

8 trying to score points.

9 Now, your cross-examination should from now on go on to other

10 topics, that is, other than NATO.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, there is just one topic

12 here and that is the crime committed against Yugoslavia and the attempt to

13 cover up that crime with an evasive --

14 JUDGE MAY: You are here to ask the witness questions and not to

15 make these speeches. Now, then, unless you have any more questions, this

16 cross-examination will be brought to an end.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask a question now, please,

18 Mr. May?

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. As Minister, as I was saying, were you aware of -- did you know

22 about this position, the position that said therefore, it is of

23 fundamental importance [In English] to preserve NATO as primary --

24 JUDGE MAY: I have ruled that as irrelevant and time-wasting.

25 Now, you are to move on from NATO. You've spent an hour on NATO.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. And, Mr. Vollebaek, do you know about this, something that was

3 written by George Kenney, who was --

4 JUDGE MAY: No. Who was Mr. Kenney? I forget. We've had him

5 before. I think he's a journalist, but I may be wrong.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He was an American diplomat.

7 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Quite right. He was an American diplomat.

8 But I'm not going to allow you to put these questions in which you ask

9 witnesses about the opinions of various people. These opinions are

10 totally irrelevant to the Trial Chamber, and therefore the witness's

11 answer to them would equally be irrelevant.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, what I'm dealing with is

13 facts, this particular fact which indicates the nature of those simulated

14 negotiations, so-called negotiations at Rambouillet, because this official

15 from America says the following: "We intentionally set the bar too high

16 for the Serbs to comply."

17 JUDGE MAY: One matter is this before we go into it: Do you --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And this was confirmed and borne

19 out --

20 JUDGE MAY: Did you have any connection with the negotiations at

21 Rambouillet?

22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, as chairman in office then of the OSCE,

23 I participated at some of the meetings as an observer. It was dealt with,

24 as you may know, by the Contact Group, but in my capacity then I was

25 invited in. So I did participate in two or three meetings, if I recall

1 correctly, a couple of meetings in Rambouillet and then one when it was

2 moved after the break.

3 But, Your Honours, since Mr. Milosevic referred to this as

4 something that was imposed on him, I think I would like to state, with

5 your permission, that up to the break the Serb delegation actively

6 participated in the negotiations and actually were part of whatever

7 agreement was reached. So it is again wrong to pretend that this was

8 imposed on them. They later changed their mind and they later said they

9 would not go along with it, but in my meeting with Mr. Milosevic, I guess

10 it was then on the 1st of March, in this break, we were discussing the

11 Rambouillet agreement, and he did what he seems to do now, kind of

12 distance himself from it. And I had to remind him that his delegation had

13 been actively participating in the negotiations.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. That's precisely what I'm saying, I'm claiming, and participated

16 with goodwill at that, Mr. Vollebaek, in the negotiations, and accepted a

17 political solution, but not the occupation of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vollebaek.

18 Are you aware of that? Do you know if that was so or not?

19 JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that unless you want to.

20 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, again I'm a little bit uncertain, but

21 yes, the Serb delegation participated in the negotiations. I felt there

22 was a change in their attitude when this break came up. And all along it

23 was very important for us from the OSCE side to make sure that there was a

24 military presence precisely because of the activities beforehand of

25 Mr. Milosevic. I realised that I could not be responsible for a new

1 civilian mission without -- without the military presence to support this

2 mission.

3 And to put this bluntly, Your Honours, this was because I didn't

4 trust Mr. Milosevic. I didn't trust that he would comply. He did not

5 comply with the agreement we had signed in October 1998, so why should he

6 comply with a new agreement? And I could not be responsible for putting

7 civilians there that I had seen could not do what they were supposed to do

8 in a new situation. That would be ridiculous, first of all, and then --

9 well, not first of all. I guess first of all, it would not help the

10 people, and secondly it would be ridiculous. And that's why --

11 THE INTERPRETE